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DEFEND REBUILD AND ADVANCE
THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC FREEDOM!

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ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER AND RE-DESIGN

DISCUSSION DOCUMENTS



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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is a socialist political party leading the economic emancipation movement in South Africa since its establishment in the year 2013. When measured against political parties founded post the 1994 first inclusive elections in South Africa, the EFF has recorded tremendous quantitative and qualitative growth. The EFF effectively outdid all political organisations founded post-1994 in terms of rapid quantitative expansion and qualitative contributions to South Africa's political, ideological and parliamentary discourse. In its few years of existence the EFF has registered numerous organisational, political, ideological and economic victories. These range from real impact on the lives of ordinary people in various corners of South Africa, to determining and guiding the country's political discourse.
2. The strength of the EFF as a political party that intends taking over government is, however, not adequate when measured against its own potential and capacity to grow. In a country, the foundation of whose economy is super-exploitation and oppression of the working class and black people in general, the EFF as the only credible dependable instrument in the hands of the working class ought to have an impact on society much bigger than it is at present. To comprehend this, the political and organisational strength of the EFF must not be measured against political parties with no clear intention, agenda and programme to take over political power and advance society towards a socialist and pan Africanist alternative.
3. The EFF must measure its strength against its own genuine working class bias agenda and program vis-a-vi the objective conditions for the rise of socialist collective consciousness and revolution. We must ask, how is it that the living conditions of the working class have worsened in terms of levels of unemployment, poverty and service delivery, yet the organisational strength and presence of the EFF has not exponentially grown, instead shows signs of stagnation or decline.
4. The EFF is a Pan-African political movement for socialism - and its comprehension and appreciation of socialism is locatable within the ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism and Fanonian thought. What distinguishes Marxist scientific socialism to what is known as utopian socialism is its commitment to political action. When scientific socialism was distinguished from utopian socialism, the 1st International's resolution

on working class organisation said; “considering that against this collective power of the propertied classes the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied classes... that this constitution of the working class into a political party is indispensable in order to ensure the triumph of the social revolution and its ultimate end - the abolition of classes”.

5. This formulation represents the principle that should guide the life of political parties representing the working class in a capitalist society. And the central kernel in this formulation is the claim that the “working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied classes”. The EFF is a political party of the working class, and it ought, and should as such distinguish itself from parties of the propertied classes, meaning those parties that seek to protect the nationalist bourgeoisie political order of the last 30 years in South Africa.
6. This Organisational Re-design Discussion Document is styled as an organic contribution to how the EFF ought and should be positioned as an impactful socialist political party of the working class. It must position itself as a party that must win political power from those who have it now in favour of inaugurating economic freedom in our lifetime. In so doing the document will focus on the following areas;
 - a. What is the Economic Freedom Fighters?
 - b. What is an ideal Organisation, the Economic Freedom Fighters?
 - c. What should define a Central Command Team of the EFF?
 - d. What should define a Province of the EFF?
 - e. What should define a Region of the EFF?
 - f. What should define a Sub-Region of the EFF?
 - g. What should define a Branch of the EFF?
 - h. What is the current state of the Economic Freedom Fighters?
 - i. What must be avoided?
 - j. Organisational re-design
 - k. Specific Constitutional Amendment Provisions.
7. The aim of this Organisational Character and Re-design discussion document is to provide a framework for the establishment of an organisation that is capable of mobilising all social forces behind the struggle for economic freedom, win political power, govern and lead a

political Pan-Africanist programme to decolonise the African continent in its entirety. To achieve such, the EFF must not be a clone of any of the existing or pre-existing organisations. The EFF ought and should be a modern post-colonial revolutionary mass organisation that maximally appreciates the new technological developments/innovations and communication platforms, without de-centring the need for direct grassroots organising, mobilisation, education and agitation. The document aims to build an organisation that will win over mass power, take political power and reclaim the economy on behalf of the working class and property-less majority.

B. WHAT IS THE EFF? THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE EFF

8. As a revolutionary mass and ideologically grounded organisation, the EFF has several manifestations, yet retains a singularity of purpose. This means that despite being a single organisation, the EFF manifests itself in different forms in the same way anti-colonial political parties manifested themselves as liberation movements, mass movements, underground movements, civil organisations, and armed liberation forces. To completely understand the EFF as an organisation, it is important to understand it in all its manifestations. Accordingly, the EFF manifestations include:
 - i. **THE ORGANISATIONAL MANIFESTATION.**
 - ii. **THE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MANIFESTATION.**
 - iii. **THE MASS MOVEMENT MANIFESTATION.**
 - iv. **THE GOVERNANCE MANIFESTATION.**
 - v. **THE PAN-AFRICANIST AND INTERNATIONALIST MANIFESTATION.**
 - vi. **THE EFF STUDENTS' COMMAND MANIFESTATION.**

The Organisational Manifestation of the EFF

9. The EFF Founding Manifesto, adopted at the National Assembly of the 26th and 27th of July 2013 says, correctly that the, **"ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS is a radical and militant economic emancipation movement that brings together revolutionary, fearless, radical, and militant activists, workers' movements, non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and lobby groups under the umbrella of pursuing the struggle for economic emancipation"**. Despite bringing all these streams together, the EFF is a membership-based organisation, meaning that each and every person who joins the EFF, joins as an individual and is

bound by its Constitution, Code of Revolutionary Discipline and upholds the non-negotiable pillars and principles enshrined in the Founding Manifesto.

- 10.** The Constitution of the EFF establishes structures of the organisation under the principle of Democratic Centralism. Currently, the EFF has individual members who should necessarily belong to a ward-based branch as demarcated by the Demarcation Board. Each branch of the EFF is required to have a minimum of 100 members before it can convene a Branch People's Assembly (BPA) to elect a fifteen (15) member Branch Command Team (BCT), that includes a Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Treasurer and ten (10) additional members.
- 11.** A branch must establish a Voting District Coordinating Committee to oversee the work of the EFF at a VD level and each VDCC must have a minimum of 10 members. Each BCTs has a term of twenty-four (24) months in office and is responsible for coordination of EFF work at ward level, mostly recruitment and induction of members, as well as campaigns.
- 12.** As of January 2024, the EFF had branches in not less than 90% of South Africa's officially demarcated wards, meaning that the organisation had a minimum of hundred (100) members in 90% of the demarcated wards in South Africa. All branches convene BPAs, and once 90% of branches were launched in a region (demarcated as District or Metropolitan Municipalities), they convene a Regional People's Assembly (RPA) to elect a twenty-one (21) member Regional Command Team (RCT). RPAs happen at three (3) year intervals and are attended by delegates from all branches on the basis of minimum 50% representation. Currently, the EFF has offices, addresses and staff members in fifty-three (53) regions of South Africa, and these provide administrative support to members and branches of the EFF on a daily basis.
- 13.** When all regions have convened their RPAs, and when 90% of wards in a province have been launched and elected their branch leadership, the province convenes a Provincial People's Assembly (PPA) to elect a twenty-one (21) member Provincial Command Team (PCT). PCTs of the EFF are constituted of the twenty-one (21) directly elected members and the regional chairpersons and secretaries elected in the RPAs. PPAs happen at four (4) year intervals and are responsible for EFF work at provincial level and provide constant support to regions. Members of the

PCT are allocated regions which they provide constant support to on all organisational and political matters.

- 14.** The highest decision-making body in the EFF is the National People's Assembly (NPA), which is convened once every five (5) years. The 2nd NPA took place in December 2019 in Johannesburg and was attended by elected delegates from all provinces and regions. The NPA elects a Central Command Team (CCT), which becomes the highest decision-making body in between NPAs and meets on a quarterly basis to receive reports from all regions and provinces to determine the next course of action. The 1st meeting of the CCT elects a fifteen (15) member War Council, whose responsibilities include constant evaluation of the work done and determination of the next course of action in between CCT meetings.
- 15.** The organisational manifestation of the EFF must be tested in relation to electoral outcomes, particularly at a Ward and Voting District level. Accordingly, out of 4,468 wards, the organisation received 0 votes in 1 ward in the 2019 National and Provincial Elections (NPE). In 2024 none of the wards received 0 votes, which is a decrease of 1 ward compared to the 2019. However, put against the recorded membership base of the organisation, the EFF received less than 100 votes in 700 wards in the 2019 NPE, and received less than 100 votes in 1 156 wards in 2024; an increase of 456 wards as compared to the 2019 NPE. In 2019, the organisation had 399 voting stations with zero votes. This number increased in 2024, to 560 voting stations; an increase of 161 VDs with zero (0) EFF votes.
- 16.** This is why the Central Command Team (CCT) decided that the delegation towards the EFF 3rd NPA will be attended by ward delegates who come from wards where the EFF received at least 10% of the votes on any ballot of the 2024 NPE. This signifies the change in perspective that only electoral outcomes are the genuine test of whether the EFF exists in a specific area or not.
- 17.** The organisational praxis of the EFF constitutes a key part of its character as a socialist economic emancipation political party. This is significantly captured in Section 6 of the EFF Constitution which outlines EFF's 7 Organisational Principles. These principles if adhered to, keep the EFF as a disciplined organ of working class power that will survive any of its individual personalities. The guarantee that in its everyday life, the EFF is

always a collective acting in the interests of its socialist mission. These principles are as follows:

- a. (1) **Elected and collective leadership:** (a) All leaders of the EFF are democratically and transparently elected in People's Assemblies and should always work as a collective. (b) Collective leadership means that all leaders of the EFF should carry the obligation to consult the collective before engaging in activities and programmes that have organisational consequences and must not act in silos.
- b. (2) **Powers of the NPA:**
 - i. (a) The NPA is the highest decision-making body of the EFF and all programmes and resolutions adopted at the NPA guide the organisation until the next NPA.
 - ii. (b) The CCT, PPAs, PCTs, RPAs, RCTs, BPAs, BCTs, and all members must be guided by the core thrust of the resolutions of the NPA.
 - iii. (c) The CCT is the highest decision-making body in between NPAs.
 - iv. (d) The NPA is the only assembly that can amend and adopt the Constitution.
- c. (3) **Democratic Centralism:** (a) Democratic centralism refers to the practice of democratic consultation and engagements before decisions are adopted and once adopted, they are binding on all members and structures of the organisation. The key and non-negotiable themes under democratic centralism are:
 - i. The majority rules over the minority, and once the majority has taken a decision, there is no expression of minority reports and perspectives that contradict the adopted positions.
 - ii. Decisions of upper structures are binding on all lower structures and should be implemented and adhered to without any form of defiance.
 - iii. Once decisions are adopted, they are binding on all members and structures.
- d. (4) **Mandates, Accountability And Reporting:** Once members are mandated tasks, they must fulfil the mandate. Whoever is given a

responsibility at all levels of the organisation and in deployments is obliged to account for and report on the mandated work. After every meeting, each member of the EFF participating in or belonging to the command team should have absolute clarity on what is expected from them over what period of time.

- e. (5) **Constructive Criticism And Self-Criticism:** From time to time, members and structures of the EFF should engage in constructive criticism and self-criticism, meaning they should openly and honestly review the work they do and avoid all forms of boastfulness and self-glorification over minor achievements. The people's assemblies, CCT, PCTs, RCTs, BCTs, deployed cadres and members should periodically review the work they are doing against their own set targets.

They should always ask whether they have taken the correct decisions, whether they have achieved what they intended to achieve within the time periods they decided on.

- f. (6) **Discipline and Hard Work:**

- i. (a) Discipline in a revolution is not a side issue, it is an essential ingredient and component of what the EFF seeks to achieve. Without discipline and hard work, all the objectives and aspirations of the EFF will not be achieved. Discipline means utmost adherence to organisational resolutions and programmes. Discipline means punctuality in fulfilling organisational mandates. Discipline means that members and leaders must be able to publicly own up to everything they do in private.
- ii. (b) Hard work means that in addition to fulfilling mandates, leaders are willing to go the extra mile and do constructive and organisational tasks that seek to improve, enhance and harness the organisation.

- g. (7) **Selflessness, Loyalty to the Organisation and Love for One Another:**

- i. (a) Selflessness means that members and leaders perform tasks and mandates without expecting financial benefits, promotions or recognition. Selflessness means members and leaders do not claim individual victory for collective work or for

work they did in service of the revolution. Selflessness means that instead of heaping individual praise and worship, members and leaders must always make the organisation shine.

- ii. (b) Loyalty to the organisation means that at all times, members and leaders will not keep quiet when the organisation is unfairly criticised and attacked in private and in public. Loyalty to the organisation means that members will remain active members even when removed from positions of responsibility or deployment. Loyalty means members of the EFF will not join in the opposing and opponent forces who unfairly criticise the organisation and its leadership.
- iii. (c) Love for one another means that all members and leaders should always look after each other and should not amass privileges and wealth when other members of the organisation are living in poverty and suffering.

18. In the course of development in many organisations of the Left, failure to adhere to these principles leads to destruction. Many of the challenges that lead to dysfunctionality and phenomena such as factionalism and cult of personality that have weakened Left political parties in history can be defeated through a patient and consistent application of the organisational principles above.

The Ideological and Political Manifestation of the EFF

19. The ideological perspective of the EFF is outlined in its Founding Manifesto, which outlines the key historical challenges of the oppressed peoples of the South Africa. The Founding Manifesto is one of the most important ideological contributions to South Africa's political struggles and should be read in the general context of continuation of the ideas and struggles of the oppressed in the world. Historical documents such as the Communist Manifesto and the Freedom Charter serve as its key ideological inspirations.
20. The EFF Founding Manifesto says **“the EFF is a radical, leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement with an internationalist outlook anchored by popular grassroots formations and struggles. The EFF will be the vanguard of community and workers’ struggles and will always be on the**

side of the people. The EFF will, with determination and consistency, associate with the protest movement in South Africa and will also join in struggles that defy unjust laws".

21. The EFF Founding Manifesto adds that **"the EFF draws inspiration from the broad Marxist-Leninist tradition and Fanonian schools of thought in their analyses of the state, imperialism, culture and class contradictions in every society. Through organic engagement and a constant relationship with the masses, Economic Freedom Fighters provide clear and cogent alternatives to the current neo-colonial economic system, which in many countries keeps the oppressed under colonial domination and subject to imperialist exploitation"**.
22. In addition, Section 3 of the EFF Constitution lays out the Character of the EFF in the following unequivocal terms: **"(1) The Economic Freedom Fighters is an economic emancipation political movement which seeks to act in the interest of all South Africans, Africans and people of the world, striving for socialism and ECONOMIC EMANCIPATION IN OUR LIFETIME. (2) The EFF takes socialism as the theoretical basis guiding its thinking and development of its political line and identifies itself as a MARXIST, LENINIST and FANONIAN organisation. (3) The basic programme of the EFF is the complete overthrow of the neo liberal antiblack state as well as the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, the establishment of the dictatorship of the people in place of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the triumph of socialism over capitalism. The ultimate aim of the EFF is the realisation of socialism through people's power and the establishment of a state that responds to the needs of its people. (4) The EFF is anti-capitalist, anti-racism, anti-sexist and anti-imperialist in its world outlook and is driven by sound democratic socialist values where the leadership is accountable to the members who elected it. (5) The EFF is a vanguard mass organisation leading the revolutionary masses in the fight against the capitalist class enemy.**
23. Of course, there is a litany of prejudices, misconceptions and falsehoods that are associated with the EFF's ideological tools of analysis and guide to action. Many organisations that uphold Marxism-Leninism are often associated with the degenerated workers' states and autocracies that came to define Eastern Europe for a great part of the 20th century. This, however, does not negate the fact that Marxism-Leninism constitutes a body of ideas, thoughts, and propositions that can sustain a modern political movement.

24. As explained in *The Coming Revolution*, “by adopting Marxist-Leninist-Fanonian thought, EFF is placed in the unique position to articulate black demands without shame or hesitation. EFF is not wobbled by concerns of what the white section of the anti-capitalist tradition thinks or feels, but it places black liberation at the core of its endeavours while extending an invitation to all peoples and races to participate in the struggle for economic emancipation for all. Accepting the uniqueness of the African experience liberates the language that shapes the demands that the EFF makes and the claims it presses against oppression. The meeting of Marx, Lenin and Fanon is the most wholesome development in the history of struggle against imperialism, capitalism and racism. This... may be recognised by generations of fighters to come as the most important gem of liberation”.
25. *The Coming Revolution* further elaborates that, “[T]he Marxist-Leninist tools of analysis and guide to action dictate that, as a movement, the EFF is fighting for socialism and there is no doubt about that”. Furthermore, “The scientific socialism EFF ascribes to should necessarily lead to the development of the productive forces, and ensure greater workers’ control of the economy, and we have no hesitation about saying that. There are various interpretations and even distortions of what Deng Xiaoping meant, but an observation he made that “Socialism means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism, still less communism” is correct.
26. The EFF is required to thoroughly understand the nature and character of South African capitalism in order to know what kind of an animal we are dealing with in the struggle for socialism. Through the writings of Karl Marx we come to appreciate that South African is a capitalist society where the means of production are in service of the rich minority and their imperialist principals. We understand that the markets, due to their anarchy and general chaos of the pursuit of profit for profit's sake, are incapable of developing a country's collective productive forces. Above all they have proven incapable in eliminating inequality, and guarantee human freedom. A struggle must be waged to inaugurate a society in which the means of production are in service of people's needs, and not profit.
27. In the writings of Vladimir Lenin we draw on principles of building organisational power for a socialist overthrow of the capitalist

establishment. And from Frantz Fanon we draw an understanding of racism, and are able to identify the racist character of 21st century capitalism in the post-colonial era, including how bourgeoisie nationalism is embedded with neo-colonial capitalism.

28. The EFF's usage of Marxist-Leninist-Fanonian tools of analysis and guides to action constitute an elementary feature of the struggle for economic freedom in our lifetime. Replacement of these tools of analysis will subject our movement to a shapeless organisation, only obsessed with the attainment of political power with no real transformation of the state and society for the benefit of the working class. For the EFF, Marxist-Leninist-Fanonian tools of analysis and guide to action are not dogma, but ideological instruments that will guarantee our movement mass, political and economic victory over the bourgeoisie.
29. The **EFF Founding Manifesto** clearly spells out the non-negotiable cardinal pillars in the war for economic emancipation. These pillars are a frame that holds the organisation together and are equally important. These are pillars that will never be negotiated. It is their realisation that will constitute victory of the economic emancipation struggle. The reason why these pillars are non-negotiable is because the EFF exists for a generational purpose. Whatever additional solutions the EFF collective provide should seek to attain the seven (7) non-negotiable cardinal pillars.
30. Politically, the EFF appreciates that there were many struggles for emancipation before its existence in 2012. In the relay race of the anti-colonial and anti-capitalist struggle, the EFF represents a generation that has picked up the baton and is running towards the finish line. The first generation are those that resisted colonial occupation, followed by those that fought against colonial rule and expansion, followed by those who fought for inclusion, and we, the EFF, are a generation that is fighting for the return of the land, the wealth and bring it in service of the working class.

31. The attainment of ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN OUR LIFETIME is our strategic mission. Towards this, we have identified 7 (seven) Non-Negotiable Cardinal Pillars for Economic Freedom In Our Lifetime. These are:
- a. Expropriation of South Africa's land without compensation for equal redistribution in use.
 - b. Nationalisation of mines, banks, and other strategic sectors of the economy, without compensation.
 - c. Building state and government capacity, which will lead to the abolishment of tenders.
 - d. Free quality education, healthcare, houses, and sanitation.
 - e. Massive protected industrial development to create millions of sustainable jobs, including the introduction of minimum wages in order to close the wage gap between the rich and the poor, close the apartheid wage gap and promote rapid career paths for Africans in the workplace.
 - f. Massive development of the African economy and advocating for a move from reconciliation to justice in the entire continent.
 - g. Open, accountable, corrupt-free government and society without fear of victimisation by state agencies.
32. The EFF strategic mission is therefore attainment of these goals, and in the progression towards the attainment of these, the EFF will take tactical decisions, some of which will appear as not immediately revolutionary. The ultimate realisation of these goals will come with the attainment of political power, and pursuit of political power requires superior tactics and the capacity to win the people over to the side of the revolutionary forces.
33. EFF elections manifestos, policies and articulations that are not contained in the **Founding Manifesto** are informed by the Left leaning framework outlined here and should always be steeped in Marx-Lenin-Fanon schools of thought. It should be highlighted that there is no mention of Joseph Stalin in the EFF as the liberals would love society to believe.

Mass Movement Manifestation of the EFF

34. The EFF is a weapon in the hands of the economically excluded, the landless and oppressed peoples of South Africa, who constitute the majority of society. The EFF is also a weapon against structural and individual racism. It is a beacon of hope and inspiration for a generation that seeks to fight for economic emancipation. At all times, the EFF must

remain cognisant of the fact that the struggle should be buttressed by mass mobilisation. Accordingly Amilcar Cabral's injunction that, "[H]ide **nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories**" should be instructive of the praxis in mass mobilisation.

35. The EFF's mass character is not an after-thought. It is a core constitutive element of the organisation. This entails that everything the EFF does should always be for the benefit of the people, rooted in the people and should always involve the people.
36. In the **Founding Manifesto** the EFF is defined as "a radical, leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement with an internationalist outlook anchored by popular grassroots formations and struggles". "The EFF will be", continues the **Founding Manifesto**, "the vanguard of community and workers' struggles and will always be on the side of the people. The EFF will, with determination and consistency, associate with the protest movements in South Africa and will also join in struggles that defy unjust laws."
37. Since its formation, the EFF has remained true to its characterisation as a protest movement, has led a number of community protests to demand justice and services on numerous occasions:
 - a. The EFF can directly trace its origins to the tragic massacre of 34 mineworkers by police in Marikana in 2012, at the time when the leaders of the EFF were being systematically pushed out from the ANC fold. EFF leaders were one of very few allowed by Marikana workers to intervene in quest to find a solution days before the massacre. The EFF has remained steadfast in fighting the noble struggle of a salary of R12 500 for mineworkers. In parliament, the very first motion tabled for debate by the EFF was for fair remuneration of mineworkers, a motion inspired by the brave workers of Marikana.
 - b. Free Quality Education: the call for universal free quality education directly emanates from the EFF and was led in the main by EFF student activists. This struggle coincides with the formation of the EFF Students Command, which has been relentless in fighting for access to institutions of higher learning, as well as free education across the country. This led to the EFF Students Commands gaining trust amongst

young people at universities, who voted the Students Command to lead respective SRC's, even at universities traditionally considered to be liberal, such as UCT and WITS.

- c. Land Expropriation without Compensation: No other party can claim to have raised awareness about black people's landlessness more than the EFF. EFF activists across the country have been leading community land struggles and forcefully repossessing land for urban settlements.
- d. Insourcing of workers: the EFF correctly identified the practice of outsourcing workers to labour brokers as repressive, and thus took a conscious decision to fight for the insourcing of workers at universities and in municipalities. This initiative has had massive benefits for the workers. The Johannesburg City Council adopted an EFF motion to insource workers, and a number of universities including Wits and UCT have also insourced workers, viz cleaners and gardeners, freeing them from the slave-like conditions of labour brokering.
- e. These are but a few examples of how the EFF has significantly managed to maintain and enhance its role as a grassroots movement, responding and leading community protests on key issues; and using the opportunity in legislative bodies such as parliament, provincial legislatures and municipalities to leverage immediate benefits for the people.
- f. The ability of the EFF to use its grassroots support to both highlight and resolve the problem of urban land shortage, and its ability to use persuasive arguments to win key debates in parliament such as the motion for land expropriation without compensation demonstrate rare qualitative ability within the revolutionary movement to change the nature of power relations in society without necessarily being in charge of state power.
- g. The EFF is arguably the only political party in parliament that confronts racism through mass action. One of the highlights of confrontation of racism is the EFF Clicks campaign. Here, the EFF shutdown majority of Clicks stores following its racist advert regarding black hair. The campaign saw hundreds of Clicks stores across the country occupied by EFF structures until Clicks apologies and removed the advert online.

- h. The EFF also led a national shutdown against loadshedding that put the country in a standstill. Following the call for a stayaway and closure of businesses, the government unleashed the most organised police presence to suppress the EFF campaign. However, many businesses were shutdown with demonstrations attended by hundreds of thousands of people across the country, especially in the Metros. This is despite massive police visibility and suppression of demonstrations.
38. This is important for progressive forces in the country in many respects, but primarily in exposing the limitations of puritanical approaches to the revolution. It is illustrative of the fact that in the current conjuncture in South Africa, the revolution is of necessity a matter of strategy and tactics, and the ability to constitute key, community level struggles and make these local articulations of the revolutionary discourse at a national and international level.
39. It is important to internalise the distinction that Kwame Ture draws between mobilisation and organisation. Mobilisation is temporary, whereas organisation is permanent. Mobilisation is issue based, mostly popular issues, whereas organisation is systemic and seeks systemic change. Ture insists that **“we must come to know the difference between mobilization and organization because the enemy will use mobilization to demobilize us. Mobilization is very easy... Since we are a people who are instinctively ready to respond against acts of injustice, any time there’s one little act of injustice, we can blow it up and we will find people who will come and make some mass demonstration around it. ‘Ms Sally lost her job, let’s rally, she’ll get her job back.’ People will come and rally. ‘So and so got kicked out of school because the teacher is unjust... people will come and rally. They will come to rally at issues. And this is what mobilization does, it mobilizes people around issues. Those of us who are revolutionary are not concerned with issues. We are concerned with the system. The difference must be properly understood... Mobilization usually leads to reform action, not to revolutionary action.”**
40. It therefore follows that only organisation rooted in the masses can lead a systematic transformation of society. Only an organisation can use mobilisation to raise levels of socialist consciousness and transform mobilisation into systematic and lasting change. A mere mobiliser only wins issues, but an organiser overcomes the system.

Government Manifestation of the EFF

- 41.** The EFF participated in the 2014 national and provincial elections and received 6.35% of the votes which translates into sixty-one (61) public representatives. These comprise of thirty-one (31) Members of Parliament, twenty-five (25) of whom were members of the National Assembly (NA) and six (6) of whom were members of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). In total the party had thirty (30) Members of the Provincial Legislatures (MPLs) spread throughout the nine Provincial Legislatures of the Republic.
- 42.** In the 2016 general local government elections, the EFF received 8.25% of the votes, an increase in all provinces compared to 2014, and this translated into eight hundred and twenty seven (827) Councillors in two hundred and twenty one (221) of the two hundred and thirty seven (237) municipal councils. It is important to highlight the fact that the EFF holds the swing vote in eleven (11) municipal councils, which include four (4) metropolitan councils, one (1) district council and seven (7) local municipalities.
- 43.** In the 2019 national and provincial elections, the EFF received 10,70% of the votes, which meant an increase in the EFF's share of the vote in all provinces compared to both 2014 and 2016. This translated to forty-four (44) Members of the National Assembly, nine (9) Members of the National Council of Provinces, and fifty (50) Members of Provincial Legislatures.
- 44.** In the 2021 local government elections the EFF received 10% of the votes, an increase from 2016, and this translated to one thousands and seventy six 1076 councillors. Noteworthy, in 2016 the organisation had representation in 208 municipal councils, and in 2021 it increased to 227. Currently, the organisation is represented in 232 municipal councils.
- 45.** In the 2024 national and provincial elections, the EFF received 9.58%, a 1.28 percent drop from 2019. Accordingly the EFF now has thirty-eight (38) Members of Parliament and nine (9) Members of the National Council of Provinces, and fifty-four (54) Members of the Provincial Legislatures. The increase in the MPLs is not due to growth, but increases in total seats of some provincial legislatures like Gauteng and Western Cape.

- 46.** The EFF used its Parliamentary participation to table the following laws, which will fundamentally change the economic architecture of South Africa to benefit ordinary South Africans:
- a. The National Health Amendment Bill, which will ensure that all clinics in South Africa are open 24 hours a day;
 - b. The Insourcing of all Government and State Entities Bill, which will result in the insourcing of all workers who provide constant services to government and state companies;
 - c. The ban of Alcohol Advertisement Bill, which will end the celebration and promotion of alcohol consumption in South Africa;
 - d. The Banks Amendment Bill, which will lead to the creation of a state-owned bank; and
 - e. The Nationalisation of the South African Reserve Bank Bill, which will discontinue private ownership of the central bank.
 - f. Student cancellation debt, which will cancel all student debts in institutions of higher learning.
- 47.** The EFF used its Parliamentary participation to table motions which sought to achieve the following:
- a. Provision of free-fee education for the poor at the higher education level, which was rejected by the ruling party;
 - b. Increase in mineworkers' salaries and improvement of their working conditions;
 - c. Repeal of all apartheid legislation and laws that continue to govern South African society;
 - d. Nationalisation of banks and changing how state-owned companies are managed; and Submission on illicit financial flows, tax avoidance, and base erosion in Parliament as well as to SARS and the Davis Tax Committee.
- 48.** The EFF in eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality fought for the return of a R1.2 billion conditional grant for infrastructure projects by the National Treasury.
- 49.** The EFF in Nongoma Local Municipality tabled a motion for the Council to adopt the Andries Tatane cleaning campaign as a municipal programme, and the motion was adopted.

- 50.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has added 1,819 new indigent beneficiaries who now receive free basic water, electricity, and sanitation services.
- 51.** The EFF Caucus in Ekurhuleni introduced motions adopted by council that are being implemented:
- a. Insourcing of security guards and cleaners.
 - b. Publication of the housing beneficiaries list.
 - c. Removal of the racist Boks statue at all municipal buildings in Boksburg and all buildings of the city.
 - d. Relocation of our people in ward 09 and ward 90 who were living on the flood line and prone to risk during the rainy season. They have since been allocated in a conducive environment safe for human settlement.
 - e. Amendment of the indigent policy so as to allow for South African Social Services (SASSA) recipients to be added onto the indigent framework.
 - f. Establishment of the Ekurhuleni Roads Agency which will mean a greater insourcing of roadworks and stormwater drainage facilities in the city.
- 52.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni is collaborating with 55 Early Childhood Development Centres (ECDC) to rollout library and sports programs across the City.
- 53.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has increased revenue by 94%, through the “Siyacima Manje Namhlanje” campaign, maximisation of collection of outdoor advertising revenue, elimination of illegal billboards, and aggressive collection from big businesses.
- 54.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has built internal capacity for municipal workers to maintain municipal buildings.
- 55.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has completed two main reservoirs that now supply water to Kwa Thema and Benoni.
- 56.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has received blue and green drop awards for the high quality of water supplied as well as for the treatment of wastewater under the EFF political leadership.

- 57.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has electrified 2,016 new households through the completion of substations and transformers in Clayville, Mayfield, Tokyo Phase 3, Tsakane, Kwa Thema, and Thokoza. The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has procured 12 waste compactors as part of building municipal internal capacity for the collection of refuse in the city.
- 58.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has reopened the Rietfontein and Jack landfill sites after they were closed for a year without operating.
- 59.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni has amended the indigent policy of the city, increasing the threshold for beneficiaries from R250,000 to R500,000, thereby increasing the number of beneficiaries.
- 60.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni introduced a debt rehabilitation scheme that doesn't require a down payment for arrangements on arrears.
- 61.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni re-introduced a municipal bursary scheme cancelled by the previous government.
- 62.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni purchased 12 new waste compactors as part of building internal municipal capacity for waste collection.
- 63.** The EFF in the City of Ekurhuleni reduced historically overdue payments to service providers from R7 billion to R2 billion within the first 6 months in government.
- 64.** The EFF caucuses in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay tabled successful motions on the insourcing of municipality workers, as a result of which thousands of security guards are now full-time employees with proper salaries at the municipalities.
- 65.** The EFF had Parliament debate the plight of 'Fees Must Fall' activists in support of all activists who were arrested and remained behind bars or who were involved in court cases or awaiting trial in prison.
- 66.** The EFF in KwaZulu-Natal tabled a motion for the discontinuation of all contracts with KPMG by the provincial government. The motion was adopted by the provincial legislature.
- 67.** The EFF in Rustenburg tabled a motion to reinstate 100 workers whose employment with the Council had been wrongfully terminated.

68. The motion was adopted by the Council. The EFF in Bela-Bela tabled a motion for a land expropriation programme. As a result, the Council allocated 700 fully serviced stands to deserving recipients.
69. There are many other achievements in other councils and municipalities which signify the impact of the EFF within governance structures it has representation in.

Pan-Africanist and Internationalist Manifestation of the EFF

70. Outside of the anti-colonial movements, the EFF is the only organisation that has inspired the rise of organisations of economic emancipation in other parts of the African continent. It is not a secret that the Economic Freedom Fighters organisations in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Liberia and Zambia draw inspiration from the EFF in South Africa.
71. This inspiration stems from the reality that the EFF's mission for economic emancipation is not constrained by the colonial borders bequeathed to our generation by colonial conquerors. The ultimate aim of the EFF is the development of the entire African continent, its unity and free movement of its peoples and goods. This is articulated in the **Founding Manifesto** of the EFF.
72. The EFF itself draws its inspiration from the Fanonian school of thought, primarily because, the organisation recognizes that for South Africa and the African continent to develop there needs to be a thoroughgoing process of decolonisation to free African people from social, cultural and economic dictates that are essentially anti-African, and hinder the growth of the African continent
73. Cardinal Pillar number 6 of the **Founding Manifesto** advocates for; "Massive investment in the Development of the African Economy", and that this investment must emphasize on "**massive footprints concerning skills transfer, the development of the communities where investments happen, the payment of tax, reinvestments, corporate social investment, safety standards, compliance with labour laws and regulations and the fundamental economic development of these countries**".
74. Furthermore, the **Founding Manifesto** directs that South African should provide strategic leadership to Pan-African economic development and

trade. It recognizes that South Africa cannot develop to its full potential if the African continent lags behind. It further says; “government should establish a sovereign wealth fund, which will prudently invest in the development of the African economy”.

75. This must be done in order to attain economic justice for the dispossessed African people. To that effect the **Founding Manifesto** says;

“the question of economic justice is fundamental to the political programme of the Economic Freedom Fighters in South Africa and should be promoted actively in the African continent. This includes the regulation and abolishment of foreign control and ownership of strategic sectors of the economy in South Africa and the African continent. The EFF political programme should deliberately provide ideological, political and economic support to countries that seek to discontinue foreign control in order to take ownership of their own economic resources within the context of providing assistance where there is difficulty”.

76. The EFF recognizes that Pan-African unity must however not be narrowly understood as concerned with racial unity within nation-states, as often perverted by those who view themselves as more radical than others. As Julius Nyerere noted, **“African nationalism is meaningless, dangerous, anachronistic, if it is not, at the same time, Pan-Africanism”.**

77. The Pan-Africanist manifestation in the EFF therefore seeks to unite all African people, wherever they may be in the universe, towards the common goal of advancing African interests and African development. This must also entail measures to fight against looting of treasures, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, under the name of trade, based on unequal, rather than mutual exchange.

78. The most seminal work done thus far towards the realisation of the goal of African unity remains the Abuja Treaty, aimed at establishing a common African Economic Community. This has not been realised because of weak leadership in the continent, and the continuing stranglehold that former colonizers and new economic colonizers have over the fate of African nations.

79. This must be done through **“the ultimate integration of the African continent through the erosion and eventual elimination of unnecessary borders”** as stated in the **Founding Manifesto**. The EFF is also committed to

“building solidarity and working relationships with all movements in the world that identify ideologically with anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism”. For this reason, the EFF stands in solidarity with the people of Palestine, of Western Sahara, West Papua, Cuba, Venezuela and all others involved in a concerted struggle against imperialism.

The EFF Student's Command Manifestation

- 80.** The Constitution of the EFF establishes the EFF Students' Command (EFFSC) as a relatively autonomous organisation within the EFF, which must mobilise students behind the banner of economic freedom in our lifetime, whilst championing their interests. In its Constitution, the EFFSC outlines its founding principles, which are;
- a. Mobilising students behind the struggle for economic freedom, embodied in the EFF Founding Manifesto.
 - b. Pursuit of radical higher education transformation with the aim towards free, quality education.
 - c. Championing the interests of students and all workers in institutions of higher learning.
 - d. Building a dynamic relationship between students and community struggles and campaigns.
 - e. Participating in progressive international campaigns and programmes.
 - f. Promoting academic and research excellence and progress.
 - g. Contributing to intellectual and ideological discourse in a manner that seek to promote the struggle for economic freedom.
- 81.** Since its formation in June 2015, the EFFSC has championed students' interests and fought for the introduction of fee-free education. The EFFSC is leading in many institutions of higher learning, TVET colleges and continues to inspire confidence on the capacity of the EFF to lead now and in the future. Many students are in institutions of higher learning today pursuing different qualifications because of the assistance of the EFFSC.
- 82.** In 2023-2024 season of SRC elections, the EFF SC controlled 17 of the 24 university campuses in South Africa, accounting for 65%. During the 2024 election, the EFF won majority of the Voting Stations with majority of university students.

83. The EFF provides all forms of necessary support to the EFFSC, yet gives it the necessary autonomy to build its own organisation because such serves as an important platform to mould future leaders of the EFF.

C. WHAT IS AN IDEAL EFF AS AN ORGANISATION?

84. In order to attain its mission, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) ought to seize political power, take over the state, and deliver economic freedom in our lifetime. In whatever form, taking over political power requires mass support, be it democratic or military overthrow of government. In this regard the EFF **Founding Manifesto** claims; **“the forms in which the EFF contests political power will, from time to time, be reviewed in the light of prevailing circumstances, but the primary role of mass organisation and activism, as a means to raise the political consciousness of the people, will remain the bedrock of our political practice”**.

85. An ideal EFF will be an organisation which is (THE DREAM):

- a. A Marxist-Leninist, Fanonian pan-continental Movement with unquestionable ability to lead the whole of society towards economic freedom, comprised of community based activist branches and members, affiliated workers' unions, civil society organisations, research and educational institutions, professional organisations (such as Doctors for Economic Freedom, Lawyers for Economic Freedom, Engineers for Economic Freedom, Teachers for Economic Freedom, etc).
- b. An organisation that has built adequate mass, political and ideological power to win elections and provide progressive, decisive and responsive socialist government at national, provincial and local level.
- c. An organisation with maximum capacity to train, develop, guide, oversee and monitor all its deployees in all spheres of the state and society.
- d. A mass campaigning organisation that consistently wins over members to the struggle for economic freedom and is active even in the period when there are no elections.

- e. A Pan-Continental Movement with ability to win elections not only in South Africa, but in other parts of the African continent and the diaspora.
- f. An organisation with elected structures at all levels that have an independent capacity to organise and mobilise society behind the struggle for economic freedom and assist ordinary people with everyday challenges.
- g. An organisation with functional EFF owned offices at provincial, regional, sub-regional and branch level, which interact with members of the community constantly.
- h. A fully functional organisation with an optimally functioning EFF Women's Command, Youth and Students' Command, and ultimately a Young Pioneers Movement.
- i. An organisation that maximally uses information technology and other forms of technology for internal systems and communication with the entire membership.
- j. An organisation with a high technology membership system that knows each and every member, their address, gender, race, employment status, and additionally with capacity to produce membership cards within a week of members joining.
- k. An organisation with excellent research and policy development capacity to guide all Fighters and Commissars deployed in all spheres of government.
- l. An organisation with an institutionalised political school that produces the best graduates in various fields of study and has internal capacity to send a minimum 500 students to the best universities across the world every year.
- m. An organisation with a sound relationship with other fraternal organisations on the African continent and other parts of the world.

- n. An organisation with sound business interests that generate enough money to fund its own programmes without reliance on external funders.
- o. An organisation that owns all its properties and has a property portfolio which includes national conference and accommodation, textile and paper printing **companies, as well as a fleet that can transport activists to organisational events.**
- p. An organisation with a fully functional and efficient media and publicity division that publishes a weekly newspaper, quarterly journal(s), books, and has capacity to directly communicate with more than 10 million people all at once through various channels.
- q. An organisation that has a perfect internal communications mechanism which will ensure that on a weekly basis, members and activists of the organisation have access to the latest organisational resolutions and programmes.

D. WHAT IS AN IDEAL CENTRAL COMMAND TEAM (CCT) OF THE EFF?

- 86.** The Central Command Team (CCT) is the highest decision-making body in between the National People's Assemblies. It ought and should function in a manner that demonstrates the determination, capacity and willingness to lead the struggle for economic freedom. The CCT should collectively be the beacon of sound ideological, political and organisational principles. The following are some of the features that should define leaders of the EFF at a CCT level;
- a. The Central Command Team should be comprised of commissars who have individual as well as collective capacity to provide leadership to the people of South Africa.
 - b. Every CCT member must be an all-rounder who has capacity to organise and mobilise without seeking external assistance.
 - c. The CCT should be composed of members who deeply understand the Founding Manifesto of the EFF, the Constitution and all other policies of the organisation.
 - d. The CCT should be composed of members who are able to conduct political education and training to all lower structures.
 - e. The CCT should be composed of members who will not complain about the vastness of South Africa and are thus able and willing to

- travel the length and breadth of South Africa to do the work of the organisation.
- f. The CCT should be composed of commissars who will not completely depend on the organisation for everyday basic organisational necessities such as travel to their areas of deployment and must have capacity to legitimately and legally fundraise in a manner that will not compromise the organisation and themselves as leaders.
 - g. CCT commissars should command absolute clarity on all issues, actively and consistently seek to improve their levels of knowledge and expertise on a diverse range of issues/topics.
 - h. The CCT should be defined by a certain degree of meritocracy wherein only those who have demonstrated verifiable leadership qualities and loyalty to the organisation should be elected into the CCT.
 - i. The CCT should be constituted by commissars whose home branches attain equal or higher percentage of votes than the national average attained by the EFF in any election
 - j. The CCT should be composed of commissars who have attained a post-matric qualification
 - k. The CCT should be composed of commissars who are able to coherently write perspectives and submissions and are able to make presentations on their own writings.
 - l. The CCT should be composed of commissars who can speak coherently and cogently with the power to persuade and agitate the people.
 - m. The CCT should be composed of commissars who are able to conduct media interviews and participate in public debates in a manner that will not bring doubt on the collective capacity of the organisation.
 - n. The CCT should be comprised of morally upright individuals who command respect, trust and confidence in that they will never use the revolution for personal enrichment or abuse power in any form
 - o. The CCT should comprise of commissars with the ability to listen and always subject themselves to the collective wisdom of the organisation and the people in general.

E. WHAT IS AN IDEAL PROVINCE OF THE EFF?

- 87.** The province of the EFF must have a properly constituted Provincial Command Team, and should be constituted of the following key ideals;

- a. EFF provinces must have organisational capacity implement their own programmes and hold mass rallies in stadiums without assistance of EFF head office.
- b. EFF provincial offices must be owned and controlled by the EFF with autonomous capacity to provide organisational assistance to all structures and formations of the EFF.
- c. The Provincial Command Team (PCT) should be constituted of fighters who have individual and collective capacity to provide leadership to the people of South Africa.
- d. Every PCT member must be an all-rounder who has capacity to organise and mobilise without seeking external assistance.
- e. The PCT should be composed of members who deeply understand the **Founding Manifesto** of the EFF, the constitution and all other policies of the organisation.
- f. The PCT should be composed of members who must be able to conduct political education and training to all lower structures.
- g. The PCT should be composed of members who will not complain about the vastness of South Africa and can be able and willing to travel the length and breadth of South Africa to do the work of the organisation.
- h. The PCT should be composed of members who are financially independent, with capacity to legitimately and legally fundraise in a manner that will not compromise the organisation and themselves as leaders.
- i. PCT members should command absolute clarity on all issues, actively and consistently seek to improve their levels of knowledge and expertise on a diverse range of issues/topics.
- j. The PCT should be defined by a certain degree of meritocracy wherein only those who have demonstrated verifiable leadership qualities and loyalty to the organisation should be elected into the PCT.
- k. The PCT should be composed of members who are able to coherently write perspectives and submissions and are able to make presentations on their own writings.
- l. The PCT should be constituted by members whose home branches attain equal or higher percentage of votes than the national average attained by the EFF in any election
- m. The PCT should be composed of commissars who have attained a post-matric qualification
- n. The PCT should be composed of members who can speak coherently and cogently with the power to persuade and agitate the people.

- o. The PCT should be composed of fighters who are able to conduct media interviews and participate in public debates in a manner that will not bring doubt on the collective capacity of the organisation.
- p. The PCT should be composed of morally upright members with no questionable reputation and who are able to inspire confidence and dependability to the entire community

F. WHAT IS AN IDEAL REGION OF THE EFF?

88. The Region of the EFF must have;

- a. A properly constituted Regional Command Team with a full-time Regional Secretary and a full-time organisational staff.
- b. EFF Regions must have the capacity to organise their own events and hold mass rallies and programmes without assistance of the province and/or head office.
- c. EFF Regional Offices must be owned and controlled by the EFF with autonomous capacity to provide organisational assistance to all structures and formations of the EFF.
- d. EFF Regions have the ability to monitor everyday activities of employees into municipal councils and government.
- e. EFF Regions must be able to translate the organisational policies into lively programs that touch the everyday lives of the people.
- f. EFF Regions should be constituted by members whose home branches attain equal or higher percentage of votes than the national average attained by the EFF in any election.
- g. EFF Regions should be composed of members who have attained a post-matric qualification.
- h. EFF Regions should be composed of members who deeply understand the **Founding Manifesto** of the EFF, the constitution and all other policies of the organisation.
- i. EFF Regions should be composed of members who must be able to conduct political education and training to all lower structures
- j. EFF Regions should be composed of members should command absolute clarity on all issues, actively and consistently seek to improve their levels of knowledge and expertise on a diverse range of issues/topics.
- k. EFF Regions should be defined by a certain degree of meritocracy wherein only those who have demonstrated verifiable leadership qualities and loyalty to the organisation should be elected into the RCT.

- l. EFF Regions should be composed of members who are able to coherently write perspectives and submissions and are able to make presentations on their own writings.
- m. EFF Regions should be composed of members who can speak coherently and cogently with the power to persuade and agitate the people.
- n. EFF Regions should be composed of fighters who are able to conduct media interviews and participate in public debates in a manner that will not bring doubt on the collective capacity of the organisation.
- o. EFF Regions should be composed of morally upright members with no questionable reputation and who are able to inspire confidence and dependability to the entire community.

G. WHAT IS AN IDEAL SUB-REGION OF THE EFF?

- 89.** Sub-region of the EFF must be a constitutional structure with elected leadership in accordance with organisational norms and conventions. It must have the following: fully functional and provide constant support to branches.
- a. EFF sub-regions must have the capacity to organise own events, hold mass rallies and programmes without the assistance of the province and/or head office.
 - b. EFF sub-regional offices must be owned and controlled by the EFF with autonomous capacity to provide organisational assistance to all branches.
 - c. EFF sub-regional offices must have fulltime staff with necessary qualifications and experience to aid political work in the subregions.
 - d. EFF sub-regions must have capacity to establish, monitor and coordinate branches with VD presence through Voting District Coordinating Teams.
 - e. EFF sub-regions where there are municipalities must have capacity to monitor members deployed in councils and municipal government.
 - f. EFF subregions must translate organisational policies into lively programs that have impact on the everyday lives of the people.
 - g. EFF sub-regions must have capacity to establish organisational presence of the EFF in all streets, blocks and villages that have a life even when there are no elections or events.

H. WHAT IS AN IDEAL BRANCH OF THE EFF?

- 90.** As the basic unit of the organisation the branch of the EFF should have a minimum of two hundred (200) members, a functional Branch Command Team, a functional Voting District Co-ordinating Team (VDCT), Street and Block Co-ordinators, and a programme of action. The following should additionally define an ideal branch of the EFF;
- a. Every EFF branch must have its Programme of Action (PoA) and internal capacity to hold branch meetings without assistance from upper structures.
 - b. EFF branches must have internal capacity to organise own transport to transport EFF members and supporters to sub-regional, regional, provincial and national programmes without assistance from upper structures.
 - c. The BCT must meet at least once per week and holds membership meetings at least once per month.
 - d. A Branch must have a branch office with volunteers who attend to EFF work on a daily basis.
 - e. A BCT must be inducted within fourteen (14) days after its election by the branch membership.
 - f. A Branch must be fully functional, each with a VD Co-ordinating Team of ten (20) Fighters per VD.
 - g. The EFF branch must have active members in each and every street, including in social organs such as School Governing Bodies, Ward Committees, Churches, Sports and Cultural organisations amongst others.
 - h. The EFF branch must be able to communicate with all members of the community in the branch through the use of local media and all other necessary forms of mobilisation and organising.
 - i. The EFF branch must know each and every member and hold an updated record of their addresses, contact details, employment status, qualifications among other things.
 - j. The EFF branch must keep an updated record of the profile of its community in terms of health, education, sports, business and faith-based profiles. Including socio-economic conditions such as unemployment, crime statistics, poverty levels, service delivery.
 - k. The EFF branch must keep an updated record of all key individuals and organisations in the community in terms of contacts and addresses; such as religious, traditional, educational leaders.

- I. The EFF branch must hold VD based community meetings every two months to listen to problems and provide solutions.

I. WHAT IS AN IDEAL ACTIVIST OF THE EFF?

91. The EFF Constitution obliges all members to “constantly and continuously strive to raise the level of her/his own political consciousness and understanding of EFF Policies, Resolutions, Rules and Regulations”. Within this context, all Revolutionary Fighters should be defined by the following values:
 - a. Sophistication and simplicity to understand and explain the modern economy and systems of government and ability to generate new ideas and solutions.
 - b. Understanding of the nature and character of imperialism in the face of attempts to re-colonise the African continent.
 - c. Versatility that appeals to all South Africans, old and young.
 - d. Acceptable behaviour and conduct to appeal to all South Africans.
 - e. Fearlessness of the previous oppressor and imperialism.
92. This therefore means that all Revolutionary Fighters should be able to know and understand the key documents of the EFF, particularly the **Founding Manifesto** and the Constitution. All Revolutionary Fighters should know and be able to explain the seven cardinal pillars for economic freedom in our lifetime without reading from any script. Fighters should be able to localise and explain what each and every pillar means to the lives of the people on the ground and in their own terrain of struggle.
93. Fighters ought to be community activists and caring individuals that;
 - a. Partake in community struggles and activities. This means that a revolutionary fighter will always be the first whenever there is a funeral or party or wedding in their community.
 - b. Always know the exact details of their community, including the number of people in their wards and the challenges the majority of the people are confronted with in the ward.
 - c. Always willing to listen to the concerns of the people and find solutions to help the people.
 - d. Always available for genuine protests and mass actions in their community.

94. The following are the values that define a fighter;

- a. A Revolutionary Fighter is an organiser who knows how to move crowds towards mass revolutionary action.
- b. A Revolutionary Fighter is a professional in the way he/she approaches the political question of revolution.
- c. A Revolutionary Fighter is the one who abolishes his/her ego and his/her attachments to personal success and achievements; s/he is selfless and one with the people.
- d. A Revolutionary Fighter is the one who believes that Revolutionary Morality is the core of the revolutionary belief-system.
- e. A Revolutionary Fighter is never depressed, bored, and sad; there is always something to do, there are always revolutionary actions to take up.
- f. A Revolutionary Fighter does not hold grudges and always complaining about unnecessary matters.
- g. A Revolutionary Fighter always reads and listens to people to understand the struggles and suffering of the people on the ground. A Revolutionary Fighter knows his community, neighbours and details of the challenges they confront on a daily basis.
- h. A Revolutionary Fighter that is charitable and practices the principle of the left hand must never know what the right hand is doing.
- i. A Revolutionary Fighter does not dwell in the conspicuous consumerist practices that seek to blindly show-off privilege.
- j. A Revolutionary Fighter leads by example and does everything with integrity.
- k. A Revolutionary Fighter is driven by the truth and never lies to the people, the organisation or to themselves. A Revolutionary Fighter lives an honest life
- l. A Revolutionary Fighter is an internationalist who seeks at all times to connect local to international struggles.
- m. A Revolutionary Fighter is not xenophobic and appreciates that our struggle is linked to the struggles of all the oppressed and exploited people in the African continent and all over the world.
- n. A Revolutionary Fighter always pays for their own membership, avoiding the malicious tendency by position mongers to pay membership for others in an attempt to patronise for selfish position driven ambitions
- o. A Revolutionary Fighter never belongs to a faction; a lobby group that never disbands and accepts outcomes of the assemblies. A group

that permanently organises itself within the organisation instead of working towards the unity of the organisation as a whole.

95. These key principles and values that guide a fighter should be exercised with maximum discipline in the context of understanding, internalising and accepting discipline not as an incidental/side issue but as a weapon which will make the EFF realise all its objectives in our lifetime.

J. WHAT IS THE CURRENT REALITY? THE DIAGNOSIS:

96. One of the key drivers of the Russian Great October socialist revolution was the honesty, frankness and truth articulated by Vladimir Lenin after the first wave of the revolution. Lenin says **“tell the people: workers of St. Petersburg, Riga, Warsaw, Odessa, Tiflis ... we are not strong enough to launch a rising and be victorious in a rising. Therefore, there is no point in thinking, no point in vain talking about a popular constituent assembly. Don't debase grand words with petty subterfuges. Don't cover up your weakness with a belief in miracles. Proclaim your weakness aloud to one and all—a fault confessed is half redressed. False rhetoric and false boastfulness spell moral ruin and lead unfailingly to political extinction”**.
97. Lenin adds that **“we are not strong enough to bring about an uprising, fellow-workers! We are not strong enough to rouse the people to the pitch of revolution! We are not strong enough to attain freedom.... We have only enough strength to jostle the enemy, but not to overthrow him, to jostle him in such a way that Petrunkevich will be able to take a seat beside him. Hence, away with all talk about revolution, liberty, and popular representation; whoever talks of these things without actually working at the ladder needed to attain to these things, at the uprising needed to win them, is a liar and a humbug, who is merely deceiving you”**.

98. It was on the basis of such frank admission that the revolution was taken to a different level leading ultimately to the victory of the working-class forces. The EFF should not be trapped in over-celebration of the otherwise impactful victories we have achieved in the first 11 years. The stark reality is that with 9,52% of electoral support a staggering 90.48%, decrease from 10.7% in 2019, of South Africa's electorate does not as yet believe in the capacity of the EFF to lead South Africa. Perhaps a more generous assessment is that we still need 56% more of South Africa's voters to vote for the EFF in order to achieve the two-thirds majority needed to effect the changes we proclaim should happen in South Africa.
99. The EFF should not draw comfort over marginal growth, in fact, the 2024 electoral outcomes signal a stagnating or declining organisation. Our response to this should not be vested in the tranquilising drug of gradualism. The EFF should never compare itself to liberation movements that took many decades to achieve meaningless transitions the result of which did not change the lives of the people. The EFF should always take leaf from Amilcar Cabral proclamation; **"[A]lways bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children"**.
100. The sections above presented a comprehensive ideal perspective of what an ideal EFF ought to be. At this point an admission should be made that this is not where the EFF currently is. In the 2nd NPA, which took place five years ago, in the 2nd NPA the following organisational realities were elevated:
- a. The EFF is not yet fully established in all corners of South Africa with branches and revolutionary activists who understand and are passionate about its mission.
 - b. Many branches do not have programmes of action and do not meet regularly to decide on the work that must be pursued to win over the masses to the struggle for economic freedom.
 - c. The EFF CCT committees are not fully functional, and despite being assigned to specific tasks, most commissars do not do anything in relation to their CCT portfolios.
 - d. A substantial number of the EFF leaders, mostly those deployed in positions of responsibility are not loyal to the organisation, but loyal to their positions of deployment.

- e. The EFF has not built adequate internal capacity to win municipal ward based elections. This is a huge challenge in light of the fact that municipal elections are partially ward based.
- f. **The EFF does not have a fully functional membership system and cannot accurately account for each and every member.**
- g. **The EFF does not own the buildings it uses as offices at all levels.**
- h. Not all CCT, PCT, RCT, and BCT members can articulate the EFF visions and standpoint with clarity.
- i. Whilst established, a lot of branches do not meet consistently and do not lead community struggles.
- j. The EFF is still not present in many of the voting districts in South Africa. The 2019 election outcome reveal that the EFF did not receive a single vote in some VDs, received less than a hundred (100) votes in some municipal wards.
- k. Most regional structures are directionless, and do not have the necessary impact expected from EFF structures.
- l. Provincial leaders don't know the length and breadth of their provinces, and PCTs do not meet from time to time as is expected of them.
- m. Regions do not meet consistently and have no mechanisms to consistently monitor the work of branches.
- n. Branches are not fully functional, not engaged in any form of programme, and the majority of them only meet when either the elections or conferences are approaching.
- o. Branches are lopsided towards specific VDs, and not present in all the VDs.
- p. The EFF Students' Command has not gained a life of its own, it remains heavily dependent on the EFF mother body to carry out its daily and constitutional functions.
- q. Whilst this remains an ideal, the EFF has not yet attained organisational maturity necessary for it to carry additional organisations such as; Trade Unions, Women and Youth wings, which are mandated by the constitution.

101. Of these challenges, we can identify two that have been partially achieved. **First, is the fact that we now have a National Head Office that we own and have proudly named after Mama Winnie Madikizela-Mandela. Secondly, we have a membership system which in its current form can still be improved. The rest of the realities identified five years ago still attain.**

- 102.** In addition we can add that following the electoral outcomes of the 2024 NPE the organisation has almost disappeared in the province of KwaZulu Natal and weakened in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North West, and Limpopo. It has recorded marginal growth in Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Western Cape and the Free State, yet not even enough to compensate for losses in other provinces. However, the challenges identified here do not in any way suggest that the EFF has no hope for growth and development.

K. WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS OF THE EFF?

- 103.** The EFF has various strengths, which should be consolidated and built on for as long as the organisation exists. These include;
- a. The EFF has massive capacity and potential to lead South Africa, demonstrated by the steady qualitative and quantitative growth since its formation in 2013.
 - b. The EFF demonstrably has the best policy alternatives compared to all existing political parties in South Africa, evinced by its superior submissions on various policy issues including; land expropriation without compensation, insourcing of workers, free education, alternative tax policies, alternative energy policies, etc, it has volunteered in all spheres and levels of government.
 - c. Strong sense of organisational democracy and democratic centralism, meaning that official structures of the EFF do not communicate contradictory messages.
 - d. Strong appeal to young voters, illustrated by the reality that wherever the EFF pays dedicated focus on youth voters, in most instances always emerges victorious.
 - e. Cogent and comprehensive ideological and political positions, which are understood both by supporters and opponents of the organisation.
 - f. Unwavering commitments to gender equality, illustrated by its progressive deployment policies to positions of responsibility.
 - g. Demonstrable capacity for mass mobilisation evidenced by the massive marches, rallies and shutdowns it has carried out over the past five years
 - h. Appeal to young black people in the entire African continent and diaspora.

- i. Established EFF structures spread throughout South Africa, meaning that the EFF is not a regional organisation, unlike many other political parties.

L. WHAT TO OPPOSE AND COMBAT IN THE MOVEMENT

104. The following are tendencies that must be opposed and combatted at all cost and should never be allowed to define the EFF as an organisation. Even though some of these factors/tendencies are derived from the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute because of the scientific nature of their theoretical foundations they hold relevant and true to this day. These are the factors/tendencies to combat and oppose:

- a. **Factionalism**—Factionalism refers to the practice of members who are loyal to other members rather than to the organisation. They are loyal to lobby groups as opposed to the organisation, turning them into permanent units with names, logos, and meeting places.
- b. **Laziness**—Laziness refers to members and leaders who do not perform mandated tasks or only perform tasks that they are assigned and are not willing to go beyond the line of duty to promote and grow the organisation.
- c. **Sectarianism**—Sectarianism refers to the trend defined by a complete refusal to conduct dialogue with other groups or work with them on small projects, thus, following one's own line dogmatically without striving towards one's further education. This includes refusal to conduct work with other local groups on the grounds of high theoretical differences, to refuse further investigation and cling to superficial understandings, to become an in-group rather than a mass organization. To combat sectarianism the EFF must engage with other groups locally when goals align, put aside petty differences for the interests and well-being of the masses, conduct itself mannerly when others do the same, and focus on political work rather than squabbles.
- d. **Academicism**—Academicism refers to the trend that separates theoretical development from practical activity. This trend supposes that organization is less important than theory, to apply the Marxist method without focusing on the revolutionary socialist implications, to over-intellectualize Marxism by focusing on its academic applications which only relate to the few who have received an elite education, to not attempt to translate Marxism-Leninism to common language.

To overcome academicism the EFF must reassure itself of the revolutionary, popular character of Marxism-Leninism, engage the masses in a revolutionary education that allows the understanding of Marxism, emphasize the importance of praxis rather than isolated theory or practice.

- e. **Conspiracism**— Conspiracism refers to the trend that equates the bourgeoisie to an Illuminati-like organization, to see the workings of class society and its contradictions as the conspiratorial actions of the ruling classes rather than as historically and materially-defined processes. To wilfully ignore antagonisms within the ruling classes and have weak analysis of current conditions, opting for a caricature of Marxist analysis. On the other hand, to conduct oneself secretly when the conditions do not call for it, to avoid working with the non-communist masses and therefore refrain from taking a leading role in political work, to operate as an isolated clandestine organization and refuse to see the masses as the motive force of history. To combat conspiracism the EFF must translate its analysis into the popular language of the masses when engaging in dialogue, work with the masses directly and openly, build ties to the localities in which it operates.

M. ORGANISATIONAL RE-DESIGN

- 105.** The following constitute key considerations concerning organisational redesign in the bid to DEFEND, REBUILD AND ADVANCE THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC FREEDOM. These are structural changes that need to be considered. If agreed and resolved on, some of the proposals will lead to constitutional amendments;

106. NATIONAL AND CCT LEADERSHIP

- a. The CCT must meet bi-monthly to appraise itself of progress in the work of the EFF at all levels. Furthermore, the following should be considered;
 - i. The secretariat convened by the Secretary-General with all departments in the SGO and Provincial Secretaries should meet monthly to monitor and check the status of the organisation in all provinces.

- ii. Parliamentary and Governance structures of the EFF should develop separate but integrated Communications Units through a guideline adopted by the CCT. What this means is that the EFF Parliamentary Caucus should have a separate Spokesperson/Communications Manager distinct from those doing the same job for the organisation.
 - iii. The International Relations Office should be fully established as one of the departments in the Head Office of the EFF under the supervision of a designated Commissar and the Presidency.
 - iv. There must be an establishment of an accredited Political Education Collage to be headed by a full-time Commissar. It must be institutionalised with teaching staff, curriculum, modules and assessments established on different key subjects such as Ideology, Organising and Governance.
 - v. Starting from this 3rd NPA henceforth any member serving at the CCT level must have a post-secondary qualification from a recognised institution.
 - vi. Whilst recognising the relative autonomy that defines the EFFSC, the CCT should permanently deploy a Commissar who shall be responsible for the EFF Students' Command, to ensure that its organisational and political programmes are consistent with the programmes and politics of the EFF.
- 107.** The CCT must be empowered, in consideration of the growth, strength and influence of the organisation, to allow the election of people who do not qualify to be in any structure, at any level, due to not having been members of the EFF for the required number of years.
- 108.** The 3rd NPA must consider this option to ensure that the leadership recruits new talent, particularly people with rare skills, with substantial following like traditional and religious leaders, as well as political leaders who close down their organisations to join the EFF. The Constitutional Clause can read as follows;

- b. The CCT can, through a decision by a two thirds majority of its members, decide to allow the election and/or appointment of people into leadership structures of the EFF at any level without consideration of the required number of years for their membership. These must be people with proven rare talent/skills, proven constituency base and who swear loyalty to the EFF. Accordingly;
 - i. For CCT, only up to 6 people
 - ii. For PCT, only up to 4 people
 - iii. For RCT, only up to 3 people
 - iv. For BCT, only up to 2 people
- c. The concerned structure or any member can write to the CCT to request such a deviation with motivation that strictly meets the criterion set out above.

109. MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP SYSTEM

- a. The EFF should use technology and grassroots mobilisation to build a supporter's database of not less than 10 million people who can be allocated to regions and sub-regions in terms of their voter registration status.
- b. War Council must receive weekly growth indications in terms of membership and supporters captured per sub-region.
- c. In terms of the constitution, any member who leaves the EFF and joins or starts another political party can never be welcomed back into the EFF. It is proposed that the CCT be empowered to consider membership applications of individuals who wish to return to the EFF, with a proviso that once readmitted, the following must attain,
 - i. Rehabilitation process where for 12-24 months they cannot occupy any leadership positions. As to how long the rehabilitation process takes, it must be determined by the CCT on a case by case basis

110. WAR COUNCIL

- a. The War Council is responsible for day to day running of the organisation. It should be constituted of 17 Members of the CCT plus Presidents of the Wings, Commands, which are;

- i. Top 6 Officials
- ii. Three full time Commissars and Heads of Departments, i.e., Organising and Mobilisation, Head of Elections, Head of Communications, Head of International Solidarity and Head of Political Education.
- iii. 9 Convenors of Deployees to Provinces.
- iv. Presidents of the Wings Commands as ex-officio with full participating rights.
- v. The War Council must receive weekly membership growth reports from the Organising and Mobilisation Department to keep track of the organisation's quantitative growth in all parts of South Africa.
- vi. War Council must be empowered to appoint a Provincial Secretary in cases of incapacity and incompetence from amongst members of the CCT or PCT, and must report to the CCT when such is done.

111. PROVINCES

- a. Until Provinces are constitutionally abolished as demarcation areas of administrative governance in South Africa, they should be retained as EFF constitutional structures mandated with the task of overseeing EFF work in the demarcated provinces.
- b. The sizes of PCTs can be one size fits all as is currently the case OR the National People's Assembly can decide to adopt resolutions on the sizes of PCTs taking into consideration the following factors; number of regions and sub-regions in a province, population size of each province and the number of potential voters in a province. The Constitutional amendment in this regard could read as follows, "**The PCT is a constitutional structure elected in a properly constituted Provincial People's Assembly and should compose of top five (5) officials plus anything between 16 and 40 additional members as determined by the NPA or the first CCT after the NPA**".
- c. PCTs and Provincial programmes must be obliged to always have directly elected member of the CCT in all their programmes.
 - d. PCTs must hold bi-monthly meetings to appraise themselves of the progress pertaining to organisational work
 - e. Provincial Secretaries must be full-time officials
 - f. From amongst the PCT members, there must be a full-time Head of Organising and Mobilisation, Head of Elections, Head of Communications, Head of Political Education

112. REGIONS

113. The sizes of RCTs can be one size fits all as is currently the case OR the National People's Assembly can decide to adopt resolutions on the sizes of RCTs taking into consideration the following factors; number of sub-regions (for those who are not metros), number of wards in the region, population size and the number of potential voters. The Constitutional amendment in this regard could read as follows; ***The RCT is a constitutional structure elected in a properly constituted Regional People's Assembly and should compose of top five (5) officials plus anything between 16 and 30 additional members as determined by the NPA or the first CCT after the NPA***

114. Below are propositions on what possibly could be done with regional structures;

- a. Regions are completely removed as constitutional structures.
- b. Regions are established as co-ordinating structures with constitutionally established sub-regional structures underneath.
- c. Regions are retained as constitutional structures together with constitutional sub-regions underneath.
- d. Regions in Metros are retained whilst regions at district municipality level are abolished and replaced with regional structures that correspond with local municipalities. In this case, the PCT must deploy from amongst its members a district coordinator.

115. If retained as full constitutional structures regions should build adequate membership capturing capacity and should constantly account on the recruited membership.

116. SUB-REGIONS

117. The following options attain for sub-regions;

- a. They must be constituted as constitutional structures elected in Sub-Regional Peoples Assemblies. Their composition must be decided using the same consideration of the number of wards, population size, potential voters. They must have; The Chairpersons and Secretaries of Sub-regions who will be members of RCTs if regions are retained or PCTs

if regions are abolished as constitutional structures with a two (2) years term of office.

- b. Sub-Regions only attain in Metros as coordinating structures with a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 15 members, elected in a Sub-Regional Peoples Assembly. Municipalities must hence forth become Regions.

118. BRANCHES

- a. Branches must remain the basic unit of the organisation and must be responsible for EFF work at branch level.
- b. Branches of the EFF must have a minimum of one hundred (200) members.
- c. A fully functional branch must have a minimum of 20 Voting District Coordinating Team with a Convenor and Coordinator elected from among members of who belong in that Voting District. This VDCT must necessarily be constituted 30 days after the BPA.
- d. Each EFF member must be an activist who, individually, has a minimum of 10 voters/EFF supporters who are not EFF members, and individually attends to them at all material times in favour of electoral victory in that VD. This must not be a side issue, but integral to the definition of being an EFF member; 1 member, 10 EFF supporters Campaign.
- e. Accordingly, there must be a consistent verified record in terms of names, addresses and voting station of each EFF supporter, not during elections, but by definition, as part of the life blood of a branch in good standing.

119. STUDENT COMMAND

- a. In the formation of the Youth Command, the NPA must decide if the Student Command becomes the chapter of the Youth Command or it becomes the Youth Command altogether. Meaning, branches that exist in campuses become youth command based in institutions of higher learning and as those in ward. In addition, we must also determine if we also form youth command branches in high schools in the founding of the Youth Command. In essence, all education institutions must have an EFF presence.

N. CONCLUSION

- 120.** The EFF is saddled with the obligation of positioning itself in a manner that will achieve its political and ideological commitments. The first 11 years of the EFF's existence have revealed that in areas of strength, such should be improved upon and in areas of weaknesses, such should be confronted with determination. The efforts to redesign the organisation must be a collective mandate and should be undertaken in consultation with the entire membership.
- 121.** All the proposals and recommendations on the nature, form and content of the EFF constitutes a deliberate effort to build a responsive mass-based organisation that has the capacity to mobilise the people behind the war for economic freedom in our lifetime. The 3rd National People's Assembly should thoroughly deliberate on what form of organisation is needed to mobilise as many people as possible to DEFEND, REBUILD AND ADVANCE THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN OUR LIFETIME.

LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM

DISCUSSION DOCUMENTS



LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM

"The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows, "Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody."

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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The struggle for the restoration of the land from a settler minority to the native majority has been a constant struggle in the territory we now know as South Africa for almost four (4) centuries. It is a struggle mired in violence, dehumanisation, and displacement. Displacement not just of a people from the land, but from the key constitutive elements of a people's identity. The history of land dispossession from African people by white settlers in the territories later known as South Africa is well-documented. The most comprehensive of these pieces of work has to be Noel Mostert's work, in which he details, with lucid clarity, the conditions that preceded the founding of South Africa.¹ Tim Keegan also impressively deals with the historical origins of the construction of the racial order that has come to define South Africa, and the difficulties any future regimes would face in dismantling the racism that has become so institutionalized in the country.²
2. More recent works, such as the comprehensive work by Patric Tariq Mellet carefully weaves together the loss of land and liberty of African people to the present crisis of labour and unemployment.³ John Laband's work on the land wars, also reveals the bloody origins of South Africa as a country, and that land dispossession was the necessary precursor to the establishment of South Africa as a settler colonial State, impervious to deeper level transformations.⁴ The colonial cumulative consequence was the creation of a "politico-economic system that was insensitive to notions of joint-interests and shared justice, while economic interest of each system thrived recklessly on unequal freedoms and the unequal distribution of power, property, and opportunities."⁵
3. Contemporary challenges relating to racialised access to land, racialised economic inequality, racialised subjection to crime, violence, poverty, and every other social ill in South Africa are all easily traced back to landlessness.
4. Central to the resolution of these challenges is a carefully thought out answer to the question asked by 17th century Khoi leader, Autshumao. Soon after the end of the first war between Dutch settlers and natives in 1659, Autshumao had this conversation with Jan van Riebeck: "*Autshumao then asked: 'if the country is too small, who has the greater right, the true owner, or the foreign invader?', to which Van Riebeck responded 'ona dan haer lant, door diffencive oorlogh rechtvaardigh als met 't swaert gewonnen, toegevallen, ende't welck wij ook*

¹ N Mostert "The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa" (1992) Pimlico: London

² T Keegan "Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order" (1996) David Philip: Cape Town.

³ P Mellet "The Lie of 1652: A Decolonized History of Land" (2020) Tafelberg: Cape Town

⁴ J Laband "The Land Wars: The Dispossession of the Khoisan and AmaXhosa in the Cape Colony (2020) Penguin Books

⁵ S Terreblanche "History of Inequality in South Africa: 1652-2002" (2002) University of Natal Press.

voornemens waren te behouden' (we have won this country in a just manner through a defensive war, and it is our intention to keep it)."⁶

5. Between the native and the foreign invader, who has a greater right to the land? This is the question the revolutionary movement must answer, and answer correctly and honestly.

B. THE FOUNDING MANIFESTO

6. The Founding Manifesto of the Economic Freedom Fighters locates our struggle: *"within the long resistance of South Africans to racist colonial and imperialist, political, economic, and social domination. This glorious resistance started with the Khoi and San people rising against colonial domination, marked by the arrival of settler colonists in 1652 in the Cape. This basically represents more than 350 years of Africans' resistance against colonial and economic domination and exploitation."*⁷
7. Further, the Founding Manifesto acknowledges that; *"Those who fought the gallant wars of resistance did so to resist forced dispossession of land, wealth, livestock and heritage, which they had cherished and inherited from their forebears. More than 350 years later, the war of resistance has not been won, and the battles that were fought almost represent nothing, because 20 years after the attainment of formal political freedom, the black people of South Africa still live in absolute mass poverty, are landless, their children have no productive future, they are mistreated and they are looked down upon in a sea of wealth."*⁸
8. To resolve this crisis, the Founding Manifesto identifies seven non-negotiable cardinal pillars, the first of which is *"Expropriation of land without compensation for equal redistribution and use."* The Founding Manifesto is the foundational reference point for the Economic Freedom Fighters, and all policy emanates from, and must be in accordance with it. In its postulations on the land question, the Founding Manifesto provides guidance on the form and manner of expropriation without compensation that it envisions. The Manifesto states; *"The EFF's approach to land expropriation without occupation is that all land should be transferred to the ownership and custodianship of the state in a similar way that all mineral and petroleum resources were transferred to the ownership and custodianship of the state through the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) of 2002. The state should, through its legislative capacity transfer all land to the state, which will administer and use land for sustainable-development purposes. This transfer should happen without compensation, and should apply to all South Africans, black and white."*

⁶ S Terreblance 'A history of Inequality in South Africa: 1652-2002' (2002) University of Natal Press

⁷ Economic Freedom Fighters "The Founding Manifesto of the Economic Freedom Fighters" (2013)

⁸ Founding Manifesto

9. Further, the Founding Manifesto affirms that; "Once the state is in control and custodianship of all land, those who are currently using the land or intend using land in the immediate will apply for land-use licences, which should be granted only when there is a purpose for the land being applied for. Those applying for licences will be granted licences for a maximum of 25 years, renewable on the basis that the land is being used as planned. The state should, within this context, hold the right to withdraw the licence and reallocate the land for public purposes."
10. For this purpose, the Founding Manifesto envisions the development of legislation to concretise state custodianship of land. It states; "Under this legislation, no one should be allowed to own land forever, because those who have money can, over time, buy huge plots of land and use them for counter-developmental private purposes, such as using land as game farms. A maximum of 30 years can then be placed on all land leases applied for by private corporations and individuals, with the state retaining the right to expropriate in instances where the land is not used for the purpose applied for. "
11. Over the past eleven (11) years of its participation in the legislative houses in the country, the Economic Freedom Fighters has attempted to amend legislation to give effect to this vision of the Founding Manifesto, and in so doing, has enriched our understanding of the land question more generally, and our approach to the resolution of the land question more specifically.

C. WORK DONE TO DATE

12. In February 2018, the EFF moved a motion in the National Assembly for the amendment of Section 25 of the Constitution, to permit expropriation of land without compensation. This motion was amended and later passed with the support of many predominantly black led political parties.
13. The motion specifically proposed that parliament;
 - a) review and amend section 25 of the Constitution to make it possible for the State to expropriate land in the public interest without compensation, and in the process conduct public hearings to get the views of ordinary South Africans, policy-makers, civil society organisations and academics, about the necessity of, and mechanisms for expropriating land without compensation; and
 - b) propose the necessary constitutional amendments regarding the kind of future land tenure regime needed, considering the necessity of the State being a custodian of all South African land.

14. By the time the EFF went to the 2nd National People's Assembly in 2019, the work of Parliament on this motion was still ongoing. The 2nd National People's Assembly, on reflecting on the work that was then ongoing, instructed EFF in Parliament as follows; *"The CCT and EFF members of parliament must intensify the work geared towards the amendment of section 25 of the Constitution. This amendment must emphasise the abolishment of private ownership of land, and the transfer of the land as a whole to the people, and that the State must hold this land in custody on behalf of the people as a whole. In order to achieve these goals, weaknesses in state institutions, such as the Commission on Land Rights and Restitution and the Land Claims Court, must be identified and addressed."*
15. The 2nd NPA also noted that; *"That even though other political parties support the concept of land expropriation without compensation, they do so for completely different reasons; reasons which may be anathematic to the ideals which the EFF fights for. Therefore, the EFF must object to any amendments to the Constitution that would not result in the fundamental restructuring of the property rights regime in the country. Therefore, the EFF must object to any amendments to the Constitution that would entrench the status quo and produce only superficial changes."*
16. Needless to say, when the National Assembly was to vote for the Constitutional Amendment Bill, it had undergone various iterations, made no reference to expropriation without compensation, and the default position of the proposed amendment still centred compensation.
17. Correctly, the EFF did not support the amendment, and the amendment process failed in Parliament. This process, as indicated, did however allow us to expand our understanding of the Founding Manifesto even further, and more specifically on State Custodianship of land.
18. Our position was that State Custodianship of land became the central bone of contention during the process of amending the Constitution, and an in depth delve into the concept is warranted.

D. STATE CUSTODIANSHIP OF LAND

19. The EFF has averred that State custodianship of South Africa's land is objectively the only mechanism to guarantee all South Africans equitable access to land. Any other method will not even scratch the surface of massive land poverty and hunger that defines the black majority and Africans in particular. Land poverty and hunger are undoubtedly a direct consequence of the barbaric colonial conquest and the nonsensical, cruel system of apartheid that entrenched dispossession and isolation of the indigenous Africans.

20. There is sometimes confusion between nationalisation and custodianship created to deliberately cause confusion by right-wing reactionary forces and derail parliamentary processes to amend the constitution. Nationalisation is defined as a transfer of ownership of means of production and exchange to the State and to utilise them for collective interest. Others have described nationalisation in more explicit terms. For example, a take-over of ownership and operation of an industry or business previously in the hands of private citizens, with or without the consent of the former owners and with or without fair compensation.
21. In a practical sense, nationalisation describes different situations, including situations where a state;
- a) Takes a minority shareholding in an enterprise (usually termed partial nationalisation).
 - b) Takes a majority shareholding but leaves managerial control in the hands of the private minority shareholders
 - c) The State takes over 100% ownership of an enterprise with or without compensation but enters into a management contract handing over management to private capital.
 - d) The State takes over the management of an enterprise with a minority or majority private shareholding.
- The State takes over, with or without compensation, both 100% ownership and management of an enterprise.
22. The primary meaning of custodianship is the safekeeping and protection of materials relating to the past, which may or may not involve limiting or promoting access to such material. More generally, others define the notion of a custodian as an institution, community or individual, or government assuming the responsibility. There is limited literature on the conceptualisation of custodianship as it is relatively new and contested.
23. The difference between nationalisation and custodianship is that nationalisation translates to the transfer of ownership to the State. The State takes some form of management or control of nationalised assets. Whereas custodianship suggests, the State acquires rights on behalf of others to facilitate access without either managing, controlling, or exploiting in the case of mineral resources. Under state custodianship, there must be rules of administration applicable.
24. To thoroughly understand State custodianship of the land, one does not need to go further than vital pieces of legislation in South Africa that govern vital natural resources, i.e. MINERAL PETROLEUM AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT (MPRDA). Section 2 a) and b) of the Act give the two primary objectives of this seminal law and states that the objects of the Act are to a) recognise the internationally

accepted right of the State to exercise sovereignty over all the mineral and petroleum resources within the Republic, and b) give effect to the principle of the State's custodianship of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources.

25. Section 3 (1) of the MPRDA emphatically states that "Mineral and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the State is the custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans". The entirety of the Act after that determines and defines the circumstances under which those with the capacity to cultivate the mineral and petroleum resources should be allowed to do so. That is not the subject of this perspective. However, it is important to highlight that this legislation is consistent with the constitution and international laws, hence that most mines operating under this legislation are multinational corporations.
26. The second illustration of State custodianship of a natural resource in South Africa is on water. In the National Water Act of 1998, "National government is designated the public trustee of the nation's resources to 'ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled sustainably and equitably, for the benefit of all persons and in accordance with its constitutional mandate". Effectively, whoever harvests water for agricultural, domestic and energy purposes necessarily need the State's permission, which is composited of a democratically elected Parliament, the Executive and an Independent Judiciary. The National Water Act is not unconstitutional and does not infringe on anyone's rights.
27. The State, composed of an elected Parliament, appointed Executive and Independent Judiciary, is the most dependable custodian of South Africa's natural resources. The State is currently the custodian of South Africa's mineral resources, water and strategic pieces of land. The custodianship is justified by political, economic, historical, and moral justification, as state custodianship is intended to benefit most people.
28. State custodianship is the only practical manner in which South Africa can effectively succeed in land redistribution. Redistribution should be the essence of land reform, and the State cannot redistribute what it does not have.
29. The risk of a piece-meal approach to land redistribution is that the State will distribute the land under its control and, at some point, find itself landless while white people continue to control the majority of the land.
30. Due to South Africa's cruel history of barbaric racism underpinned by the colonial dispossession of land from the black majority and Africans, the State custodianship of the land is the only rational and logical option towards equal redistribution of the land.
31. More fundamentally, for society as unequal as our, State Custodianship of land is important for the following reasons; *Land, which ought to be a public resource, has been commodified and can be owned, bought or sold. This is a foreign*

concept to the manner Africans relate to the land; as a means of affirming identity, as a solidifier of the relationship between the physical world and the spiritual world, as an inheritance from those who came before us, which must be passed to those still to come. Private ownership of land is a colonial construct. State custodianship of land would therefore be a means through which the concept of land ownership is decolonised. The State does not own the land, the people as a whole do, and the State is a mere custodian on behalf of the people.

32. Private ownership of land has allowed for the injudicious accumulation of land by only a few of those with access to capital. It is not even all white people who own land in the South African context, but just a tiny minority. State custodianship of land will mediate this dynamic and ensure that everyone has access to land by allocating land use rights. This will not be mediated by money but by the use for which the land is intended. So, State custodianship would ensure a more equitable redistribution of land use rights and eliminate exploitation of one class by another, and in South Africa's case, of one race by another.
33. The land question has taken a more urban form due to rapid urbanisation, leading to unsustainable and dehumanising informal settlements in the cities. State custodianship of land would give the State massive leeway to and for ensuring sustained, State directed development for the benefit of the majority of South Africans. This will include targeted development of human settlements in areas closer to where people work and the eventual elimination of unexpected developments.
34. State custodianship of land is the most reliable manner of guaranteeing the security of tenure. The land-use rights given to citizens become a solemn contract between the State and the citizens it represents. The clarity of purpose for which these rights are given ensures that no one can arbitrarily take these land use rights away.
35. Linked to the above, State custodianship would guarantee the rights of the most vulnerable in society against evictions. Farmworkers, farm dwellers and people in townships get evicted every day from areas they have lived their whole lives when purported new owners buy the farms.
36. When the land is under the custodianship of the State, the rights of these people to the legal occupation of the land will be guaranteed.
37. This will also lower the cost of building houses and reduce the number of years people must service their home loans. Buying land for housing development is the most expensive part of building a house in urban areas. State custodianship will eliminate this aspect of the cost, lifting a heavy load on many South Africans who are heavily indebted or cannot afford to buy their own houses.

38. State custodianship will also allow for a more democratic manner of administering land. For example, in the former homelands, where traditional leaders still do land allocation, women are sometimes barred from the land allocation based on their gender; and young, unmarried people are also not granted land parcels. State custodianship would ensure that land is administered democratically, with no discrimination based on gender, age or sexual orientation.
39. South Africa has a total land surface of almost 122 Million Hectares. About 79% of this land is privately owned, 14% owned by the State, and 7% unaccounted for, meaning it was unregistered land, which the State may technically own, according to the 2014 Land Audit Report. Of the privately-owned land, the last land audit (2017) shows that of the surveyed land, individuals, companies and trusts own 89 523 044 ha, which is about 90% of the land under private ownership. Broken down into finer details, land in private ownership is as follows: Individuals own 37 800 986 ha or 39% of this total land; followed by trusts at 29 291 857 ha or 31%; companies at 23 199 904 or 25%; Community Based Organisations at 3 549 489 ha or 4%; and co-ownership at 883 589 ha or 1%.
40. It would be impossible to address this inequality, the problem on ongoing insecure right so land for people living on farms, in the former Bantustans, and in informal settlements, if the core of the problem is not addressed, and that is the continued exclusionary and repressive system of private ownership of land.
41. In this regard, State custodianship of land remains the only logical solution.

E. CURRENT REALITIES AND WAY FORWARD

42. In terms of the current conditions, the following ought to be noted; The land reform programme has deadlocked in the country, and there are no practical indications that the situation is going to change in the foreseeable future. A tiny minority of the settler community continues to own most of the land, while the vast majority of the natives are landless.
43. The Constitution and the protections it affords to the settler land owning community remains the biggest hindrance to comprehensive reforms.
44. The incapacity and ineptitude of the State are major contributors to the almost non-existent programme of land reform, even within the constraints of the Constitution.
45. Within existing constitutional limitations, the land reform programme is grossly underfunded, and most of the funding goes towards the compensation of white farmers

46. Within the context of current electoral performances, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future, there will be a sufficient voting block constituting two thirds majority to amend the Constitution in Parliament.
47. In its current formulation, land reform is implemented on the basis of three programmes, all provided for in the Constitution, these being, Land Redistribution, Land Tenure Reform, and Land Restitution.
48. The land restitution programme has captured popular imagination, because it relates to claiming restitution of that which was lost, but in reality, the programme has been a spectacular failure. Of the land claims lodged in 1998, the Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights still has about 6 000 land claims yet to be resolved. They have estimated that it would cost them about R68 billion to finalise these claims, over a period of 30 year's.
49. Further, there are over 100 000 land claims submitted after the Restitution Amendment Act, which was later declared unconstitutional. The Courts ruled that these new claims must only be entertained once all the 1998 claims have been settled. So in essence, the over 100 000 land claims lodged after the enactment of the Restitution Amendment Act can only be unsealed and entertained after 30 year's.
50. The Restitution programme is conceptually and practically flawed, and must be done away with as a programme of land reform. Our land reform programme must be underpinned and driven by a massive and focused land redistribution programme, aimed at making land available to all, without having to prove historical links to a piece of land. All land in this country belongs to the African people, and all of it must be returned to the African people.
51. Taking these factors into account therefore, it is important for conference to engage with possibilities of advancing the EFF vision within the context of existing limitations. In this regard, the EFF can do the following:
52. On State Custodianship: Introduce legislation State Custodianship of Land, this law would be akin to the MPRDA, and would be initiated in accordance with Section 25(1) of the Constitution, which permits deprivation of property, if that is done in terms of a law of general application. In the *Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy (CCT 51/12) [2013] ZACC 9*, the Constitutional Court ruled that it is possible to limit rights to property, if this is done in terms of a law of general application. This suggests that land can also be subjected to this constitutional provision and bring it all under the custodianship of the State. This is unlikely to get support from the dominant right-wing faction in parliament, however.
53. On expropriation without compensation: The amendment of the Constitution to permit for expropriation without compensation remains a non-negotiable policy position for the Economic Freedom Fighters.

54. With little possibility of effecting a Constitutional amendment in the short to medium term, the incoming CCT must upscale a national wide programme of land occupations, not merely for the purposes of building informal housing structures, but settlements aimed at taking productive agricultural land for productive use by the people themselves.
55. Linked to this, the incoming CCT must build strong internal legal capacity to defend land occupations and those leading land occupations in Court.
56. In Parliament, the EFF must work towards regularising the Interim Protection of Informal Rights Act, in order to create a solid legal mechanism for protecting the rights of those whose rights to land is not secured.
57. The question of traditional leaders and their role in the management of land must be carefully reconsidered. A progressive movement like the EFF must not pander to the whims of unelected feudal institutions that are known to be oppressive towards women and young people. Legislative amendment ought to be made to ensure that traditional leaders do not have the powers to lease or sell land that belongs to the people to private companies, and that land administration powers at local level are democratised, and are affirming of the rights of women to own land. Legislation should make it clear that traditional leaders do not have more rights to the land than the people.
58. The EFF has consistently proclaimed that its agricultural vision depends largely on the support given to, and the efficiency of smallholder farmers. As a matter of this ideological commitment, attempts must be made to develop South African agriculture through the promotion of smallholder farming.
59. The promotion of smallholder agriculture must essentially mean the subdivision of large, unworkable farming estates into smaller, feasible family farms. This also means that in the context of agricultural value chains currently controlled by white monopoly capital, which squeeze out subsistence and smallholder farmers, making it impossible for emerging black farmers to come through, the EFF leadership should establish a commercial institutional framework, which must have the necessary research and development capacity, to provide strategic interventions in support of black farmers. This must include the opening up of market opportunities for black farmers, and the development of scientific capacity within the state and amongst black farmers to produce seeds that would break the monopoly of Monsanto. This, the EFF can do before it gets to government.
60. The above is also linked to the ideal of food sovereignty. In this regard, it is important that the food produced in the country is free of genetically modified seed and foodstuffs. To this end, the EFF must do all it can to force the government

to undertake independent studies on the impact of GMOs on the health of the people, and their impacts on the environment.

GENDER STRUGGLES AND INEQUALITY




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A. INTRODUCTION

1. Gender inequality remains a pressing issue across the globe, with stark disparities observed in economic, social, and political spheres. In South Africa, despite the country's transition to democracy and the implementation of various legislative measures, progress towards gender equality has been slow and uneven (Musetsho et al., 2021). The South African workplace, in particular, continues to be dominated by men, with women facing persistent discrimination and barriers to advancement.
2. The struggle for the emancipation of women and the gender non-conforming (GNC) is one that cannot be divorced from the struggle of Black people as the marginalized collective. Black people, for centuries, have been subjected to immense abuse and alienation from the dignity that is afforded to humankind, manifesting in many ways. Women in South Africa, particularly Black women, have suffered a great deal during apartheid. The distinction to separate the struggle of Black women from that of other women is intentional as, by virtue of being Black, Black women are not only confronted by the struggle for liberation as women but also as Black people.
3. Black women face a nuanced and multifaceted and intersectional struggle—from access to sanitary towels to safety, and the right to be afforded a platform to be leaders of society, and everything else in between. Not only did Black women have to deal with apartheid laws, but also with patriarchy and misogyny at home and in society. Despite the attainment of political power post-1994 elections, wherein gender equality policies and laws were partially established, the status quo remained and is still the case to date.
4. In different parts of the world globally, Black women in particular find themselves being the premise of various kinds of oppressions waged against humanity—socially, politically, and economically. In 2014, South Africa dramatically dropped from 4th position out of 87 countries on their social institutions and gender index to 90th position out of 148 nations. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) largely attributed the decline to the failure of the justice system. Of the 63,057 sexual offences reported between 2012 and 2013, only 12,324 of these cases led to conviction. Currently, the status remains the same (PERSISTENCE IN GENDER EQUITY, n.d.) (South African Police Service Annual Report 2012/2013 | South African Government, n.d.).
5. From a young age, Black women and girls are raised to believe that they are the weaker gender, vulnerable to violence and abuse. Black women and girls are taught to not only fear men but also to revere them as superior human beings. Furthermore, the systemic entrenchment working against the liberty of women ensures that various factors trigger and

sustain the positionality of women and GNC persons in society. These factors are entrenched through social systems like culture, politics, religion, and general social norms. These factors also work to normalize and mainstream the domesticity of women, their objectification, and the stripping away of agency and bodily autonomy from women in different and various ways. Engels (1884) asserts that gender oppression is closely related to class oppression and that the relationship between men and women in society is similar to the relations between the proletariat and bourgeoisie.

6. He further emphasizes that women's subordination is a function of class oppression, maintained because it serves the interests of capital. "Gender oppression also divides men against women, privileges working-class men relatively within the capitalist system in order to secure their support, and legitimates the capitalist class's refusal to pay for the domestic labour assigned, unpaid, to women." As a result, women have historically been marginalized and regarded as unequal to men in terms of social and power relations, giving rise to significant social, cultural, and economic inequalities.
7. South Africa is ranked as the most unequal country in the world when measured in terms of income and wealth. Inequality often overlaps with poverty, socio-economic disadvantage, and race, and South Africa is a typical example where poverty and socio-economic disadvantage intersect directly with race due to the legacy of apartheid, which affected women disproportionately. A system that exploits and creates a conducive foundation for society to wage different kinds of violence against women and the GNC is thus misogynistic. A system or way of living that acknowledges men as default leaders and superior species over women and children is patriarchy.

B. ON GENDER

8. Gender pertains to the performative aspect of being a man or woman. Most genders are assigned to people at birth based on the biological sex of the baby. A person born female will be assigned the gender of a girl and later on, a woman, and a person born male will be assigned the gender of a boy and later on, a man. These assigned genders are performative even before the birth of the baby. Male children assigned the gender of a 'boy' are associated with the colour blue and cars, while female children assigned the gender of a 'girl' are associated with the colour pink and dolls. In the assignment of gender under the current social norm, there is no in-between or alternative gender other than that of man or woman. This is what we refer to as a gender binary. The woman is presumed to be feminine, and the man masculine.

9. Femininity is associated with gentleness, irrationality, and weakness, while masculinity is associated with strength, logic, and intelligence. In some cultures, the logic behind the woman being a weaker gender is supported by the idea that the woman has a bleeding wound (vagina) from having 'castrated' the phallus (penis). This binary becomes problematic as it is imposed and also excludes those born intersex. The socialization perpetuated by gendering assumes the performative nature one should possess, and failure or the decision not to follow suit results in various violations toward human beings. This is thus the foundation of misogyny, homophobia, transphobia, and queerphobia. This way of imposing gender norms also results in the perpetual continuation of patriarchy, whereby those assumed to be men have to overcompensate by exerting masculinity so that they can be deemed 'men,' as fragility is associated with femininity.
10. Sexuality is a term broadly used to refer to sexual orientation. There are over fifty terms in the discourse of sexuality, the most common being heterosexual and homosexual. This supposed binary does not cover the entire existence of sexuality, which is always evolving as a discourse. LGBTQIAP+ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual/Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual, Pansexual, etc.) refers to a collective outside of the heterosexual identity. It must, however, be noted that being transsexual, transgender, and intersex are not sexualities per se but identities either assigned at birth or transformed into later in life.
11. The struggle for gender equality is peculiar regarding the different identities embodied and performed by women. Intersectionality pertains to recognizing the nuances and dynamics of being a woman who is Black, Coloured, identifying with the LGBTQIAP+ community, living in rural or township areas, an immigrant woman, or living with a disability, and having some of these different struggles coexist. The point of contact of each of these struggles, where they intersect, is the premise of defining the duality as intersectionality. In each of the noted identities women embody, there are various other intricacies that inform the different struggles inherent in the overall quest for gender equality. In simple terms, there is no umbrella approach in defining women's struggle, uprooting misogyny, and normalizing patriarchy, and there is no one way to go about realizing liberation for African women and the GNC in particular. Gender inequality extends beyond women and men. The lives of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Queers (LGBTIQ) are under consistent threat in a misogynist, homophobic, classist, and violent society like South Africa.

C. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

(a) Labour

12. Regrettably, compared to men, women in South Africa still bear a disproportionate amount of the burden associated with underdevelopment, unemployment, and low labour force participation. This is partially due to the fact that women are more likely to take on tasks that restrict their options in the job market, such as childcare and home chores. Women have been less active in the employment market than men, according to changes in labour force participation and absorption rates for men and women from 2014 to 2024.
13. The structural gender divisions of labour, both paid and unpaid, continue to lie at the heart of many cultural and social practices in South Africa. For women residing in rural areas of South Africa, poverty remains a persistent contributing factor to gender inequality. With transport in rural areas being a challenge, women often depend on lifts from strangers to get around. This puts them at huge risk: violence, human trafficking, rape, and other forms of sexual assault. Women living in rural areas are automatically excluded from partaking in or initiating opportunities to compete with their male counterparts.
14. Compared to their urban counterparts, women in the rural economy are typically more susceptible to poverty. A few of the dynamics at work are highlighted by the report's evidence. First, the percentage of women in South Africa who live in rural areas is larger than the percentage of women who live in metropolitan areas. Second, compared to metropolitan areas, more women work in rural areas. Third, overall, men continue to outnumber women in terms of employment shares in both rural and urban areas. The results have several important ramifications, one of which is that while women are overrepresented in the workforce in rural areas, these places are not as developed as metropolitan ones; thus, the advantages might not translate into lower rates of poverty for women.
15. In terms of household income, men generally earn almost twice what women earn annually. In addition, trends indicate that white men dominate top positions across all sectors in the country. According to the study by the Enterprises University of Pretoria (2023), the average monthly household income in South Africa ranges between R24,000.00 and R26,000.00; however, a significant number of Black women earn far below R20,000.00.
16. While both men and women have seen increases in unemployment rates across all educational categories during this period, the data highlights a disproportionately greater impact on women. The most significant rises were among women with other tertiary qualifications, where the unemployment rate jumped from 15.1% in Q2:2014 to 26.9% in Q2:2024, a

rise of 11.8 percentage points, and those with a matric qualification, which increased from 28.8% to 39.5%, a rise of 10.7 percentage points. Women with graduate qualifications saw the smallest increase in unemployment, rising by 3.8 percentage points over the decade. In Q2:2024, their unemployment rate stood at 10.7%, which is higher than the 8.3% observed among men with similar qualifications (Africa, 2024).

17. According to the Human Sciences Research Council's (2024) reflection on women's position and barriers in the South African labour market, these issues are exacerbated by class struggles and cultural norms. The reflection finds that women in rural areas have a lower participation rate in the labour market at 40.3%, compared to urban women's participation rate of 55.7%. These disparities are caused by the higher opportunities and development in urban areas; however, adherence to culture and traditional attitudes regarding gender roles significantly affects women in rural areas due to a lack of empowerment and educational opportunities.

i. Agriculture

18. The agricultural sector has an overwhelming number of white men at top management levels. This means that transformation in terms of access to alternative streams of income is very slow. White men also have an upper hand in land ownership, whereas women have very limited access to land, whether white or Black. However, this phenomenon is worse within Black society due to cultural and traditional beliefs that men are the heads of households and thus have the right to land, while women can only access land when married, and forfeit that right if they divorce or are widowed.
19. Agricultural economist Wandile Sihlobo confirms that women constitute between 60% and 80% of smallholder farmers but make up only 15%-20% of landholders in sub-Saharan Africa. However, there has not been a land audit or research that investigates land ownership by women yet. Women's contribution to the agricultural labour market is hampered by legal and cultural constraints. Of most concern, the latest studies reveal an 11.8% drop in women's employment in the agricultural sector between 2008 and 2022. (Women in South African Economy 2024 - Google Search, n.d.).

ii. Mining

20. The research indicates that women in the mining industry in South Africa face significant challenges and discrimination. Despite the country's efforts to promote gender equality, the mining sector remains predominantly male-dominated, with women underrepresented in senior and leadership positions. The data reveals that women employed in the

mining industry often face hostile work environments, with reports of gender-based harassment, discrimination, and limited opportunities for advancement. The corporate culture in the mining sector is not yet fully ready to accept women as professional equals, and they continue to encounter barriers to career progression.

21. Furthermore, the research suggests that women in the mining industry are also vulnerable to gender-based violence, including sexual assault and harassment, which can be exacerbated by the remote and isolated nature of many mining sites. Addressing these issues is critical to improving the safety and security of women working in the mining sector.
22. Women in mining saw a significant reduction from 15% in 2018, according to the Department of Labour, to 12% in 2023. This decline is a result of non-supportive legislation, which is largely male-influenced and by no means serves as a provision to create a conducive environment for women, particularly those working underground. This phenomenon extends to construction and farmworkers as well. (What Is Women in Mining? - Women in Mining, n.d.) (Non-Supportive Legislation in Mining for Women - CGE 2018.)

iii. Unpaid care work

23. A study presented at the University of Cape Town in 2019 by an international institution called Counting Women's Work South Africa reveals that as far back as 2010, in more than 60 countries, unpaid care work was valued at R749.9 billion. Such unpaid production is equivalent to 27.3% of GDP. This is contrary to the UN resolution on Sustainable Development Goal 5, particularly goal 5(4), which states: "Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies, and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate."

iv. Hospitality and manufacturing

24. Like many other structural problems faced by women, the exclusion of women from the workspace is linked to the belief that men are more valuable than women. Recent global studies by KERB (2024) confirmed that one of the biggest issues in the hospitality industry is the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions. Despite 56% of all hospitality workers being women, they are disproportionately more likely to occupy the most junior roles in the kitchen (39%) than be a chef (17%), and they make up less than 40% of restaurant managers, with ownership rated at 1 in 3 being women (Women in Hospitality - Breaking Barriers and Building Bridges | Blog | Startle Music, n.d.). In manufacturing, women are

more associated with and face fewer barriers in seamstressing; however, women barely make it to the engineering field.

25. Capitalism has played a role in ensuring that women remain at the bottom of the food chain. Despite the fact that industries dominated by women are the most pivotal in the making, development, and sustenance of societies (food production, textile and apparel industry, nursing, and teaching, to name a few), capitalism has maintained that the labour provided by women remains unnoticeable and exploited in numerous ways. The economic positionality of women renders them dependent and easily exploited, and much of the violence against women is encouraged by the fact that women do not have the means to care for themselves.
26. The general nature of capitalism is the pursuit of labour for exploitation. The exploitative relationship between community healthcare workers and nurses, foreign nationals and citizens of a country, is no different from the indifference presented in the labour provided by women compared to men. The reason is not the quality of work, but the conditions presented that are opportunistic and conducive for exploitation.

(b) Transgender

27. Discrimination on the grounds of gender and gender identity is rife in our society. A case of a transgender learner before the Equality Court highlights how much must be done to address the concept of gender identity. While the case was won by the complainant, it was striking that the court referred to the complainant as male despite her identifying as female. The inability to understand or reasonably accommodate non-binary gender identities, as displayed by both school authorities and the Equality Court itself, reflects indirect discrimination and systemic inequality in the form of a hierarchy of social norms that do not fully recognize those who do not conform to traditional gender identities. Even the institutions tasked with resolving such issues are not equipped to deal with the less traditional forms of otherness.
28. Transgender people often struggle with home affairs officials due to the incorrect application of the law pertaining to changing gender markers, particularly regarding doctors' required documents on gender reassignment surgery and hormonal treatment. There is a lack of accommodative spaces and access to hormonal treatment, which is still largely provided by the private sector.

(c) Discriminatory cultural practices

29. Traditional culture and religious morals link female value to virginity, with the implication that a woman's value is irrevocably diminished once she is sexually active. This is a clear indication of patriarchy. It is also linked to

the belief that pregnancy is the sole responsibility of a female, rather than a co-responsibility equally shared between women and men.

30. It is often attributed to a woman to bear offspring, and should a woman lose children or be unable to carry a child, she is deemed useless and may be forced to allow polygamy, accept illegitimate children, or quit the partnership/union, regardless of how she feels about it.
31. Linked to the above beliefs is the invasive and discriminatory practice of “inspections” (such as **ukuhlolwa**) where a young woman is required to “prove” her virginity. Men are not at any stage subjected to this practice.

i. Ukuthwala

32. Ukuthwala is a traditional form of marriage involving the abduction of young girls with the intention of marrying them. This practice involves the kidnapping, rape, and forced marriage of minor girls as young as 12. Traditionally, the practice involves negotiations between the man and the girl's family in the form of an arranged marriage. Communities that practice **ukuthwala** value the custom and believe that it prevents girls from having children out of wedlock, as long as the male has the means to pay lobola.
33. South African legislation further exacerbates this phenomenon by allowing children as young as 16 to have the right to marry under parental guidance, contrary to the globally accepted standard that an adult is 18 years old.

ii. Ukungena

34. This is mainly practised by the Amampondo tribe when a widow, after losing her husband, is obliged to marry the brother of the deceased. This process is referred to as a law of succession.

(d) Gender-based violence

35. Gender-based violence (GBV) remains a persistent problem in South Africa. The high levels of GBV that women face also reflect violence against sexual and gender minorities and people with non-normative bodies. In particular, “corrective rape” results in significant harm to lesbian, gay, and transgender people, as it is not just a sex crime but a hate crime as well. It is estimated that 21% of women over the age of 18 years have experienced violence by a partner.
36. In the South African and African context, GBV is widely used to refer to the violence waged against women in particular because they are women. Culture and religion have, for many decades, been used to

ensure the continuity of women being subordinates and “objects” of men. GBV manifests in different ways, the most common being women not being afforded agency and/or choice. Women in South Africa are harassed by men every single day. These violations range from verbal insults hurled at women in the streets to actual physical assault, rape, and the murder of women.

37. Gender struggles go beyond physical GBV. Banyana Banyana earning less than Bafana Bafana just because they are women is a form of GBV. Capable women being sidelined from managerial and leadership positions is also a form of GBV.

(e) Intimate Partner Violence

38. Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) refers to the abuse happening in conventional relationships. IPV occurs in many ways: physical, verbal, emotional, and psychological abuse of a romantic partner. It is similar to domestic violence, except that in domestic violence, everyone in the home is affected by the abuse and the abuser (emotionally, physically, psychologically, and verbally).

(f) Education

39. It is the state's responsibility to provide access to quality education. The importance of access to quality education to unlock the potential of people and provide economic opportunities cannot be over-emphasized. However, the education system in South Africa faces significant challenges, including but not limited to inadequate infrastructure (such as water and sanitation). Access to education impacts young women and girls in a peculiar manner.
40. In rural and some township areas, where geographical distance is a barrier for pupils in accessing education, it poses a distinct risk for girls, whose safety is more at risk than that of boys. There are reports of young girls being dragged into bushes and velds and being sexually assaulted daily. The anxiety paralyses many young girls, who then drop out of school.
41. Young women and girls also face the challenge of not having sanitary towel resources, which leads to them missing school during menstruation. Four days a month may seem like a small number of days, but when added up, a young girl can lose close to 400 days of schooling due to a lack of sanitary towels. The undignified reality of having to use newspaper, which also has health repercussions, is an issue that has led many young girls to choose not to live with the shame. If a pupil is to drop out, it shouldn't be because they do not have sanitary towels.

(g) Legislation

42. The provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, explicitly provide for a democratic state based on, amongst other principles, "non-sexism." Section 9 of the Constitution guarantees the right to equality. It does so by providing for equality of all before the law, allowing for positive redress measures to advance previously disadvantaged persons, and prohibiting unfair discrimination by the state and by individuals.
43. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA), Section 8 of this Act stipulates that no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the grounds of gender, and goes on to list the following prohibited forms of gender-based discrimination:
 - i. Any practice, including traditional, customary, or religious practices, which impair the dignity of women and undermine equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-being of the girl child.
 - ii. Any policy or conduct that unfairly limits women's access to land rights, finance, and other resources.
 - iii. Limiting women's access to social services or benefits, such as health, education, and social security.
 - iv. Systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual division of labour.

(h) Parental Injustice

44. Women are historically entrusted with being primary caregivers in the home. It is unjust to relegate primary caregiving to women while at the same time not recognizing it as paid domestic labour. It was the efforts of women like Socialist Feminist Lily Braun that brought about victories for women in the workspace, like paid maternity leave and state-subsidized early childhood development centres. This position is important because capitalism is the primary beneficiary of labour that is birthed, cared for, and paid for by the free labour of primary caregiving by women. The state is also a beneficiary by default and, therefore, should be obliged to contribute to the care of children and, by doing so, grant women the opportunity to be active economic participants.
45. In South Africa, there is a culture of women being abandoned and children being neglected by their fathers. This is a social issue that cannot be resolved by simply wishing it away. The government must initiate tangible steps to protect women and children by ensuring that raising children is not solely the responsibility of women. The government must

ensure that women do not rely on the mercy of men to raise the children they brought into this world.

(i) Sexual Reproductive Health Righters

46. Every three minutes in sub-Saharan Africa, an adolescent girl or young woman aged 15–24 years is infected with HIV. In South Africa, nearly 1,000 adolescent girls and young women are infected with HIV each week. Young women and girls face the challenge of clinics being short of contraceptive drugs. Young women also cannot effectively negotiate the use of condoms, considering the skewed power dynamics between men and women.
47. The vulnerability of young women in a world with a weak sexual reproductive healthcare system leads to premature deaths as they seek abortion facilities that aren't afforded to them. On paper, our government provides all kinds of sexual reproductive healthcare. However, the reality for a young, poor Black woman, who does not want to be one of the 1 in 4 women stuck permanently in the cycle of poverty by keeping a child they cannot afford, is that she will be forced to do so because sexual reproductive healthcare is a myth for the dejected in South Africa.
48. There are various other dynamics at play that influence access to and usage of sexual reproductive healthcare by young women and girls. These dynamics range from some contraceptive methods being health hazards (Depo-Provera increases the chances of contracting HIV by 41% and is the most widely used contraceptive for teenage girls—who happen to be the most vulnerable to contracting HIV), to the shortage of contraceptives, stigma, and negative bodily responses to hormonal disturbances.

(j) Sex Work

49. Sex work is currently a criminal offense in South Africa. Women sex workers face many dangers, including risking their lives. Sex workers are subjected to immense abuse at the hands of men, their clients, societal stigma against sex work, and even state machinery that treats them as criminals. Sex work is an alternative way of making a living in an economy that alienates women, yet they are abused for this.
50. No woman should be subjected to rape, exploitation, inaccessible healthcare, treacherous work conditions, and the relinquishing of their basic human rights just because they are sex workers. The price of sex work is the decay of the dignity of women, which is a basic right of every South African. The decriminalization of sex work is not only about dignity and the protection of sex workers, but also about restoring agency and bodily

autonomy to a collective that has been robbed of the power to choose what to do with their bodies.

D. ORGANISATION POSITION

51. The EFF is a non-sexist organization that acknowledges the ever-evolving discourse on women, gender, and sexuality. The Fanonian lens on decolonization and emancipation finds expression even in the gender and sexuality question: "The first shall become last and the last shall become first."
52. Feminism, in simple terms, refers to the quest for equality and equity for those who have been ostracized and marginalized because of their biological sex, gender, and sexuality. Feminism's primary call is for social, political, and economic equality for women, the LGBTQIAP+, and the GNC. Feminism recognizes that there is an intentional subjugation of women, in particular, from political, social, and economic opportunities and freedom.
53. The EFF represents society's most vulnerable, who have been marginalized under the current system. The organization also believes that an indignity to one person is an indignity to all. The EFF is against the oppression of anyone based on their gender expression or sexual orientation. It is against tribalism and religious and cultural intolerance. The organization opposes any cultural or religious practices that promote the oppression of anyone, especially groups that have been historically oppressed by such practices.
54. The EFF will strive to realize women's liberation through a variety of interventions, from education against patriarchy and sexism to legislation and close monitoring of the implementation of the same in order to realize women's empowerment in society, the family, and the workplace. The EFF believes that gender-based violence and related antisocial activities are reinforced and even sustained by the deplorable conditions of our people; therefore, a key to female emancipation is the emancipation of all. The EFF will emphasize transforming the lives of our people from generalized structural violence as a mechanism to end all violence, including violence against women

E. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

55. The EFF government will strive to realize women's liberation through a variety of interventions, starting with prioritizing women when it comes to the benefits of economic emancipation. These interventions will include education against patriarchy and sexism, complemented by legislation to protect and promote women's liberation, and the close monitoring of

implementation to realize real women's empowerment in society, within the family, and at the workplace.

56. The EFF believes that gender-based violence and related antisocial activities are reinforced and even sustained by the deplorable general conditions of our people; therefore, a key to female emancipation is the emancipation of all. The EFF will emphasize transforming the lives of our people in the ghettos from one of generalized structural violence as a mechanism to end all violence, including violence against women.
57. In realizing women's liberation and fighting against discrimination and injustice against women, the EFF has implemented a non-negotiable Zebra approach for all positions of government and 50% or more women representation across all leadership positions. As such, when the Eastern Cape 3rd PPA elected an all-male top 5, the EFF leadership, through the utilization of Complementary Pillar no. 6 of the founding manifesto as well as the principles of the EFF under the section of the EFF constitution, corrected the gender balance in the top 5 of EC.
58. Believing in advocacy for the rights of women, the EFF established a GBV desk, which is dedicated to assisting women, vulnerable people, and the LGBTQI+ community with the challenges and injustices they face on a day-to-day basis.
59. The EFF government will ensure that the following key interventions are made:
 - i. 50% women representation in all spheres representing economic benefit, political participation, and managerial and leadership responsibility;
 - ii. Compulsory gender education and training for all (e.g., at school, work, within the family, church, in the legislative, executive, as well as civil society);
 - iii. Education of the police on gender justice and the establishment of specialized law enforcement units to deal with women-related crimes;
 - iv. Strengthening of education for men on patriarchy, sexism, and misogyny;
 - v. Engaging custodians of tradition, faith leaders, and other cultural practitioners to collectively find means to combat the oppression of women;
 - vi. The EFF government will introduce a special inspectorate in the Department of Labour to monitor, report on, and enforce gender parity and equality in the workplace. Such measures will range from name-and-shame, heavy penalties, to the withdrawal of trading licenses in the case of repeat offenders;

- vii. The EFF government will introduce a whistle-blowing mechanism for reporting all instances of sexual harassment, jobs-for-sex, and gender-based violence in the workplace;
- viii. The EFF government will initiate a comprehensive research project aimed at recognizing the work performed by women in the household as formal labour that contributes to the national economy, GDP, and the formal tax system;
- ix. The EFF government will ensure that in high-risk areas, and in areas where school pupils and students have to walk through dangerous surroundings, there will be police presence 24/7 and on-site police to walk the pupils to school;
- x. The EFF government will devise legislation that ensures that domestic abuse and gender-based violence cases are cases in which the state intervenes without formal cases being opened by victims;
- xi. The EFF government will build shelters for women and LGBTQIAP+ survivors and ensure that they are well-resourced, that the staff is added to the government employee payroll and has a standardized payment method, and that shelters and places of safety are run like other state institutions such as clinics and police stations;
- xii. The EFF government will publicize the sex offenders list for the public to access;
- xiii. The EFF government will add domestic violence, gender-based violence, and sexual crime cases to schedule five offenses that are most likely not to receive bail in court;
- xiv. The EFF government will create an IPID division that solely focuses on complaints against police who do not allow victims to open cases related to GBV, and against police who are complicit or alleged to be perpetrators of crimes against women, children, and gender-based violence crimes;
- xv. The EFF government will ensure that all cultural practices that promote and tolerate gender discrimination and gender-based violence and enforce gender inequality are abolished through institutions such as SAHRC, CGE, and CRL;
- xvi. The EFF government will ensure that the curriculum used for the training of police includes gender justice, the nuances of gender-based violence, and an evolving curriculum constantly updated to address the multi-sectoral growth around gender justice. SAPS members should be trained on the Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 and other legislation dealing with violence against women to be well-versed in handling offenders of such cases;
- xvii. The EFF government will make accessible to the public a routinely updated database of police officials and stations found to have violated victims of gender-based violence and sexual crimes;
- xviii. The EFF government will institute immediate suspensions of police officers and officials alleged to have committed crimes of violence against women and children, pending the outcome of the cases in court;

- xix. The provision of evidence kits will be regulated via a national system able to track the supply, demand, and provision to the public via an electronic system;
- xx. The EFF government will ensure that all police stations and offices have at least one person available who is trained in and understands sign language to cater to people with speech or language difficulties. Police stations must also be accessible for people living with all forms of disabilities, so as not to block their right to protection and security;
- xxi. The EFF government will ensure that the courts, SAPS, and NPA use community media and public meeting platforms for direct communication as a standard monthly procedure for all GBV education and information-sharing programs, prioritizing mother-tongue instruction;
- xxii. The EFF government will ensure that ALL judges, from the Magistrates Court to the Constitutional Court, as well as retired judges and Justices, are trained and retrained through annual refresher courses to equip them to deal effectively with gender-sensitive cases, including cases of sexual violence, domestic violence, paedophilia, rape, and gender-based murders. This training will extend to legislatures, prosecutors, and personnel working in environments dealing with vulnerable groups;
- xxiii. The EFF government will aggressively engage in public awareness and communication strategies and training interventions aimed at positively changing social norms that declare LGBTQI sexual preferences as abnormal;
- xxiv. The EFF government will amend the Criminal Law Amendment Act and existing legislation to include harsher minimum sentences for 'corrective' rape and crimes motivated by hatred;
- xxv. The EFF government will amend the Sex Description Act and related legislation to ensure the Home Affairs Department expedites ID alteration applications for transgender applicants;
- xxvi. The EFF government will invest in a public healthcare system that ensures easy access to gender-affirming treatment;
- xxvii. The EFF will establish a Gender Equality Desk at national, provincial, and regional levels to deal with implementing national standardized resolutions on addressing gender inequality. This desk will also report on gender matters arising from the membership base and serve as a school of thought on advancing and deepening the culture of gender mainstreaming in the organization. The Gender Equality Desk will be led by both male and female commissars;
- xxviii. The EFF government will abolish forced marriages, particularly those of minor girls as young as twelve. This is a violation of children's rights, human dignity, and freedom, and should therefore be punishable as kidnapping, sexual assault, and human trafficking;

- xxix. The EFF government will ensure access to female-specific healthcare and sexual reproductive healthcare according to universal healthcare coverage standards;
- xxx. The EFF government will ensure that the state provides free sanitary towels and alternative sanitary materials for menstruation for women and girls;
- xxxi. The EFF government will develop a maintenance court and strengthen legislation around parental justice, acknowledging that parenthood is not just monetary but also involves emotional and physical labour, to be contributed to equally by both parents. The maintenance court will assist dysfunctional families with counselling and standardize a parenting facility that teaches healthy parenting skills for parents found to be neglecting their children.

F. CONCLUSION

- 60. In conclusion, the EFF remains steadfast in its commitment to the liberation of women and all marginalized genders from the systemic oppression entrenched in society. Through a comprehensive set of interventions, ranging from legislative reforms to public education, the EFF aims to dismantle the patriarchy and eliminate gender-based violence, ensuring that the rights, dignity, and agency of all women, the LGBTQIAP+ community, and gender non-conforming individuals are fully recognized and upheld. The fight for gender equality is central to the broader struggle for social and economic emancipation, and the EFF will continue to lead the charge in building a non-sexist, inclusive, and just society for all.

MEDIA, COMMUNICATIONS AND BATTLE OF IDEAS



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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The media space in South Africa is controlled and dictated by the capitalist and racist establishment that defines political and economic life, and this continues to necessitate the need for us as a revolutionary movement to partake in a battle of ideas in the media terrain.
2. As our assessment made ahead of the 2nd National People's Assembly in 2019, the development of information, distribution of information and packaging of information and what purpose it serves, is curated by the colonial establishment. The control over media in the context of neo-colonial South Africa, where wealth and knowledge production purposely serve to entrench white capitalist control over society, is part and parcel of our obstacles on our path towards the attainment of Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime.
3. Our identity, our traditions and the rationale for our subservience to white minority rule and oppression, is rooted in the communication of black existence as devoid of a history of development, and as a result of that it has become easy to utilize media to discredit African liberation movements, African liberation history, the ideals of anti-capitalism and the notion of leftist governance in South Africa and the continent. The revolution which the EFF is pursuing, is therefore confronted by the long-established tradition of media that is counter-revolutionary and organized by the very capitalist establishment we want to defeat.
4. Our people are socialized to hate themselves, and hate even that which seeks to liberate them, by a media that is owned by people and institutions that have a vested interest in their continued disempowerment. Of greater concern, is the growing re-emergence of the portrayal of African people through the lens of historical racist tropes, using popular media. The characterization of Africans as promiscuous, unable to sustain their marital and family relations, the portrayal of Africans as violent or immersed in illegal substance abuse or trade, the portrayal of Africans as debt-ridden and financially irresponsible, are the hallmarks of racist indoctrination.
5. In recent years, models of communication, particularly in the television and radio broadcasting environment have invested heavily in these negative depictions of African people, through the medium of "reality television", and these denigrating portrayals of black life have been framed as story-telling, and as the sum of what black people are and represent.

6. It is by no coincidence that these types of communication of African reality, are mass-produced by corporations such as MultiChoice which is owned by foreign capitalist interests, who are amassing profit from selling the negative outcomes of colonial defeat of African people, as a form of entertainment.
7. The links between the capitalist project in South Africa, and racial denigration of black people therefore goes hand in hand even at the level of the production and dissemination of information and so-called entertainment. Colonial conquest assumes the legitimacy of white identity and the economic capitalist model of organizing society, and from this genesis, enacts a program of labelling the conquered as deserving of conquest due to the negative social-behavioral patterns that grow out of conditions of conquest.
8. The challenge in South Africa is that the colonial establishment has found an ally in the former liberation movement, which has now openly cemented itself as a tool of the oppressor camp. The formation of what is wrongly referred to as the "Government of National Unity" (GNU), has worsened the control of our nations' highest levers of economic power by the white capitalist establishment, and sent South Africa down the path of neo-liberal economic policy, austerity and privatization. News outlets, be it broadcast, radio, print or outdoor media, have been weaponized as platforms to promote the government of compromise, wherein racists have resumed political control of South Africa.
9. This political control of South Africa by the political parties of capital, was heavily funded and has distorted and compromised the democratic project. The Provincial and National Elections on the 29th of May 2024, were a perfect case study of the investment of capital in the battle of ideas in the media terrain. In the lead up to the elections, media outlets in South Africa were willing participants in the depiction of the EFF as the quintessential evil, that ought to be defeated by an alliance by formations formed and funded by the Oppenheimer and Rupert capitalist enterprise.
10. As the EFF correctly predicted in its Founding Manifesto, the former liberation movement lost political power, with the EFF having played a crucial role in its collapse, and as the capitalist establishment awoke to the reality of the EFF emerging as an alternative movement of African people, they created conditions that propelled a narrative that the control of South Africa by a socialist and anti-racist organization would spell a doomsday.

11. The EFF, because it represents ideas which are antithetical to colonialism and capitalism was promptly declared as enemy number one. This characterization was fueled by the very capitalist media establishment, that is owned, funded and controlled by the enemies of the liberation of African people. It filtered into the processes of negotiating and forming a new government, after the former liberation movement lost political power.
12. The possibility of an alliance between the EFF and other subjectively or objectively progressive organizations, posed a threat to capitalist rule in South Africa, and the media and the currency was weaponized as a tool for negotiations. Essentially, an EFF in government was deliberately and aggressively framed as a path to economic ruin.
13. An EFF government represented a break from colonial domination, neo-liberalism and the post-modern racism that permeates South Africa, and capital invested millions in suppressing this emerging alternative and resisting its inevitable destruction. Capital reached into a history of compromise and collaboration, to sanitize its capture of our democratic project, and the sentiment of a government of national unity, became a convenient smokescreen for an alliance of capital, between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA). For all intents and purposes, South Africa has achieved a more deliberate and concrete compromise of the liberation struggle than it did in 1994, as the compromise of 2024 is clear-cut in its aspirations to privatize every facet of South African society and auction it to domestic and international capitalist interests.
14. The battle of ideas South Africa today is therefore against this alliance of neo-liberalism in government, and the charge ought to be led by the EFF that the founders and funders of this alliance fear the most. This battle needs to be waged in all terrains, and in the very media platforms controlled and owned by capital. The EFF needs to take the battle against neo-liberal market fundamentalism to the streets, the airwaves, the television screens, the billboards, digital media and social media. It is imperative that we heighten our critique of the establishment and refine our message to appeal to the middle and working classes, who bear the consequences of the control of society by market interests.
15. Our battle of ideas must therefore conduct analysis of broader society, and how media has entrenched itself as a weapon to numb the consciousness of our people and perpetuate white colonial domination, and capitalist ideology. We must critique and form an analysis on the trajectory and

character of media in society in light of technological developments, and a growing trend of alternative media such as podcasting and streaming. The purpose of this is to ascertain how the movement will inject itself in the development of media as a tool of control over society and propel revolutionary ideas to gain hegemony in public discourse.

16. This discussion document will explore four broad categories; broadcast media, which includes television, radio and cinema; print media, which includes newspapers, magazines and knock-and-drops; outdoor media, which describes mainly billboards, posters and branding; and digital media, which refers to communication in the online space.

17. The document is divided into seven sections:

- a) Information and Communications Technologies
- b) Media and ICT legal frameworks
- c) The broadcasting sector
- d) Print media
- e) Digital media
- f) The propaganda war against the EFF – Shift From Smear Campaign To Funded Ideological Warfare
- g) Advertising and out-of-home media
- h) EFF media

B. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (ICT)

18. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) remain at the center of the developmental program of society and has been critical to create a global interactive society. Globalization, and political, economic, social and cultural transfer of information and influence no longer depends on physical interaction but is achieved through digital engagement and a digital research hub that can provide access to any society anywhere in the world at the palm of one's hand.

19. More than ICT being the main tool of the project of globalization, both positively and negatively, it has become one of the most profitable industries in the world as it sits at the center of digitizing all human interactions and collection of data. Data has become one of the greatest modern commodities, as it is used for purposes of advertising, tracking human behavior, manipulating social, economic and political trends and storing of information that can track and determine human behavioral patterns. In today's world, access to healthcare, financial services,

education, security and justice, which are basic human rights, will be impossible without telecommunications.

20. The profitability of the ICT sector over the past few years, and the access by households to telecommunications infrastructure is an indicator of the growth of the sector. The tables below illustrates how in South Africa alone, this sector has made remarkable growth and impact on the economy, with decreases only in fixed internet and data, as well as fixed line revenue.

21. Revenue breakdown by telecommunications sub-sector

No.	Sub-sector	Revenue 2022 (2021)
1.	Mobile services	R121.9 billion (R113.9 billion)
2.	Other	R59.6 billion (R56.2 billion)
3.	Fixed internet and data	R20.9 billion (R23.4 billion)
4.	Fixed line	R5.5 billion (R6.5 billion billion)
	Total	R208.1 billion (R200.2 billion)

22. In 2022, 32 280 individuals were directly employed in the telecommunications industry, a decrease from the 37 063 which were employed in the sector in 2018.

23. Investment in telecommunications services in South Africa over the past five years, although there has been expansion in the sector and access to telecommunications infrastructure, has decreased.

24. The table below illustrates this;

No.	Year	Rand value of investment
1.	2018	R46.9 billion
2.	2019	R38.9 billion
3.	2020	R36.5 billion
4.	2021	R33.9 billion
5.	2021	R39.7 billion
	Total	R195.9

25. Access to internet has seen a general increase in all provinces of South Africa both at home and in terms of access to the internet outside of home: (as of 2021)

No.	Province	Percent with access to internet at home	Percent with access to internet everywhere
1.	Eastern Cape	5.00%	64.70%
2.	Free State	7.10%	72.60%
3.	Gauteng	16.4	86.70%
4.	KZN	6.40%	75.90%
5.	Limpopo	1.90%	63.90%
6.	Mpumalanga	1.70%	76.60%
7.	North West	2.40%	67.50%
8.	Northern Cape	5.90%	66.70%
9.	Western Cape	25.90%	89.10%
	South Africa	10.40%	64.70%

26. Access to telecommunications devices: South Africa

No.	Type of access	Percentage of households 2021	Percentage of households 2020
1.	Functional cell and landline	6.5% (Decrease from previous years)	8.20%
2.	Only functional cell phone	90.8% (increase from previous years)	89.40%
3.	Only functional landline	0.50%	0.50%
4.	None	2.2% (decrease from previous years)	1.80%

Source: ICASA Report On State of ICT Sector In SA 2023

27. Notably, the telecommunications sector in South Africa has not been immune to the challenges posed by lack of reliable electricity supply, and a dwindling economy, as in the year 2024, Telkom expected to retrench 1 170 employees and Cell C having experienced a shrink in the workforce from about 2,600 to 900 as of September 2023.

28. The cost of data in South Africa remains comparatively high when viewed against continental and global data costs, and this remains due to the duopoly control over the sector by Vodacom and MTN.

29. As predicted in 2019, the auctioning of spectrum did little to improve competition in the sector, and further entrenched the duopoly. The auctions and allocations of spectrum held in March 2022, and generated a revenue of R14 billion, and predictably maintained the duopoly of MTN and Vodacom because an auction that determined allocation based on the

monetary strength of service providers, will do nothing to alter a duopoly because new entrants cannot compete, and the needed competition will not be achieved.

30. The tables bellowed, sourced from the ICASA auctions held in March 2022 illustrate.

No.	Bidder	700	800	2600	3500	TOTAL (ZAR)
1.	Telkom		20			R1 504 815 407.10
2.	Liquid Telecom					
3.	Cell C					
4.	Rain	20		10		R1 151 274 105.50
5.	Sub-total Revenue					R2 656 089 512.60

31. Spectrum Lots Acquired in Main Auction Stage and Associated Revenue

No.	Bidder	700	800	2600	3500	TOTAL (ZAR)
1.	Telkom				22	R608 800 000
2.	Liquid Telecom				4	R111 000 000
3.	Cell C				10	R288 200 000
4.	Rain			10		R280 100 000
5.	MTN		20	40	40	R5 152 100 000
6.	Vodacom	20		80	10	R5 381 600 000
7.	Unsold		20			
	Sub-total Revenue					R11 821 800 000

32. Total Spectrum Lots Acquired per Bidder and Associated Financial Commitment

No.	Bidder	700	800	2600	3500	TOTAL (ZAR)
1	Telkom		20		22	2 113 615 407.10
2	Liquid Telecom				4	111 000 000.00
3	Cell C				10	288 200 000.00
4	Rain	20		20		1 431 374 105.50
5	MTN		20	40	40	5 152 100 000.00
6	Vodacom	20		80	10	5 381 600 000.00
7	Unsold		20			
	Sub-total Revenue					14 477 889 512.60

33. As can be seen, Vodacom and MTN bid a total of R10.5 billion out of the R14.4 billion for spectrum allocation, rendering the auction obsolete and the duopoly of MTN and Vodacom intact. In this scenario, the cost of data will continue to remain high. The most viable option remains that the state must license spectrum to service providers such as Rain, Cell C and Telkom to boost their competitiveness against the duopoly.
34. As argued in 2019, a more comprehensive solution as the roll-out of 5G still stagnates in South Africa, is that the Wireless Open Access Network (WOAN) model must be reserved for the whole 5G spectrum roll out. Companies must be obliged to start sharing infrastructure with the view to move into being more service based. There must be a single network owner and operator, and multiple retail service providers that deliver services over the network. As things stand; the South African telecommunications industry is not sharing infrastructure, and we as consumers suffer the brunt of profit maximization efforts by the duopoly.
35. As things stand, the revenue for prepaid mobile data and prepaid mobile voice (airtime) sits at R32.8 billion and 24.7 billion for the year 2022. For a period of 5 years, revenue from prepaid mobile data increased by 6.28%.
36. The table below illustrates the cost of mobile data in South Africa as per the ICASA Report for 2023;

No. Prepaid data Bundle prices			
	Data Bundle (MB)	2023² prices	
		Lowest price	Highest price
1.	100(MB)	R15	R20
2.	250 (MB)	R35	R35
3.	500 (MB)	R69	
4.	1024 (MB)	R79	R85
5.	1536 (MB)	R89	R99
6.	2048 (MB)	R139	R149
7.	3072 (MB)	R199	R229
8..	5120 (MB)	R299	
9.	6144 (MB)	R299	R349
10.	10240 (MB)	R469	
11.	20480 (MB)	R599	R699

C. MEDIA AND ICT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

37. One of the constitutional cornerstones of South Africa's democracy are the constitutional rights to media freedom, access to information and freedom of speech. These exist within a regulatory framework in ICT, broadcast and print media, and critical to the regulatory responsibilities in these spheres is the promotion of competition, compliance, diversity and transformation in the sector.
38. ICASA as the regulator in telecommunications, broadcasting and postal services has been ineffective in its mandate, as we have seen that the duopoly of MTN and Vodacom in terms of spectrum allocation has been entrenched by their misguided auction-centric approach to diversification. Further to this, under ICASA's regulatory authority, MultiChoice remains dominant in the Pay TV arena of broadcasting services, at the expense of the public broadcaster the SABC. The ability by MultiChoice to generate revenue through subscriptions, and the use of SABC content for free under the Must Carry Regulations which remain in place, mean that Multi Choice is able to utilize its financial muscle to equally dominating bidding for broadcasting licenses of major sporting events, while the SABC limps into financial ruin because of its dependency on subsidies and payment of TV licenses, where there are no consequences for defaulting.
39. The Media, Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA). in partnership with the major print and broadcast media industry, is supposed to help create an enabling environment for media development and diversity that is conducive to public discourse and reflects the needs and aspirations of South Africans. This has been an objective failure.
40. Print media is allowed to self-regulate through the Press Ombudsman. Print media sets up the Press Council, Ombudsman and Appeals Panel to handle disputes between the public and the print media (newspapers and magazines), however this self-regulation does not lead to meaningful accountability and fairness, as the consequences for false-narratives and articles take long periods of time to process and do not act as a deterrent to the publishing of defamatory and misleading information. Further to this, the regulatory space in the print media is riddled by conflicts of interest, where editors equally form part of regulatory bodies such as SANEF, and the very same editors use **their discretion and control of publications to pursue bias narratives and personal** political vendettas.

D. THE BROADCASTING SECTOR

41. The unfortunate reality confronting South Africa is that there remains a monopoly in the Pay-TV space which is held by MultiChoice. The advent of Open View has had a minimal impact in shifting this monopoly, while the SABC is plagued by declining revenue, poor management and stagnating creativity.
42. The emergence of alternative media, in the form of podcasting and streaming has posed a unique competition to traditional media platforms such as television broadcast, radio broadcast and cinema, but these platforms remain resilient despite the modernizing of the sector through digital media over the past few years.
43. 75% of South Africans aged 15 and older tune into radio weekly, with an average listening time of 5 hours and 12 minutes per day. Radio remains highly popular across all socio-economic groups, despite the rise of digital platforms.
44. Interestingly, 68% of social media users and 76% of music streamers are also regular radio listeners. While 61% of South Africans reporting to listening to radio during their morning commute, afternoon drive-time listenership has decreased to 25%. This shows how traditional radio continues to coexist alongside digital media, retaining a broad, engaged audience.
45. More than 26.4 million South Africans listen to the radio several times a week. Music remains a key driver of radio shows' popularity, but localised content such as news (65.9%), weather updates (64.8%), advice (59.4%), and traffic reports (55.9%) also play a crucial role in maintaining high listenership levels across the country.
46. In the first quarter of 2021, 73% reported tuning into a TV channel that week, but this number significantly dropped to 54% by the third quarter of 2023. Meanwhile, the streaming industry is seeing considerable growth, with approximately a third of all TV viewing now occurring online. This translates to an estimated eight million South Africans, particularly from Gen Z and Millennial generations, who are shifting to various streaming services.
47. Data shows that 40% of Gen Z and 41% of Millennials view content primarily on mobile devices, while only 4% of Boomers have adapted to streaming, according to the Media Audience Research Survey (MAPS).

48. DStv, owned by MultiChoice, reported a 5% decline in its active subscribers, which dropped to 7.6 million by the end of 2023.
49. According to the Market Research Foundation's MAPS data from 2021 to 2023, around 619,000 South Africans visit movie theatres regularly, typically once or twice every two or three months.
50. The prevailing challenges in the broadcasting sector created by MultiChoice still persisted over the years, with the entity retaining the abusive control of sporting rights and the parasitic Must-Carry Regulations, wherein MultiChoice aired SABC content and channels without directing revenue accumulated from this to the SABC continued
51. The EFF has over the years raised this challenge which is crippling the SABC in the 5th and 6th Administrations of the National Assembly, and made a breakthrough on the 01st of April 2022, as the SABC announced the official amendment the Must Carry regulations by ICASA, to prescribe to subscription broadcasters to carry the public broadcasters' channels subject to commercially negotiated terms.
52. The process of digital migration for broadcasting services and the switching off of analogue signal distributors for broadcasting services has been met with the predicted challenges over the years of legal and political battles, amending policy and digital migration regulations; finalising a government subsidy to move the remaining 3.9 million households from analogue-only sets to DTT sets; and ensuring that the broadcasters and Sentech play a more central role in driving the process.
53. The analogue switch-off has been subject to numerous delays and postponements, with the latest being that it is set to occur on the 31st of December 2024. The constitutional challenge with this is that should it proceed under the current circumstances, then nearly 4.5 million South African households will lose access to free-to-air television services because the required set-top-boxes have not been provided to them.
54. This would constitute an undermining of the right to access to information. The South African Post Office (SAPO) which was ceased with the task of distributing these set-top-boxes is in a state of collapse, with its storage facilities holding the infrastructure because of incapacity to distribute it.

55. It is important to note that over the past five-years, the EFF has not had any relationship with the eNCA broadcaster, due to their decision to pull out of the EFF 2nd National People's Assembly in 2019. Their fascist decision, which was inspired by their ties to Johann Rupert in terms of its ownership model led to its rapid decline in the news broadcasting space.
56. In 2020 according to the Broadcast Research Council Data, SABC improved its market share performance to 42% and 40% in the national, DTT and DSTV news markets, overtaking eNCA in audience viewership. In successive years, SABC has maintained this status after the call by the EFF for our people to consume news through the SABC and has in instances been overtaken by the then emerging channel Newzroom Afrika.
57. The principled decision by the EFF to maintain eNCA's self-imposed ban has proven to harm the channels performance financially, and equally resulted in them not having access to critical news which the EFF was at the centre of over the past five-years. eNCA has made frequent appeals to the EFF leadership to review our relationship, in light of changes in their leadership structure which took the decision to pull out of the EFF 2nd National People's Assembly.
58. It is up to the 3rd National People's Assembly to reflect on the decision and resolve on what is to be done in relation to eNCA.

E. PRINT MEDIA

59. Print media seems to fast be approaching its extinction, as digital consumption of news on social media gains traction and popularity.
60. According to the IAB, in the second quarter of 2023, daily newspaper circulation in South Africa reached 208,810, showing a year-on-year decline of 18%. The growth was mainly driven by eight daily newspapers, although most saw increases under 10%. Notably, The Herald and The Daily Dispatch achieved increases. On the other hand, publications like Citizen, Daily Sun, and The Witness experienced declines from the previous year.
61. For the first quarter of 2024, Isolezwe saw a 6% increase in circulation, reaching over 20,200, while Die Burger became the top-selling daily with more than 24,160 copies. The Cape Argus suffered the steepest decline, with a 19% drop. Daily Maverick and Beeld shared the highest growth of 5% when comparing Q1 of 2024 with Q1 of 2023.

62. Despite a 2% circulation drop, the Sunday Times remains the highest-selling weekend paper at over 60,700 copies. However, this is a far cry from 2014 when it had over 408,000 copies in circulation. City Press has seen a sharp drop from over 118,600 copies in Q1 of 2014 to just over 12,400 in 2024. Additionally, the Daily Dispatch Weekend and Weekend Post were discontinued earlier this year.

F. DIGITAL MEDIA

63. Digital media has seen a surge of usage especially for the consumption of news, sourcing and sharing of information. A majority of media houses now operate on a daily basis to provide news through digital versions of their publications, which are accessible online and on social media platforms, while podcasting has emerged not only as an entertainment producing medium, but one where political, social and economic commentary is made, with media outlets also venturing into that medium of communication.

64. As of early 2024, South Africa had 45.34 million internet users, with 26 million of them active on social media. Facebook led the platforms with 26 million users, while YouTube followed closely with 25.10 million users, according to Google's advertising data. Instagram had 6.95 million users, based on Meta's advertising tools, while TikTok boasted 17.46 million users aged 18 and above, as per ByteDance's advertising data.

65. Other platforms also showed significant engagement. Snapchat had 5.71 million users, according to Snap's advertising data. LinkedIn had 12 million members, and X (formerly Twitter) had 4.10 million users, based on advertising data from LinkedIn and X, respectively.

66. According to IAB, pageviews have gone up across publishers, except for sports media, with DStv Online Sport dropping to 29,230,878 pageviews. The top two positions went to News24 and Netwerk24 respectively.

- a) News24 - 174,524,155
- b) Netwerk24 - 102,047,262
- c) Maroela Media - 40,933,826
- d) SuperSport - 28,115,621
- e) SNL24 - 26,629,604
- f) Business Tech - 17,194,509
- g) Citizen - 16,987,235
- h) The South African - 15,567,280
- i) Daily Maverick - 10,791,192
- j) TimesLIVE – Arena – Web & App - 9,952,978

67. The Propaganda War Against The EFF – A Shift From Smear Campaigns To Funded Ideological Warfare; *"If you're not careful, the newspapers will have*

you hating the people who are being oppressed and loving the people who are doing the oppressing. . .The media's the most powerful entity on earth. They have the power to make the innocent guilty and to make the guilty innocent, and that's power." – Malcolm X.

68. The EFF has reached an incredible milestone since its inception, which is the marking of a decade of existence on the 26th of July 2023. This milestone was hailed as 10 Years of Unbroken Struggle, as it symbolised consistency of leftist and revolutionary activism on the picket lines, in governance and in relation to building of internal organizational capacity.
69. The ability to maintain over a period of 10-years, loyalty to a core set of values and ideas which are anti-establishment, contrary to capitalism and pursue justice that means disturbing the patterns of land ownership and control of the wealth of the country and the continent, is one that must be applauded.
70. The EFF has consistently capture public imagination, while never succumbing to the temptation of populism in exchange for electoral gain or public favour. It is the EFF that has remained the sole and consistent custodian of land expropriation without compensation, nationalisation of mines, banks and other strategic sectors of the economy, free education, housing and healthcare and a corrupt free and capable state anchored on industrialisation and economic-integration of the continent.
71. This the EFF has pursued, in the legislative terrain, and elevated people's struggles into public discourse that is saturated by neo-liberalism and false unity in the face of racialised control of the economy.
72. Until the most recent elections on the 29th of May 2024, the EFF had maintained an consistent upward trajectory in electoral performance, with the exception of certain areas in our body politic. Since 2014, this had been a place of pride for the EFF, as this upward trajectory was maintained in the face of organized propaganda and media campaigns that sought to discredit the EFF and its leadership at an ethical and moral level.
73. The EFF, not without difficulty weathered the storms of smear campaigns, which centred unverifiable claims of corruption against its leadership as the barometer for the moral and ethical incapacity of the movement itself. The establishment which the EFF seeks to topple, therefore had to find new avenues of deterring the EFF, and this was a combination of massive-investment in creating an opposition whose sole purpose was to erode the

EFF's electoral support base, as well as massive investment in a swart-gevaar propaganda campaign against the EFF and the ideas it represented.

74. The EFF had defeated the establishments shallow smear-campaigning, and for the first time since 1994, the puppet-masters came out openly ahead and during the 2024 Provincial and National Elections, and declared an ideological and political war against the EFF. The ideological war against the EFF, must be noted as a critical shift in the *modus operandi* of the established market and capitalist interests, because it meant that rumour-mongering and control of the press as outlets of speculation was no longer enough, and those who were opposed to the EFF had to come out openly and fight the EFF at an ideological level.
75. The EFF must therefore be credited for having dragged the enemies of the struggle for liberation out of their cocoons, wherein lies are manufactured against revolutionaries, and into the terrain of ideas. For a very long time, those who control the levers of power in South Africa operated with a policy of not getting their hands dirty, but smearing the character of proponents of the liberation struggle. Stratcom, the Apartheid media nexus of evil which went from tainting struggle stalwart Mama Winnie Madikizela Mandela as the murderer of Stompie Seipei, or creating a narrative the Peter Mokaba was an agent of the West, relied on lies to defeat the ideological opponents of the interests they represented.
76. The EFF after the 2019 Provincial and National Elections maintained its growth trajectory, despite the fact that Stratcom apparatus was unleashed to peddle propaganda regarding the EFF's involvement in the collapse of VBS, despite the peddling of lies about the EFF targeting women journalists, or being involved in procurement process in various municipalities it did not govern. Essentially, the media as a tool of putting into question the character of revolutionaries and the contemporary revolutionary movement, faced an unprecedented standstill.
77. It is for this reason that capital came out openly to fight for its interests, without any sense of innuendo or underhanded methodology. The method was, establish numerous political parties that represent neo-liberalism, market fundamentalism and an acceptance of the status quo, in order to ensure that the capitalist establishment has more political parties to leverage a neo-liberal coalition post the Provincial and National Elections in 2024.

78. The establishment and funding of these political parties of capital, was crucial to this plan, because the EFF had visibly been chipping away at the support base of the former liberation movement over successive elections over a 10-year period, and was poised to assume the position of the official opposition. This meant that as many political parties as possible needed to be established to present as possible alternative alliance partners of the former liberation movement, to avoid the firm leverage of state-apparatus, including economic policy by the EFF.

79. It is for this reason that billions of Rand were spent to sustain and form political parties with no clear ideological persuasion, other than a purported need for market stability and the creation of an investor friendly environment, and that all these parties had an incestuous commonality in their source of funding. The tables below, which contain Electoral Commissions' Party Funding Fourth Quarter Disclosure Report for the 2023-24 Financial Year illustrate the said political parties which were sustained and formed in anticipation of the establishment of a neo-liberal coalition to undermine the projected growth of the EFF.

No.	Political Party	Funder	Amount
1.	Democratic Alliance (DA)	Jonathan Ernest Maximilian Oppenheimer and another individual reported to be his father, NF Oppenheimer.	R65 074 359
		Martin Moshal	
		Main Street 1564 (PTY) LTD	
2.	Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	NF Oppenheimer and Jonathan Ernest Maximilian Oppenheimer.	R20 000 000
3.	Rise Mzansi	Voluntary organisation named We Are the People	R15 100 000
4.	Action SA	Martin Moshal	R10 525 000
		Moss Kadey	
		Style Eyes of California (Pty) Ltd.	
5.	Change Starts Now (Roger Jardien)	Main Street 1564 (PTY) LTD	R35 820 000
		Ball Family Trust	
		Fynbos Ekwiteit (Pty) Ltd	
6.	United Democratic Movement (UDM)	Voluntary organisation named We Are the People	R2 250 000
		Douw Steyn Family Trust	

80. It must also be highlighted that at the time these political parties received this funding, the EFF was projected to achieve 19% of the vote in the Provincial and National Elections of 2024 by IPSOS.

81. In April 2024, this trend of common funders ahead of the elections was further revealed. Political parties who were anticipated to form a coalition at the exclusion of the EFF received millions, and would ultimately turn out to be members of the DA-ANC led coalition in National Government.

82. The table below illustrates the 2024/2025 First Quarter Disclosures of Funding to the Electoral Commission by political parties of the neo-liberal establishment;

No.	Political Party	Funder	Amount
1.	Democratic Alliance (DA)	Voices of South Africa Foundation NPC - This group has links with one of the directors of Fynbos Ekwiteit Fynbos Ekwiteit Fynbos Kapitaal Jonathan Oppenheimer SAFDEV SSDC (Pty) Ltd	R56,601,039
2.	Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Jonathan Oppenheimer, Nicholas Frank Oppenheimer, Martin Moshal	R38,340,000
3.	Rise Mzansi	Rebecca Oppenheimer Voluntary organization "We Are The People" The Tempyr Trust - a foreign entity based in Luxembourg	R33,895,000
4.	Action SA	Martin Moshal Victoria Freudenheim	R13,186,000
5.	BOSA with Mmusi Maimane	Martin Moshal	Martin Moshal

83. It is also important to note that all of these political parties which have been appropriately characterised, now form part of the DA-ANC led coalition, inappropriately referred to as the Government of National Unity (GNU) post the 2024 Provincial and National Elections.

84. The formation and sustenance of these political parties of neo-liberalism, was supplanted by a direct campaign that depicted the ideals of anti-racism, land expropriation, nationalization, free education, socialism, anti-privatisation, anti-austerity and the EFF's posture against dependency on foreign direct investment as a mechanism for development, as a recipe for the economic and political collapse of South Africa. The advanced focus was no longer on how corrupt the EFF and its leadership possibly is, but the danger that the EFF and its ideas and inevitable assumption of governance with these ideas represents. Hence it can be stated that there was a shift from smear campaigns against the EFF, to ideological warfare and swaart-gevaar.
85. The South African media became the mouth-piece of an ideological propaganda war in South Africa ahead of the 2024 Elections, one that resembled the red-scare against the Soviet Union propagated by the USA during the Cold War in the 1960's. The EFF was presented on radio adverts and in self-styled opinion pieces and editorials by editors of publications as the quintessential evil, that was laden with impossible promises that would destroy the South African economy.
86. For the first time, the ideas of the EFF were the meaningful point of contest by popular media in South Africa, and not the personalities who lead it in terms of their social patterns and alleged behaviours. The fear of Malema transcended from being the fear of an alleged past of corruption, to the fear of his leadership style that maintained the cohesive growth and unity of the EFF. The airwaves and newspapers no longer cried VBS, but lamented that he may lead South Africa with the same intolerance for incompetence, laziness and betrayal as he leads the EFF.
87. The resistance of the EFF to bourgeoisie styles of democracy, in favour of firm leadership whose bedrock was democratic-centralism, became the rallying point by the liberal establishment to posit the EFF as a movement to be feared.
88. The fear was no longer the nonsensical and unsubstantiated notion that the EFF would loot state-coffers, but that the EFF would do with state-resources what it had outlined since its inception in its founding manifesto, and this had to be stopped. The efficiency with which the EFF ran its internal systems, was portrayed as something to fear, as the establishment knew that it would be this same efficiency that the EFF would run government, create a capable state and defeat capitalism.

89. Therefore, the declaration that an ANC-EFF coalition meant a doomsday for South Africa, was a supplement to the ongoing program of establishing and funding political parties that would be an alternative to an ANC-EFF coalition, within which the EFF would leverage the ANC away from neo-colonial influence.
90. The second factor to consider is how the EFF has without fail or compromise remained an unpleasant opponent of the establishment.
91. The EFF is not palatable, and this has resulted in an unease by the ruling capitalist and racist status-quo, that as Steve Biko once opined, *“want to administer the kick, and prescribe the response”*.
92. The EFF has therefore throughout its decade of existence been painted as violent, divisive and against the social-cohesion that was developed as a path for democratic society since 1994. The EFF has been an inconvenient enemy of the oppression of African people, and this inconvenience has been weaponised to caricature the movement as the enemy of the same people it seeks to liberate. The refusal of the EFF to succumb to modifying its revolutionary approach to seek approval from those it seeks to defeat, is one of its strongest points and is in line with a long history of the demand by the oppressor for a pliant victim.
93. The current evolving struggle by the people of Palestine against the genocidal campaign by Apartheid Israel, is a case study of how the media portrays victims, who deliver an appropriate response to oppressive violence, as aggressors.
94. The struggle of the people of Palestine dates back decades, and has for so long captured public imagination through solidarity protests and calls to cut diplomatic, political and economic ties with the Apartheid State.
95. For years, solidarity has been pledged to the people of Palestine through silent protests, pickets and demonstrations at Israeli embassies across the world, against the Zionist project that was underpinned by land dispossession and ethnic genocide of the Palestinian people.
96. At the point at which the struggle of Palestinian people, importantly on October 07 2023, through the revolutionary actions of Hamas responded to the Israeli aggression with the same aggression, is when solidarity with Palestinians became conditional.

97. Through adept propaganda, frequent public addresses by Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), Israel suddenly became the victim of anti-semitism and terrorism, and the Palestinians who have lived under the brutality of the Israel for decades became the aggressors.
98. The propaganda machinery of Israel used this messaging, to justifying intensified bombings of schools, hospitals and sites of religious worship as bases of "terrorists" that had to be bombed, and the casualties as victims of the new war against terror
99. The EFF, which is yet to pursue an armed struggle against the systems that oppress our people in South Africa, suffers this manipulative reversal of roles because of its radical posture against the continued control of the means of production by a white minority.
100. It is therefore important as part of the media campaign and political education of the EFF to consistently position itself as the only legitimate, cohesive and sustainable weapon for liberation of our people in the continent and the world.

G. ADVERTISING AND OUT-OF HOME MEDIA

101. Advertising remains a lucrative sphere in media and communications and especially as it relates to political party campaigns. The recent elections were a testament on how much advertising plays a vital role in messaging and appearances on radio, television broadcast and billboards in prime locations
102. The rise of social media as an interactive platform, has marked a shift in advertisement spend marginally away from the traditional billboard market, although it remains a dominant medium to advertise
103. In the recent 2024 elections, political parties spent substantive amounts on advertising on social media and through google. According to Meta's Ad Library Report the Democratic Alliance (DA) spent R2.6 million on advertisements on Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp between the 4th of February and the 3rd of May 2024.
104. This form of target digital marketing, which relies on monitoring of trends, data, behaviour and preferences is impactful and relies on the sale of the data of target markets for efficiency.

105. There remains a lack of transformation in the out of home advertising arena, with the top five OOH media players in South Africa remaining as JC Decaux (Continental); Primedia Outdoor; Outdoor Network Provantage; and Ad Outpost.
106. Government departments and municipalities continue to spend highly in advertisement utilizing these established entities, as well as alcohol brands, the real estate sector and telecommunications companies
107. There needs to be increased pressure to utilize black-owned OOH media companies especially by government and state-owned entities.

H. EFF MEDIA

108. The EFF continues to boast the most effective social media footprint amongst all political parties in South Africa with 2.2 million followers on X (formerly known as Twitter), 1.3 million followers on Facebook, 229 263 followers on Instagram and 271 548 subscriptions on Youtube.
109. Social media remains the most vital platform for the EFF tell its own stories, counter media propaganda, popularize organizational work and interact with society in the digital sphere.
110. The EFF has been able to enter the emerging podcast and streaming arena effectively, with all national organizational programs being livestream on all social media platforms, and with a weekly EFF Podcast that covers political, social, cultural, economic and entertainment themes
111. The EFF now boasts a state-of-the art studio hosted at Winnie Madikizela Mandela House, where the podcast is recorded, media houses are invited to conduct interviews and audio-visual content on prevailing affairs in society are recorded.
112. Additional to this, the EFF now has internal photography, audio-visual and streaming capacity which is able to produce high-quality content for public consumption on a regular basis
113. The resolution of a weekly publication has been rolled out with the advent of The Radical Voice, where topical and popular political and legislative themes are explored.
114. There remains a need to strengthen media capacity at local levels, in provinces, regions and branches, which are responsive and interactive at a community level

HEALTH AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

GAUTENG NEWS ♦ HEALTH ♦ JOBURG NEWS ♦ LOCAL ♦ NEWS

EFF MMC Opens New 24-Hour [Orchards Clinic](#) in [Johannesburg](#)



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A. INTRODUCTION

1. Quality of life in any country is one of the foremost indicators of development and acts as a metric for the state to meet social welfare requirements. It impacts life expectancy, mortality, the prevalence of disease and cannot be separated from the ills of poverty. The healthcare department in South Africa has a high budget allocation, yet we do not see this transforming the state of the sector and the quality of services provided to members of society. This is telling and should guide the EFF in understanding that throwing money at structural problems in South African society is not the solution for sustainable and effective change.
2. The current government has been incapable of changing public healthcare infrastructure to accommodate the growing demand brought on by a democratic dispensation and higher levels of access. The post-1994 government did not repurpose public healthcare to include millions of black people who were previously excluded from a healthcare system that served only a few minorities. We still exist in an infrastructural framework that is designed to cater for the healthcare demands of a few, which is why hospitals and clinics are understaffed, under-resourced and overcrowded.
3. Public healthcare in South Africa is in crisis. Denial of this has led to the death of many citizens, deaths which could have been avoided.
4. The provision of medication in rural and township clinics and hospitals is poor, and this is due to the state's dangerous dependency on private pharmaceutical companies, which function on a profit basis, and do not consider the needs of South Africans.
5. The poor state of research and development in healthcare results in high mortality rates for diseases that prevail due to inequality and poverty.
6. The Life Esidimeni tragedy represents the failure of state officials to understand complex medical phenomena and how to handle it, the cruelty that comes with entrusting South African lives into hands of the private sector, and how outsourcing continues to fail in all respects.
7. Our developmental outputs with regard to health are low, with public healthcare professionals being overworked, incapacitated and ill-equipped. This results in the simplest procedures causing long-lasting harm to public healthcare sector patients.
8. Public healthcare is also facing high levels of corruption at health department level, while public health institutions have no basic facilities, buildings are collapsing, machines are broken and there is a shortage of doctors and nurses.
9. Healthcare in the private sector does not encounter the same infrastructural and demand problems faced by the public healthcare sector. The separate

development of the private healthcare sector, however, perpetuates a structural problem.

10. Corruption in private healthcare is rife, with recent evidence of price fixing in the private healthcare sector, corruption and the deliberate institutionalising of patients to serve the profit-making aspirations of healthcare institutes and medical aid providers.
11. The quality of private healthcare is equally not consistent with what consumers pay.
12. How we view the provision of healthcare, and the conceptualisation of the National Health Insurance Bill has to be revised.
13. Our healthcare sector is plagued and shaped by socio-political problems that we must come to grips with – from those who provide healthcare to those who receive it. We must address the stigma and approach to certain illnesses, such as mental health, reproductive health and sexual health.
14. South Africa needs a healthcare sector that caters for emerging realities and undoes apartheid-era spatial and infrastructural arrangements. This means rethinking how healthcare services are provided in townships and rural areas.
15. It means having an approach to healthcare that is preventative to ensure the prevalence of diseases and illness is dealt with at the root. Healthcare must apply in everyday life – with concepts such as hygiene, sexual education and sanitation.
16. It means modernising healthcare and making it more mobile and accessible.
17. It means focusing on a large-scale programme of vocational training for nurses and doctors.
18. This discussion paper will begin with an overview of the EFF's position on public healthcare stemming from the Founding Manifesto.
19. It will proceed to a diagnosis of the South African healthcare system and its limits and inadequacies at the level of infrastructure i.e. buildings, ambulances, equipment, human resources and medical supplies.
20. It will then define healthcare, making a distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare, making reference to case studies of successful healthcare systems that are not premised on the rolling out of funding but effective non-capitalist mechanisms of healthcare provision – mechanisms which are social in form and are centred on pharmaceutical independence.
21. The discussion paper will analyse the National Insurance Health Bill and how it ought to be restructured.
22. Finally, the paper will give a comprehensive guideline on what is to be done to improve the quality of healthcare in South Africa.

B. EFFs POSITION ON PUBLIC HEALTHCARE

23. The Founding Manifesto, adopted at the National Assembly in July 2013, identifies seven non-negotiable cardinal pillars for economic freedom in our lifetime, one of them being: “[f]ree quality education, healthcare, houses, and sanitation”. The Founding Manifesto goes on to say: “The state should build massive capacity in healthcare and remunerate medical practitioners in a way that attracts the best medical practitioners to the public healthcare sector”.
24. The Founding Manifesto was correct to put the spotlight on the need for the state to regulate the cost of medicine and healthcare provision in order to prevent private hospitals from overpricing medical care, which is a basic human right.
25. The investigation by the Competition Commission into the health market in 2019 found that the South African private healthcare market is characterised by concentration of funders and facilities markets, and uniformed consumers which has led to high costs of healthcare and medical scheme cover not associated with improvements in health outcomes.
26. The Founding Manifesto also tabled as an urgent matter the need to set up a state pharmaceutical company to intervene decisively in the production and distribution of medicines. In 2018, according to a National Treasury budget document, public healthcare was allocated R213.3 billion, and R148 billion of the budget was transferred to provincial departments of health. Of that R120 billion (62.6% of total expenditure on health) was spent on salaries for healthcare workers. In the same year, government spent R20 billion on medical supplies and medicine. The main suppliers of medical supplies and medicines are companies such as Adcock Ingram, Aspen and Cipla Medrop, and others who produce the majority of their medical supplies and medicine in India, France, Germany, Mexico and Brazil.
27. Since the adoption of the Founding Manifesto, the EFF has since tabled motions in Parliament, campaigned and advocated for the establishment of a state-owned pharmaceutical company. In our 2019 Election Manifesto, we made a commitment to establish a state-owned pharmaceutical company to ensure the availability of adequate medicine at all healthcare facilities by 2021. We also committed to establishing a pharmaceutical industrial zone for investors with protection for investment and security of tenure on state land on the condition that

they work with the state-owned pharmaceutical company, supply medicine and equipment to public clinics, hospitals and community healthcare facilities

28. The post-1994 government's commitment to establishing a state-owned pharmaceutical company has amounted to nought. In 2016, former president Jacob Zuma announced, during his 2016 State of The Nation address, the establishment of a state-owned pharmaceutical company, Ketlaphela. Ketlaphela was meant to supply the anti-retroviral drugs to the National Department of Health from 2017. Former minister of Science and Technology, Dr Naledi Pandor, in her budget speech in the same year, said that from 2017- 2019 the department would be allocated R5.2 million.
29. Ketlaphela has failed to manufacture ARVs yet and has postponed its launch date from 2017 to 2022. In addition, Ketlaphela has advertised a tender for a partner to manufacture the medicine. This means the entity will not be entirely state-owned.
30. The Founding Manifesto committed to urgently engaging with doctors, nurses and general staff unions in the health sector to exert working class power and control over the health system, with a view to improving the quality and health services. The Founding Manifesto went on to raise the issue of remuneration and career paths, skills development and training. Our nurses, doctors and general workers work in poor conditions and are paid low wages. For example, National Hospital in Bloemfontein, Free State, does not have clean running water and workers have to carry drinking water.
31. In 2018, EFF structures all over the country marched to clinics and hospitals to demand better public healthcare for the poor and working class. The organisation declared 2018 the year of public health to ensure that clinics and hospitals have facilities, skilled staff, medicine and a caring environment.
32. In the 5th Parliament, the EFF Caucus introduced a National Health Amendment Bill to amend the National Health Act, 2003, to provide for clinics to operate and provide 24-hour healthcare services. The Bill will be re-introduced in the 6th Parliament and will be referred to the Portfolio Committee on Health.
33. EFF councillors in municipalities have sponsored motions for 24-hour clinics. The City of Johannesburg is planning to provide 24-hour clinics to increase

access to healthcare and the City of Tshwane Council adopted a motion sponsored by the EFF in March 2018 to have clinics open for 24 hours.

C. DIAGNOSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PUBLIC HEALTHCARE

34. According to the former Minister of Health Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, in a reply to a question submitted by the EFF in Parliament, there is a total of 5 505 public health facilities (See Table 1: Details of public healthcare facilities per province below).

No.	Province	Total number of public health facilities
1.	Eastern Cape	1 083
2.	Free State	401
3.	Gauteng	588
4.	KwaZulu-Natal	1 003
5.	Limpopo	700
6.	Mpumalanga	422
7.	Northern Cape	305
8.	North West	427
9.	Western Cape	577
	TOTAL	5 506

35. The majority of public healthcare facilities are clinics. Out of the 5 506 public healthcare facilities, clinics account for 3 152 (57%) of the total public healthcare facilities. See Table 2: List of public clinics per province).

No.	Province	Clinic	%
1	Eastern Cape	739	21%
2	Free State	213	6%
3	Gauteng	334	10%
4	KwaZulu-Natal	617	18%
5	Limpopo	454	13%
6	Mpumalanga	245	7%
7	Northern Cape	161	5%
8	North West	297	9%
9	Western Cape	270	8%
	Total	3479	100%

36. Clinics were assessed by the National Department of Health (NDoH) using the Ideal Clinic Realisation and Maintenance Tool, which assesses clinics against set standards of what an ideal clinic is. According to the assessment conducted in 2018, only 1 507 out of 3 152 clinics are ideal,

and the remaining 1 645 clinics do not have the necessary infrastructure, human resources, clinical services management and support services to operate optimally to deliver services to people. A total of 20 clinics and community healthcare centres were closed and the NDoH ascribed these closures to renovations, safety of staff and some being burnt down.

37. There is a total of 392 public hospitals;

No.	Province	District hospitals	National central hospital	Provincial tertiary hospital	Regional hospital	Specialised chronic hospital	Specialised hospital	Specialised TB hospital
1	EC	65	1	3	5	1	5	10
2	FS	25	1	1	4		1	2
3	GP	12	4	3	9		6	1
4	KZN	39	2	3	13	2	7	8
5	LP	30	-	2	5		3	1
6	MP	23	-	2	3			5
7	NC	11	-	1	1		1	1
8	NW	13	-	2	3		2	
9	WC	33	2	1	5		4	6
	Total	251	10	18	48	3	29	33

38. South Africa's public hospitals have collapsed and face serious challenges. According to the 2017 report of the Office of Health Standards Compliance (OHSC), an organisation established to protect and promote the health and safety of patients in South Africa, only five of the 696 hospitals and clinics inspected in 2017 complied with the NDoH norms and standards.

39. A Statistics South Africa report, titled "Mid-year population estimates", released in July 2019 noted the following: 1) the infant mortality rate for 2019 is estimated at 22,1 per 1 000 live births and 2) the life expectancy at birth for 2019 is estimated at 61,5 years for males and 67,7 years for females. According to Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), an independent population health research centre at UW Medicine in the United States that measures the world's health problems, the top ten causes of death in South Africa is: 1) HIV/AIDS, 2) Ischemic heart disease, 3) Lower respiratory infection, 4) Stroke, 5) Diabetes, 6) Tuberculosis, 7)

Interpersonal violence, 8) Road injuries, 9) Diarrheal diseases, and 10) Lung-related diseases.

40. The South African Medical Research Council's National Disease Burden shows that "non-communicable diseases have now become the leading group of causes resulting in death in South Africa, accounting for almost 40% of total deaths and one in three deaths before the age of 60 years".
41. South Africa's public healthcare system cannot deal with major causes of death.
42. The major issues facing public health facilities include a lack of medicines and supplies, hygiene and patient safety; inadequate infection prevention and control; a long waiting time; and broken infrastructure. For example:
43. Most of the buildings are old and not maintained. There is a total of 565 public health facilities with asbestos ceilings, 571 with asbestos roofs, 126 internal asbestos walls and 75 with external asbestos walls. Seating and space for patients is not adequate, there is poor ventilation and lighting, windows and doors are broken, bathrooms and toilets don't work, and hospital and clinic grounds are not maintained.
 - a. Kitchen equipment, trollies to deliver food to wards, and meals do not meet the required hygiene and environmental standards, and the majority of service providers in hospitals and clinics that outsource food services are of an extremely poor standard.
 - b. Hospitals and clinics are not kept clean, including critical public and patient care areas. The majority of hospitals do not have daily inspections for cleanliness or monthly pest control, and cleaning machines are broken. Hospitals and clinics do not have policies to handle patient and bed linen. As a result, linen rooms are not kept clean and are used as storage areas and are not locked.
44. The people who suffer the most from a collapsed public healthcare system are the poor and workers who cannot afford medical aid and cannot access private healthcare. According to a presentation by a High-Level Panel on Health to the Portfolio Committee on Health in November 2018, only 16% of the South African population have medical aid and the rest either pay cash or use the collapsed public healthcare facilities.
45. The investigation by the Competition Commission into the health market found that South Africa's healthcare system is characterised by many

challenges, particularly the uneven distribution of coverage and of access to funding, poor infrastructure and human resource constraints. The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Competition Commission indicated that in 2012, 42.5 million South Africans were dependent on the public sector for the provision of healthcare services, while 8.7 million were serviced by the private sector.

46. Clint Cronning's paper in the 2013 South African Medical Journal titled, "Will the Department of Health and the Minister make the same mistake twice?" shows that in the early 1990s a decision was made by the South African Nursing Council (SANC), and supported by the Department of Health, to close down all adult-education vocational-training nursing colleges in favour of higher education training. This decision has led to a massive shortage of trained nurses, a crisis that is threatening public healthcare institutions.
47. In response to an EFF Caucus question in Parliament in 2018 about the number of vacancies at hospitals, clinics and departmental offices, the Minister of Health reported that there were 41 300 vacancies in the public healthcare facilities.
48. Following calls, the NDoH is working on re-opening nursing colleges. However, there is bias towards private sector nursing colleges whose resources meet Council for Higher Education (CHE) requirements. Public nursing colleges in the pipeline are under-resourced. This will lead to an uneven and unequal allocation of resources and the majority of trained nurses will end up in private hospitals.
49. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), health is defined as a "state of complete, physical, mental, and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or sickness".
50. Therefore, healthcare facilities have the responsibility to ensure delivery and maintenance of a holistic system of medical care.
51. Maintaining optimal health requires the organised provision of medical care and social services. According to the Constitution, everyone has the right to healthcare services, including reproductive healthcare, sufficient food and water, and social security, and the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available means, to provide this.

D. HEALTH CARE SERVICES

52. Healthcare services in South Africa are divided thus:

- a. Primary healthcare - deals with a broad range of psychological, physical and social problems as a first line of healthcare that a patient receives. This includes treatment for disease through regular visits and prevention education. Primary healthcare focuses on prevention and accessibility. The WHO says primary healthcare "is about caring for people, rather than simply treating specific diseases or conditions".
 - b. Secondary healthcare - provides specialists such as cardiologists, dermatologists, urologists and others. Patients access secondary healthcare providers through referrals by the primary healthcare professionals.
 - c. Tertiary healthcare – specialised, consultative healthcare usually for inpatients and on referral from primary and secondary healthcare professionals for advanced medical investigation and treatment. Services include plastic surgery, burn treatment, cardiac surgery, cancer management, neurosurgery, complex medical and surgical interventions etc.
53. In 1997, the NDoH published a white paper on the transformation of the health system in South Africa, guided by the belief that there is a comprehensive primary healthcare system in place. The white paper aimed to reduce inequalities in health service delivery and increase access to improved and integrated services, based on primary healthcare principles.
 54. South Africa has failed to build a functional primary healthcare, and a paper by Priya Maillacheruvu and Elaine McDuff published in the Journal of Global Health titled "South Africa's Return to Primary Care: The struggles and strides of the Primary Healthcare System", shows that primary healthcare is failing because of inequalities between private and public healthcare, and an increase in long term diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and non-communicable diseases such as hypertension and diabetes.
 55. In South Africa the healthcare sector spends more resources treating patients with serious conditions. These long-term diseases are not treatable at a primary healthcare level through healthy lifestyle and prevention education and the provision of basic social services infrastructure. These long-term diseases are, however, treatable.
 56. South Africa spends more than R30 billion on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) treatment, compared to R221 million on primary healthcare functions i.e. environmental and port health services, district health services, and emergency medical services and trauma.

57. The prioritisation of patients with serious conditions has led to training healthcare workers specialising in diseases and training in primary healthcare. Countries like Cuba, that have preventative medical training, do better at this level. Cuba's infant mortality rate is 4.3 per 1 000 births. A WHO report shows that Cuba's life expectancy is 79 for males and 80 for females.

E. THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE BILL

58. National Health Insurance (NHI): the underlying principle of the NHI, which is the provision of universal healthcare is commendable and ought to be supported. The financing of the NHI ought to be remodelled and its focus shifted to primary healthcare provision and human social realities. This is because the NHI assumes that access to medical aid schemes automatically guarantees quality healthcare and access to the best facilities. This is simply not the case and does not address the definite structural problems of healthcare in the country. It is true that separate sectors in the healthcare system perpetuate inequality, but to collapse those without creating capacity at the level of primary healthcare will result in a broadening of the infrastructural problems under a single medical aid scheme.
59. Furthermore, there is no evidence that supports the assumption that healthcare in the private sector is of better quality. Rather, it suffers less strain due to the economic barriers of access, resulting in practitioners being more effective. Thus, the difference in healthcare provision is as a result of economic, social, infrastructural and political imbalances between the two sectors
60. There must be equality in provision of healthcare for all South Africans. This requires more than giving the majority of South Africans access to supposedly better-quality healthcare by creating a medical aid scheme that must adjust itself to the inflated costs of a private healthcare sector.
61. Financing healthcare is important, but social lenses are required for us to understand where funding should be channelled and how. This aspect recognises that health outcomes are directly linked to social conditions and political and legislative outlooks. Healthcare must capacitate itself to understand complexities of inequality, and the health needs of minorities such as the LGBTQI community. The health requirements in Africa need an approach that is cognisant of local and traditional realities that impact interaction and mortality rates.

62. Healthcare cover must take into account local phenomena – customs such as initiation rituals, the high levels of domestic abuse and sexual violence, and mental illness and its causes. These are social phenomena that require the intervention of a capacitated and well-resourced healthcare sector.
63. The bill must also have comprehensive input on how it plans to overcome the spatial idiosyncracies of the country. Healthcare is difficult to access for people in isolated rural areas, and ambulances have difficulty in navigating townships that are crowded with shacks and untarred roads. Modernised healthcare must adapt and respond to this to reduce the mortality rate and levels of illness where our people are the most vulnerable.
64. Healthcare in South Africa must respond to social needs as much as access to it must be made equal. Therefore, the EFF must look at the NHI warily and provide complementary solutions where it is found to be lacking. Equal healthcare will not exist in isolation of social development and must go hand-in-hand with development in other sectors of government.
65. It is for this reason that the Finance and Fiscal Commission has warned that the deadline to roll out the NHI by 2026 is not in sync with reality. Primary healthcare intervention must be the direction in which South Africa goes in order to tackle our problems as a country, and this requires innovative solutions that are in line with a broad developmental programme.

F. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

66. The EFF government will renew the health system through the strengthening of Primary Health Care: universal coverage, people-centred care, with an emphasis on public health and evidence-based policies. A health system that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health.
67. The EFF government's approach to health care will be based on the pillars of a) prevention, b) promotion and c) education on health care.
68. The EFF government holds important the quality of connections between individuals, families and communities over the course of life, across generations, between government and people, between different nations and between humankind and nature, are critical for physical and

mental health and as such views the health system as an integral part of social systems.

69. The EFF government will ensure that “leave no one behind’ is more than a slogan, and that those in vulnerable situations who are frequently neglected in terms of health care, including people living in poverty; women; persons with disabilities; older persons; internally displaced persons; sex workers; persons in overcrowded settings and in residential institutions; people in detention; homeless persons; migrants and refugees; people who use drugs; and intersex, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and gender-diverse persons comprehensive needs are understood in how the structural dimensions of health system affect them.
70. The EFF government will ensure adequate, equitable domestic funding for health and will be proactive in ensuring sustainability and will not allow austerity or deficits to impact the health system efficiency.
71. The EFF government uses a pluralistic, non-siloed approach to health systems and its governance, ensuring coherence with other departments key to the success of the public health system and will address the underlying social and commercial determinants of health.
72. The EFF government will take into account the current stagnation in the growth and modernisation of sector, the lack of adequate number and quality facilities where people reside, and levels of poverty already existing and will formulate more equity-oriented policies, programmes and practices, thereby increasing the life expectancy of all people in South Africa.
73. The EFF government will create a comprehensive and supportive legal environment for the governance of universal health coverage that is equitable, people-centred, and enables strategic and innovative comprehensive solutions and implementation for the health system. This is integral to the realisation of all human rights and to ensure people are able to participate in the economic, social, political, civil spheres amongst others.
74. The EFF government will foster multilateral cooperation, influence and support trade, professional ties, research and product development across the board in the health and medical field.
75. The EFF will implement a 12-month infrastructure refurbishment and maintenance plan, which details monthly targets, allocation of resources and timeframes. Maintenance and refurbishment of public healthcare

facilities will be underpinned by building internal capacity based on artisans, engineers, architects and general workers.

76. The minimum recommended ration for doctor to patient and nurse to patient are an indicator for quality and accessible care and must be met, therefore medical training institutions should be resourced and governed to produce as many quality health science graduates and practitioners as possible. The EFF government will massively increase the number of health care practitioners employed and ensure that they are equitably spread across districts and provinces.
77. The EFF government will ensure a conducive working environment for employees as a priority. And that the occupational, security and lodging needs of the healthcare workers are a priority and plans are resourced.
78. The EFF government will increase the number of nurses and doctors in South Africa's health care system by:
79. Establishing at least one health care training facility per province and ensuring that there is no province without a health sciences campuses inclusive of nursing school and medical school. The practice of health professionals has a significant bearing on the promotion and protection of human rights, in particular the right to health therefore it is imperative that the health science education curriculum be reformed in relation to methods and the practice of teaching as well as approaches that must be adopted to centre the dignity, human rights, and equity.
80. The EFF government will ensure both undergraduate and postgraduate students have a clear and efficient pathway to qualifications recognition, professional registration, licensing, and employment for those trained outside of South Africa.
81. The 7th Parliament should finalise the National Health Amendment Bill to ensure clinics are open 24 hours. The immediate focus should be on the establishment of one clinic or polycyclic per ward, and the focus will vary according to population size in each ward. All clinics should have a permanent doctors, nurses and allied and community health practitioners.
82. The EFF government will pay specific attention to childhood developmental and cognitive health matters and build adequate and high level capacity for comprehensive medical and psycho-social support in the community. The process of continuation of care should be linked to other social services such as the collection of social grants to ensure no loss to follow-up or care.

83. Furthermore, health education and promotion will be encouraged through campaigns on public and mass media platforms. Citizens should receive credible information about health to support their decision making about health-seeking and wellness. This is key for a primary health system that relies on early detection and intervention.
84. An EFF government will establish a pharmaceutical industrial zone for investors with protection of investment and security of tenure on state land on condition that they work with the state-owned pharmaceutical company and supply medicine and equipment to clinics, hospitals and community healthcare facilities.
85. The EFF government will build and maintain a state-owned health care equipment company to manufacture health care equipment, commodities and diagnostics.
86. Due to massive South African intra-migration for economic and educational purposes, an electronic healthcare data system should be established and maintained to yield the outcomes of access to timeous quality data. Within health facilities and in public spaces, the EFF will promote digital inclusion, access to affordable and reliable connectivity, and the underlying need to address digital literacy.
87. The EFF government will establish a fund to support indigenous African health systems and knowledge production to ensure coherency and innovation that is in line with the public health systems strategy for the country.
88. The EFF government's state-owned fleet management, health mechanical service workshops and technicians will prioritise all ambulances, machines and equipment. The EFF government will ensure that technicians in South Africa receive training to provide maintenance of all equipment as required.
89. The EFF will ensure stewardship in the entire health sector (public and private), support the adherence to the principles of medical ethics and health economics for equitable outcomes, as well as good governance to achieve positive public health outcomes.
90. The EFF government will ensure that the benefit and profiteering of industry and private companies will not be prioritised over the rights to health of South Africans, and will ensure legal and policy frameworks that protect intellectual property rights in a manner that is inconsistent with the right of every person to access a safe and effective medical intervention and innovation as well as the right to benefit from scientific discovery.

91. The EFF government will utilise the provincial legislature to propose amendments to laws and other legal restrictions that interfere with accessibility, availability, acceptability, quality of goods, services, care.
92. The EFF government will hold components of monitoring, review and redress and in addition, will have transparent governance as a way for duty bearers to explain their actions and make adjustments where necessary.

G. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

93. The EFF government holds important the quality of connections between individuals, families and communities over the course of life, across generations, between government and people, between different nations and between humankind and nature, are critical for physical, mental and societal wellbeing.
94. The EFF government will ensure that “leave no one behind’ is more than a slogan, and that those in vulnerable situations who are frequently neglected in terms of health care, including people living in poverty; women; persons with disabilities; older persons; internally displaced persons; sex workers; persons in overcrowded settings and in residential institutions; people in detention; homeless persons; migrants and refugees; people who use drugs; and intersex, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and gender-diverse persons comprehensive needs are understood in how the structural dimensions of health system affect them.
95. Ensure local, regional and international participation on policy, gender, population development and research.
96. Ensure that the Legal Frameworks that govern the work of the Social Development are updated, aligned and informed by scientific evidence and constitution;
97. Work closely with other government organisations, such as education, health, justice, police, gender, labour, environment, tourism, agriculture, energy, and ICT.
98. Form legal entities to formalize and refine work streams of the ministry – Grant management, Youth development, Policy, Social work etc.
99. Ensure direct provision of Social Work services (e.g. assessment, counselling, advice, programmes, and referrals) to the population.

100. Complete timeous assessments of need and qualification for and facilitate the payment systems of welfare benefits, pensions and entitlements
101. Complete social housing assessments, service needs and placements efficiently
102. Establish a proactive social outreach network in the province, district, municipality and wards to assist the needy and the disadvantaged
103. Provide funding for the delivery of emergency housing, clothing, equipment, food
104. Provide multi-sectorial post domestic and sexual violence facilities, shelters. The multi-disciplinary team will refer and link survivors/victims to emergency services and follow up of cases
105. Advice to the various Government departments, corporates, NGOs, partners, donors and sectors on social policy, community development, employment support and training required at various community levels.
106. Encourage access to concessions and discounts for seniors, families and those on low incomes on products or services offered by government and partners.
107. Manage tertiary student food and lodging allowances through the National Students Services with links to community internships, voluntary programs and MPCC
108. Lead and develop campaigns that challenge antisocial attitudes and behavior and advance constitutional principles
109. Encourage and support self-sustaining community-based leisure-time programmes to be coordinated with relevant Departments and partners e.g. safe playing spaces etc, vocational upskilling, informal mentorships, municipal/community games etc. Link up to the Multi-Purpose Community-based Centre (MPCC)* to form community networks. Introductory occupational courses, to provide basic practical training to unemployed adults who are out of school.
110. Provide the Statutory care and protection of children, youth, vulnerable groups, elderly, disabled people
111. Establish, monitor, Coordinate, refer and manage the Assessment, Treatment, post treatment Care and Rehabilitation facilities (Drugs, Violence, Learning etc).

112. Ensure efficient Family, in all various compositions, and child support – adoption, foster care, co-parenting, guardianship services.
113. Provide funding, capacity-building and institutional Strengthening programmes for NGO community service providers
114. Be an integral part of reception of, and follow up social work intervention, with documented/undocumented migrants/refugees upon their arrival at South African borders and foster integration or referral to other departments appropriately.
115. Advocating the building of a caring community and encouraging participation of people to help those in need through promoting volunteer service in the municipality and wards.
116. The division that provides a range of social work interventions to promote healthy family functioning and common community vision and country vision. Healthy Families lead to healthy communities.
117. Through various partnerships both private and public, the preventive, developmental and remedial programs and services will bring the following, considering the evolving capacities and the evidence base, these issues to be addressed: Constitutional Principles –non-discrimination, non-racialism, dignity; Mental Health; Community Life; Abuse; Domestic Violence; Marital Problems; Parenting; Drug use and Abuse; Life Crises, Behavioral Issues, Financial Issues etc.
118. Programmes and services provided will include for example: Community Workshops – Parenting Skills, Violence in the Family, Support for Parents, Caregivers of Children
119. Rehabilitation of Families, Individuals and Children through: Counselling, Advising, Consultation, Networking and Collaboration, Mediation, Advocacy, Placement.
120. The EFF Government will be a government of all races, and will not discriminate against any South African on the basis of race and skin colour. All South Africans will be judged by the content of their character and contribution, not by the colour of their skin.
121. Social cohesion and unity of all South Africans will be promoted by EFF Government through greater integration of our communities, particularly schools, institutions of higher learning, training facilities and human settlements and by teaching the history of the country to ensure a society that understands its history in order to imagine a collective future.

122. The EFF Government will criminalize all forms of racism and tribalism and run a programme to enlighten people that we are one people with a common vision and destiny.
123. The EFF Government will respect the rights of all regions to exist and cherish the diversity that define South Africa.
124. Multi-Purpose Community-based Centre (MPCC) in all wards: with customer care centres linked to other departments: DSD, labour, DTI etc
125. Services: Sports, arts, culture, Free access to computer facilities, vocational upskilling, Informal mentorships, Basic computer literacy training, Internet access, Recognizable Certification/accreditation, Facilities for photocopying, faxing, scanning, email, Conference Room Space for CBOs, FBOs, NGOs.

H. SOCIAL GRANTS

126. Social grants are an important aspect of bringing the poorest of the poor into some level of economic participation, and the EFF government will introduce a system which will link social grants to development.
127. The EFF appreciates that social grants are not a permanent solution to the crisis of South Africa's unemployment, poverty and inequalities. However, this does not mean that we should abolish social grants. Instead, we will make social grants more valuable to impact meaningfully in the lives of poor South Africans.
128. The EFF Government will create sustainable jobs and open educational and training opportunities for women who receive child support grants, so that child bearing is not seen as a basis to receive social grants
129. Within this framework and commitment, the EFF Government will increase social grants to take the following shape:
 - a) Grant for older persons: Increase from R2 110 per month to R4 180.
 - b) Disability grant: Increase from R2 090 per month to R4 180.
 - c) War veterans grant: Increase from R2 110 per month to R4 220.
 - d) Care dependency grant: Increase from R2 090 per month to R4 180.
 - e) Foster child grant: Increase from R1 130 per month to R2 260.
 - f) Child support grant: Increase from R510 per month to R2 260.
130. The increase of all the social grants is primarily an instrument to boost local economies and address crisis levels of poverty.

131. With creation of millions of jobs, the number of dependents on social grants will gradually decrease, because many people will be receiving sustainable income from the jobs they will occupy.
132. All social grants will be paid through the post office and post bank.
133. The EFF Government will introduce a social grant of R2 260 per month for all terminally ill South Africans.
134. The EFF Government will explore and investigate the possibility and practicality of grants for unemployed people and also pay attention to the Basic Income Grant (BIG).

EDUCATION



EDUCATION

“For too long, “postcolonial” African/Black education has contended with issues driven by neoliberal capitalist economic agendas making education more of a privilege than and {a} right. Neoliberalism has been a new way of colonialism in African education. In current educational contexts, there is the primacy of markets determining educational choices and decisions of nation states... the commercialisation/privatization of education in Africa has led to funding being disproportionately allocated to certain fields, as well as Western control of African intellectual property pursued under the guise of global knowledge. As globalization continues to exacerbate global inequities, the role of education in helping address rising poverty levels and social inequities has received attention in scholarly debates, writings, and public discussions... the hegemony of free markets, deregulation, competition, individualism, privatization, and restrictive definitions of educations of education to serve corporate market interests has produced colonizing forms of education.” Afful-Broni, Anthony, et al. 2020

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A. INTRODUCTION

1. South Africa education system is characterised with poor performance of school children. The education system is also characterised with inequalities and discriminate children from poor families and communities. Post 1994 government has failed to repurpose education from the dual-apartheid education system that prioritises minority whites while subjecting majority of black children into an inclusive education system for all. Instead, South Africa has continued with dual education that discriminates against the poor.
2. Second to this debilitating status quo; is the divide in the quality of education that is drawn upon this parameter of the rich and the poor. This divide emanates from colonial conquest. Upon this separation is the true essence of apartheid, division, and separation of Black people from the whites. This divide in education continues to persist well into democracy, 30 years post-Apartheid.
3. Mjiba Frehiwot, a research fellow at the University of Ghana who writes on decolonization of knowledge production made a well-expressed point in her paper titled "Pan-African Education: A Case Study of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute", Print Media and The Ghana Young Pioneer Movement, published as part of the book, "African's Many Divides and Africa's Future: Pursuing Nkrumah's Vision of Pan-Africanism in an Era of Globalization" in 2015, that education carries society's history, culture, values and principles. Education also shapes the country's direction, leadership and societal institutions.
4. This perspective is a contribution to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 3rd National People's Assembly and aims to set a foundation for a diagnoses of South Africa's education system given its centrality towards economic emancipation of our people. It aims to provide solutions ideologically informed by what the Founding Manifesto adopted at the 1st National People's Assembly (NPA) on What is to be done on the 26th and 27th of July 2013.
5. The Founding Manifesto, emphasises, as part of the 7 non-negotiable pillars the need to achieve free quality education, wherein all pupils and students are provided with adequate learning and teacher-support material. The Founding Manifesto recognize that for successful and sustainable economic development and growth, South Africa requires a focussed and deliberate education system that will prioritise skills, education and expertise in various fields. Especially skills and expertise to build industrial economy that create jobs and redistribute wealth to majority instead of just few minorities in a globalized economy.
6. The diagnoses section reflects on the inequalities in South Africa's education system, collapsed infrastructure and waste of resources, dysfunctional early childhood development, Eurocentric capitalist bias knowledge production and teaching, and poor funding for higher education.

B. DIAGNOSIS

(a) Dysfunctional early childhood development and Basic Education inequalities in South Africa's education system

ECD

7. Early childhood is important and correct time to develop basic skills of reading for children. When children gain the basic skill of reading earlier in their education, they are able to attain education successfully and increase their chances to participate in the economy meaningfully later in adulthood. At the moment, at least at a policy level adopted in 2017, two years of ECD for all children before Grade 1 is compulsory.
8. However, in South Africa, there is no dedicated training programmes for early childhood development (ECD) practitioners and foundation phase teachers. The Member of the Executive Council (MEC) in Gauteng Province, in a reply to a written question in the legislature, revealed that more than 1 600 ECD practitioners don't have a single qualification.
9. ECD has only been incorporated into the Department of Basic Education recently, and there is no funding dedicated to ECD. The only funding that is available is for basic Grade R. In 2019, government does not know what career options are available for ECD practitioners, how much they should get paid, and what qualification framework should exist, meaning that ECD has existed in ad hoc basis for the last 20 years. According to the South African Childhood Review of 2019, a report which measure progress in ECD, has found that more than one million children between the age of 3 and 5 are excluded from ECD programmes across the country.
10. With the growing levels of poverty that affect women and children in majority in South Africa, more children are now susceptible to the threat of malnutrition. As is, 1 in four children under the age of 5 are affected by malnutrition in South Africa. This results in Stunting as the outcome of chronic and prolonged malnutrition. Children who suffer from malnutrition suffer various effects to their development and healthy growth. The deficiencies that result from malnutrition also include essential vitamin and nutrient deficiencies like Vitamin A that weakens the immunity of the child, which in turn makes the child more vulnerable to opportunistic diseases and illnesses.
11. Challenges that continue to plague South Africa's Early Childhood Development Centres include the costly registration of facilities. This is the primary reason why numerous facilities are unregistered in rural areas, townships and informal settlements and thus are under-resourced and excluded from state subsidisation. This must be noted as a regression of socialist victories that ushered

in the subsidisation of Early Childhood Development by the State and the private sector.

12. The under resourcing of ECD facilities in poor communities results in infrastructural deficiencies that affect teaching methods, physical development and compromised professional development of ECD practitioners in neglected communities.
13. The diverse linguistic landscape in South Africa poses an obstacle to effective education. Not only is there a lack of investment in developing a standardised and evolving curriculum for ECD facilities, but there is also an inadequate investment in the absorption of the 12 official languages in the ECD curriculum that thwarts the efforts of unsupported ECD practitioners, the transfer of knowledge, and sustained effective modes of acquiring literacy and numeracy skills of children. These barriers are fundamental as they lead to elongated poor performance and high dropout rates prior to reaching the matriculation standard.
14. Countries like Cuba that has adopted a holistic approach to ECD accessible to all children, with specific attention to vulnerable children, has adult literacy rate of almost 100%, with majority if not all of adults above the age of 15 years and older are literate. Cuba has prioritised ECD for the past 50 years. According to United Children's Fund (UNICEF) report published in 2016, titled 'Early Childhood Development in Cuba', 99,5% children under the age of six years of age attend an early childhood education programme or institution.

BASIC EDUCATION

15. South Africa's education and what is taught in classrooms is as a result of colonial past and was meant to deepen colonization in a way that schooling produce lowly skilled workers required by the oppressive racist economy that then reproduce knowledge in classrooms that is limited around the sustenance of that very oppressive racist system. Normalising the paradigms of difference in the most immediate – overly crowded classrooms in townships and rural areas, and vast opportunities for physical and psychological growth in previously white-only public schools.
16. In the last 25 years, the ruling party has not been able to repurpose education, in particular basic education, in a manner that it values and build on indigenous knowledge and languages. As a result, the education system has purposefully undermined local history, culture, languages, and systems of knowledge.

17. Language, over and above class and geographical difference, has been historically utilised with the intention of maintaining the status quo in basic education.
18. This manifests in the sense that the poor and Black children being isolated to township, rural and informal settlement-based schools which cater for their indigenous languages, whilst the resourced and catered for previously whites-only schools, maintain the racial separation via instituting Afrikaans and English as the only mediums of instruction. At the base, these languages are largely used by the minority and the selected few Black people who have proximity to accessing geographical spaces that were historically ordinarily not for Black people.
19. Historically white only schools in South Africa produced educational outcome and achievements closer to the standards attained in development countries. These schools are accessed by minority of South African children. A vast majority of children in South Africa access historically disadvantaged education system which is burdened with educational unfavourable factors associated with poverty. These factors include limited resources, lack of learner and teacher support material, poor security, teacher absenteeism, and crowded classroom amongst others.
20. In these schools, the learner to teacher ratio remains high and thus individual attention and investment in a pupil's development seemingly impossible. Learners in previously disadvantaged schools are left out to fend for their educational needs with minimal to no support at all in worst cases. The teacher to learner ratio in South Africa has risen from 27.4 in 2012, to 29.8 in the year 2021. Learners in wealthier quintile 5 schools are less likely to have classrooms that are overcrowded, in comparison to quintile 1 - 3 schools. As at 2021, just 4% of Grade 3 learners in quintile 5 schools are in classrooms with over 50 pupils when in contrast, over 23% of quintile 1 schools surpassed 50 pupils per classroom. (Gabrielle Wills, 2023)
21. SADTU's cadre deployment remains a major crisis in the functioning of basic education. The bringing on board into the system of persons who aren't capable to carry out functions for the purpose of servicing loyalty and allegiance continues to be a barrier for effective functioning. SADTU has gone on to advocate against proper performance management for teachers and the department has cowed to the demands of the union. This should rightfully raise concern noting the ties of the union to the African National Congress. Merit, capacity, and commitment to development should be the founding principles of processes in absorbing teachers and education personnel into the system. This more-so noting the failure of the department to fill in more than 30 000 teacher posts as at April 2024 in schools across the country.

22. On average, children in these previously disadvantaged schools cannot read, write or understand and work with numbers. According to the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), an international comparative reading assessment, in the year 2016, 78% of Grade 4 learners in South Africa could not read for meaning in English and it is worse in African languages. In a study commissioned by the Department of Basic Education and conducted by the University of Pretoria's Center for Evaluation and Assessment, the figure grew to 81% by the year 2023.
23. These inequalities are obvious in the higher levels of education, employment outcomes and in the income patterns of inequalities. Consequently, the education system has not been able to challenge hegemonic social structures and transform or enhance people's lives. The education system has done very little to change the lives of majority of people particularly the health and wellbeing of black people in rural areas. Instead, the education system in South Africa continues to reproduce and reinforce apartheid patterns of poverty and privilege, a racial based divide between the poor and rich. This is even worse for children living with disability. The education system is also dominated by hegemonic colonial education in its curriculum while rendering indigenous knowledges as backward, primitive and barbaric as part of a colonial legacy.
24. In 2021, close to 3% of the 14–15-year-old age group and 9% of the 16 -17-year-old age group dropped out of school. Post the Covid-19 pandemic, 19 000 children of compulsory school going age had dropped out when the 2020/2021 enrolment data was compared. No efforts were made to retrace and reabsorb those pupils back into the education system. The broader estimation provided beyond the Covid-19 dropout rate is that out of 100 pupils who begin Grade 1, only 40 sit for their final examination for the Grade 12 National Senior Certificate (NSC) Examination.
25. Abuse, rape and sexual violence from teachers, fellow pupils, community members and family members continue to define the daily struggles of our children in primary and, secondary and high schools.
26. According to a report published the Department of Basic Education in March 2024, in 2022, there were 13.4 million learners in the schooling system, of which 12.7 million learners were in public schools and 735 085 were in independent schools, also known as private schools. In a reply to a parliamentary question published in March 2018, the Minister of Basic Education said that the learner educator ratio for government primary schools was one teacher to every 35.2 students. This means that an educator is responsible for a class with at least 35 students.

27. Small classes are beneficial as teachers because they allow teachers to give each learner individual attention and accommodate various needs which allow a learner to learn and excel. In a class of few learners, teachers are able to experiment with different teaching methods, employ technology and do not waste much needed time to teach with administrative duties such as reporting.
28. The South African National Education Infrastructure Management System (NEIMS) asserts that the school infrastructure consists of water, electricity, furniture, sanitation facilities, computers, communication technologies, and the number of learners per teacher. In a study conducted by NEIMS, learners were cited that dirty, smelly and non-functional bathrooms, smelly and littered classrooms, unkempt playgrounds and general maintenance of schools (faulty classroom doors) were a normality in their daily schooling lives. Learners also expressed their need for safer schools, inviting and hazard-free schools/playgrounds. These issues are central to the learning environment of pupils and directly affect the learning experiences of pupils. Lack of proper seating results in backaches, lower concentration and writing difficulties. This then affects the academic development of the learner and their academic progress in future.
29. The patterns of spending in education showcase that expenditure on South Africa's education grew from R30 billion in 1994/5 to R101 billion in 2007/8, and R324.5 billion in 2024/2025 thus showing an upward trend in total education expenditure in these twelve years with a decline in real expenditure between 1996/7 and 2003/4 (Department of Education 2007). The EC particularly showed a steady 46.8% to 49.0% (in the years 2002/3- 2008/9) thus demonstrating (from an aggregate national picture) that education funding remained relatively static for a decade.
30. During this period, public ordinary schooling relative proportion budget increased by only 2% from 1997/7 to 2006/7 (Department of Education 2007) while it increased by 23% in real terms. Majority of this funding has gone to improving infrastructure, salaries for more teachers amongst other things. In the period between 2009/10 to 2013/14, spending increased from 60 billion to 79 billion (+7.3% per annum) for primary education while secondary education spending rose from 50 billion to 71 billion (+9.1% per annum) (Statistics SA, 2015). This means that major spending goes to pre and primary education amounting to R79 billion (32%) of the total general government expenditure in 2013/14, followed by secondary and post-secondary at 71 billion (29%). Tertiary education (24%) and unclassified education (15%) then follow.
31. But how do we account for these expenditure patterns when little has changed in poor schools in SA since 2006? Despite so much spending on education, this education system has done little to change the lives of a majority people, particularly the health and well-being of indigenous rural people. It has also

done little to prepare students for post schooling activities that could enhance their livelihoods both locally and globally. It has done very little to empower pupils with economic prowess to develop the country, the continent, and in the immediate, their individual lives. Majority of pupils exit the schooling system to wallow in poverty, unemployment and a stagnant economy that cannot absorb them.

(b) Collapse of education infrastructure

32. Majority of public schools in South Africa lack basic infrastructure necessary to create a conducive and proper environment for learning. Government has failed to build proper classrooms, sanitation facilities and recreational infrastructure for schools. Some schools have buildings without doors and windows, no toilets, electricity or water, and basic security.
33. In November 2013, the Department of Basic Education published legally binding Norms and Standards for School Infrastructure which made it a law for public schools to have water, electricity, internet, working toilets, security and in future will include libraries, laboratories and sports facilities. Norms and standards remain an ideal in paper which the Minister of Basic Education has claimed that is not affordable. Despite the norms and standards which have a clear reporting framework, provincial and national government's data on school infrastructure is inconsistent, and this has led contradicting information.
34. We still have schools that are built with material that are health hazardous. In 2017, in a reply to a question by the EFF in Parliament, the Minister of Basic Education said that of the 24 885 primary and secondary schools, 3 062 or 12% of these are schools roofed with asbestos sheets. There is overwhelming evidence to show that exposure to asbestos causes fibrotic lung diseases and changes in the lining of the chest cavity. Learners spend majority of the time in schools and are exposed to asbestos material.
35. In another instance, the EFF in Parliament asks the Minister of Basic Education how many schools do not have water and electricity. The Minister responded that according to the National Education Infrastructure Management System (NEIMS), all ordinary schools have been provided with water and electricity. But the 2019 NEIMS paint a depressing picture. The reports detail the following;
 - a. Out of 28 874 schools, only 11 686 schools have flush toilets, the rest use pit, mobile and chemical toilets.
 - b. Out of 23 258 schools inspected, 10 956 schools have water supplied by municipality in school year and 7 520 depend on borehole well on site, the rest depend on unreliable mobile tanks, municipal water outside school yard, and rainwater harvesting.
 - c. There are more than 2 000 without reliable electricity.

- d. Only 2 066 schools have access control, and 982 have alarm system. Other schools have some form of security, but it is insufficient.
 - e. More than 10 000 schools do not have sports facilities.
 - f. There are more schools without libraries than schools with libraries. More than 75% of schools do not have libraries.
 - g. In a 2018 written response to Parliament asked by the EFF, the Minister of Basic Education said that 471 schools in the Eastern Cape were built with inappropriate materials. In the same province, there is widespread corruption in school infrastructure projects.
36. There is need to investigate the full impact of private ownership of land in which schools and basic education lease in the country. The Grootkraal Primary School in the Western Cape, Duzenendlela LSEN School for learners with special needs in Orange Farm and various other schools who reject reform, transformation and government intervention on the basis that these schools operate on private owned land should be interrogated. As intervention, immediate expropriation of all the land to which schools operate on should be prioritised.
37. The BELA Bill which aims to implement transformation efforts and ensure government control of public schools is currently intangible due to factors like private ownership of land of public schools and community regression on transformation. These barriers not only seep through the infrastructural development project but the very fabric of governance over all public schools.
38. According to the Public Protector report number 29 of 2017/18, titled "Mandela Funeral", which investigated the allegations of misappropriation by the Eastern Cape Provincial Government and other organs of state in connection with the expenditure incurred in Preparation for the Funeral of the late former President Nelson Mandela, an amount of R22 million was paid for the procurement of goods and services for the funeral from a R300 million infrastructure grant. The report went further to say, the funds were meant for the provision of running water, electricity, sanitation, ablution facilities, replacement of mud-schools and refurbishing of hospitals. This kind of corruption does not only occur in the Eastern Cape. It is common throughout the country wherein money meant for school infrastructure gets stolen.
39. One of the reasons why government is unable to build schools efficiently is because of lack of capacity. Like it is the case with all other services, provincial education departments across the country depend on private companies to build school infrastructure. The process of tendering to procure infrastructure projects of school infrastructure leads to inflation of prices, tender rigging, and appointment of incompetent and unqualified contractors. Money allocated for purposes of accelerating school infrastructure delivery is used improperly.

(b) Crisis of Higher education

40. Conditions in the Higher Education Sector continue to be defined by increased barriers to access of a financial nature, that hinder the progress of graduates due to the phenomena of debt.
41. Debt while studying and post-completion of qualifications, remains a challenge that affects the graduate outputs in South Africa and makes the skills competency of our youth inadequate which feeds into the high unemployment rates.
42. Graduation levels at public universities sit at 22% for undergraduate students (40% of all first-year students in South Africa do not complete their degrees), 20% for Master's students and at 12% for doctoral students. Various components inform these harrowing statistics and present as multidimensional barrier for poor students in the most. These include lack of access to safe and conducive learning environment and accommodation, poverty, lack of access to tools of study and information, lack of access to adequate nutrition, mental health issues, and cultural shock. Inequality doesn't spare the education sector and continues to rear its ugly head in tertiary education.
43. Engineering and science fields present the lowest completion rates. These fields exacerbate the national and the global deficits pertaining to skills and skill development. This is a primary concern as these are critical disciplines in developmental countries that should ordinarily necessitate urgent and national-based interventions from the state. However, fundamental support is a lacking aspect for poor students and those who come from backgrounds ailed by multidimensional poverty.
44. The EFF has over the past five years pursued a method to handle student debt, which has been hamstrung by the tedious processes of passing legislation in the Parliament of South Africa. It will be important for the National People's Assembly to reflect on the mechanism and advise the way forward in terms of dealing with the high cost of education and existing levels of debt
45. The Students' Debt Cancellation Bill arose after a considerable turmoil that has confronted the higher education sector in South Africa, which has been particularly heightened in the past 10 years, notably due to the emergence of various student movements and protests around access to higher education.

46. The policy document proposing the bill at the time, explored conceptual perspectives on the importance and character of higher education economically and socially, in order to make clearer the importance of the clearance of student debt. More pointedly however, it was a policy document whose central purpose was to emphasise the need to clear student debt to fast-track the personal development of students and national development of South African and African society, with an understanding of education as a means to uplift broader society, provide dignity and give rise to access to opportunity and poverty alleviation.
47. If we are to read education as beyond a means towards employment, and not as a privilege reserved for the few, but as a tool to domestic and continental development, much of the social and economic crisis we face as a people today would be subverted.
48. In essence, should education be read as a means to further industrial development, contribute to qualitative research into human behaviour and social patterns and as a means to undo historical injustices, by creating a socially conscious intelligentsia, the clearance of student debt would be a non-argument. We would collectively understand that debt and the commodification of education is a hinderance to broader societal development and prosperity.
49. The Students' Debt Cancellation Private Member Bill sought to achieve this, and was a context specific intervention to a much broader need for a reconfiguration of how we understand education, its purpose and how it ought to be disbursed to South African society.

50. **Overview of the Student Debt Crisis in South Africa**

51. Student debt has been a stumbling block to graduation outputs in South African society for decades.
52. On top of the fact that access to education in itself is limited to those who are able to exhibit their poverty, or able to directly pay for their studies, it is the exorbitant costs of higher education in this country that has led to a limited production of scholars, particularly from the majority black population.
53. In a response to a question posed by the EFF in 2022, on the number of graduates who are unable to access their qualifications over the past decade due to debt (2010-2020), the Department indicated that 116 837 are unable to access their qualifications, from 21 out of the 26 Universities in South Africa.

54. The need to clear this debt is overwhelming, as the unemployment rate soars and the students flounder with bad credit ratings and unable to enter into financial and contractual credit or loan agreements.
55. The debt crisis has far reaching implications, if one takes for example the number of black post-graduates in South Africa, who are a direct product of procession from the undergraduate level of study. It is only possible to proceed to post-graduate study if one has been able to settle their undergraduate fees and obtain their qualification, and the implications of this mean the representation at post-graduate level racially, and the calibre and focus of high-level research is robbed of the insight of the experiences and interests of the majority poor black population.
56. It is an undeniable fact that inequality and affordability in South Africa has a colour, and that colour is black. Logic then follows that it is black students who are most under-represented in the post-graduate sector, whose aims and objectives ought to be aligned to the needs of the country at a research level.
57. According to a 2019 Report of the Ministerial Task Team on Recruitment, Retention, and Progression of Black South African Academics, reported that the pool of black South Africans can be recruited remains small. The report noted that spaces are there but are not being taken up by black South Africans.
58. More pointedly, the report noted that high dropout rates across all levels of education result in low recruitment and retention of black post-graduates. In the higher education sector, student debt and financial distress is a major contributor to drop-outs.
59. Student Debt that hinders students from accessing their qualifications therefore has a significant impact on the transformation objectives of the country in academia and research, and undoubtedly on our developmental outputs.

60. **Proposed Legislative Intervention**

61. The intervention proposed by the EFF was that all student debt that has resulted in the qualifications of students being withheld must be nullified.
62. This was on the basis that it is not workable to condemn the emerging intelligentsia to debt when our nation, which is riddled by social, economic, financial and technological decay requires as much growth in academia as possible.

63. The logic was that it is irrational as it furthers unemployment and stifles the emergence of black people in the post-graduate and high-level research arena.
64. The EFF therefore proposed a Students' Debt Cancellation Private Member Bill as the most logical and reasonable policy intervention, to a regressive phenomena of commodification, that characterises the higher education sector.
65. The bill has since lapsed as the term of the 6th Administration of Parliament came to a close, and as the EFF intends to re-introduce the bill in the 7th Administration, it will be important for this National Assembly to make inputs on how it ought to be structured
66. There are several institutions of higher learning in South Africa; a total of 26 public universities and 50 TVET colleges. There are two sectors in the higher education terrain namely the University sector and the TVET sector. The distinctions are made in terms of the level of basic education acquired and the academic performance within the basic education sector. TVETs offer vocational qualifications and apprenticeships that wage equivalence to high school diplomas and associate degrees whilst universities offer their student base degrees that wage equivalence to a bachelors or masters degree.
67. An honest assessment, one that is considerate of the character of separate development that characterises South Africa would suggest that access to institutions of higher learning is determined by the class background of an individual, the infrastructural differences within the basic education sector which favour the rich and hinder the poor, and that academic efficiency is dependent and influenced greatly by one's social reality.
68. The unequal levels of development between the university sector and TVET sector also results in stigmas that mean there is a concentration of students who do not want to pursue TVET sector education as a career option.
69. The Department of Higher Education and Training reported on the negative effects of unequal budget allocation between universities and TVETs in a briefing with the portfolio committee on higher education in training in September 2019 stating that they, ". . . had been advising the Committee on the question of funding, that 82% of its total budget goes to universities. R78 billion goes to universities and R12 billion remains available for TVET colleges. There were 26 universities and 50 TVET colleges in the country with a rural footprint. There was no adequate funding to carry all the responsibilities for the TVET colleges."
70. Many students thus find themselves in the TVET sector due to circumstance and, their poor performance in the basic education sector, and the hierarchies of

quality created between the two sectors. Many then end up not even pursuing a qualification in the TVET sector due to how it is poorly managed, lack of resources for education and teaching material, infrastructural challenges, stigmas, and lack of awareness.

71. The challenges and stigmas are valid, and the South African Further Education and Training Association (SAFETA) made shocking submissions on the conditions in the sector to the portfolio committee on higher education and training, such as; *"If the profile of the principals was checked, the Committee would notice that it was people who came from secondary schools with a significant lack of experience and expertise in the TVET sector. In the previous presentation, it had been indicated that the lack of leadership from some of the principals was evident, and the way they ran the colleges in some instances was suppressive in nature."*
72. SAFETSA proposed that there should be a term of office for principals; the post must not be permanent. For instance, Vice Chancellors at universities had terms of office.
73. Some of the council members over-stepped their authority, but there were also instances where principals undermined the authority of the council members.
74. SAFETSA proposed that there should be additional expertise in the councils, such as people with research capacity to assist them to respond to the needs of the regions where Colleges were based.
75. SRC constitutions were changed year in and year out without the consultation of the SRC body, and were aimed to suppress the SRCs from discharging their duties effectively. In some colleges, students were not allowed to wear their political regalia. In a democratic country, this was fundamentally wrong.
76. In addition, there were colleges that did not allow the SRC elections to be conducted in a democratic manner. Some of these students were just hand-picked for compliance with the Department.
77. Furthermore, it was found that "infrastructure was outdated on college campuses. Most computer laboratories were either without computers or internet connections. Some libraries did not even have books, and some of the buildings did not have access for students living with disabilities. There was a significant lack of infrastructure management, and the budgets were much less compared to operational budgets. Only about 4% of the 10% of the budget allocation was used for infrastructure, and the remaining 6% would be utilised for operational pressures. Regarding the curricula in the TVET Sector, the students graduate with inadequate experience. The textbooks used do not resonate with recent labour market conditions."

78. Leadership challenges at the staff and executive components of the institutions continue to haunt the TVET sector. The Department of Higher Education has failed to formulate and enhance standardization of managing institutions which make them vulnerable to managerial abuse. The declining enrolment in the TVET sector is validated by the quality concerns, and ineffective vocational pedagogy and skills required for the purpose of training.
79. South Africa is therefore faced with a dilemma of a small educated populous that is more theoretically skilled, than vocationally skilled due to the structural and governance problems facing the TVET sector. This has an impact on developmental and employment levels. It is therefore important for the EFF to make its assessments and diagnosis of the higher education sector with the social realities that define access, infrastructure and academic performance in mind.
80. It is therefore important for the EFF to make its assessments and diagnosis of the higher education sector with the social realities that define access, infrastructure and academic performance in mind. There are 26 Universities in South Africa:
- a. University of Cape Town (28 600 registered students)
 - b. Cape Peninsula University of Technology (34 400 registered students)
 - c. Stellenbosch University (31 765 registered students)
 - d. University of the Western Cape (22 000 registered students)
 - e. University of Witwatersrand (39 593 registered students)
 - f. University of Johannesburg (51 000 registered students)
 - g. Sefako Makgatho University (6 300 registered students)
 - h. University of Pretoria (50 000 registered students)
 - i. Tshwane University of Technology (60 000 registered students)
 - j. Nelson Mandela University (27 000 registered students)
 - k. Rhodes University (8200 registered students)
 - l. Walter Sisulu University (30 000 registered students)
 - m. Fort Hare University (13 000 registered students)
 - n. University of Limpopo (19 000 registered students)
 - o. University of Venda (10 000 registered students)
 - p. University of South Africa (400 000 registered students)
 - q. Durban University of Technology (30 000 registered students)
 - r. University of Zulu Land (7 000 registered students)
 - s. University of Kwazulu-Natal (45 000 registered students)
 - t. Mangosuthu University of Technology (11 000 registered students)
 - u. North West University (70 000 registered students)
 - v. Vaal University of Technology (22 000 registered students)
 - w. Sol Plaatjie University (1 560 registered students)
 - x. University of Free State (37 000 registered students)
 - y. Cental University of Technology (15 000 registered students)
 - z. University of Mpumalanga (900 registered students)

81. These institutions are categorised into three:
- a. namely comprehensive universities (research intensive institutions), (6)
 - b. conventional universities (14)
 - c. and universities of technology (6)
82. Universities accept students based on certain pass levels acquired at a matric level. These are:
- a. Higher certificate
 - b. Diploma
 - c. Bachelors pass (previously known as an exemption).
83. They then subsequently assess the marks of students at the matric level and whether they are in accordance with their own metrics for their programs on offer. This is commonly done through a system known as Admission Point Score system. A majority of institutions are organized around 8 core faculties, which consist of various departments and disciplines that contribute towards a degree or diploma qualification. Namely these are:
- a. Commerce
 - b. Engineering
 - c. Humanities
 - d. Health Sciences
 - e. Law
 - f. Science
 - g. Education
 - h. Business and Management
84. There are 50 Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVETs) with more than 264 campuses in South Africa. These are:
- a. Buffalo City FET College (C)
 - b. East Cape Midlands FET College (B)
 - c. Ikhala FET College (G)
 - d. Ingwe FET College (F)
 - e. King Hintsa FET College (H)
 - f. King Sabata Dalindyebo FET College (E)
 - g. Lovedale FET College (D)
 - h. Port Elizabeth FET College (A)
 - i. Flavius Mareka (D)
 - j. Goldfields FET College (A)
 - k. Maluti FET College (C)
 - l. Motheo FET College (B)

- m. Central JHB (F)
- n. Ekurhuleni East FET College (D)
- o. Ekurhuleni West College (C)
- p. Sedibeng FET College (H)
- q. South West FET College (E)
- r. Tshwane North FET College (B)
- s. Tshwane South FET College (A)
- t. Western College FET (G)
- u. Coastal FET College (Moben) (F)
- v. Elangeni FET College (E)
- w. Esayidi FET College (I)
- x. Majuba FET College (C)
- y. Mnambithi FET College (D)
- z. Mthashana FET College (A)
- aa. Thekwini FET College (G)
- bb. Umfolozi FET College (B)
- cc. Umgungu-Ndlovu FET College (H)
- dd. Capricorn FET College (B)
- ee. Lephalale FET College (A)
- ff. Letaba FET College (F)
- gg. Mopani South East FET College (E)
- hh. Sekhu-khune FET College (G)
- ii. Vhembe FET College (D)
- jj. Waterberg FET College (C)
- kk. Ehlanzeni FET College (A)
- ll. Gert Sibande FET College (C)
- mm. Nkangala FET College (B)
- nn. Northern Cape Rural FET College (B)
- oo. Northern Cape Urban FET College (A)
- pp. ORBIT TVET College (C)
- qq. Taletso FET College (A)
- rr. Vuselela FET College (B)
- ss. Boland FET College (B)
- tt. College of Cape Town FET College (E)
- uu. False Bay FET College (F)
- vv. Northlink FET College (D)
- ww. South Cape FET College (C)
- xx. West Coast FET College (A)

85. TVET Colleges accept students who've completed Grade 9, 10, 11 or 12 at high school level offering diplomas and certificates in various vocational skills. A briefing by the Department of Higher Education (DHET) in September 2019 on Overview of the TVET sector with respect to governance, management, teaching, learning & new campuses confirmed that, "... currently two qualifications formed the core offerings at TVET colleges. These were the Report

191 programmes, commonly referred to as the National Technical Education (NATED) programmes, and the National Certificates (Vocational), commonly referred to as the NC(V).

86. The Report 191 programmes had a long history of delivery in the TVET college system in the form of the N1-N3 and the N4-N6 programmes in engineering, business and services-related studies. The N4-N6 programmes culminate in a National N Diploma at National Qualifications Framework (NQF) level 6, following 18 and 24 months of internship for engineering and business/services studies respectively. The NC(V) was introduced in 2007, and caters for young people who wish to pursue a vocational career pathway after grade 9, and want to still achieve the equivalent of matric, at NQF level 4.
87. University post-graduates can also enrol for courses at TVET Colleges for more practical exposure.
88. TVET colleges have a high focus on the employability of students and are most effective at preparing students for employment in a very wide range of fields. The TVET sector ought to play a critical role in South Africa's developmental aspirations, particularly in terms of industrialisation and to tackle unemployment.
89. Various courses are on offer in the sector that relate to our immediate developmental needs, especially considering the emerging era of the 4th industrial revolution. These include:
 - a. engineering (construction, electrical and mechanical),
 - b. information communication technology (ICT), and
 - c. Computer networking.
 - d. hospitality,
 - e. food service
 - f. tourism industries,
 - g. haircare,
 - h. early childhood development,
 - i. Management (financial, human resource, marketing, administration)
90. Unfortunately, as is the reality with all departments in South Africa the higher education sector is in a state of collapse, lack of transformation, inadequate funding and incapacity. Both the TVET and University sector are riddled with corruption. As of August 2019, Historically Disadvantaged Institutions (HDI) such as Fort Hare, Vaal University of Technology, have been placed under administration due to:
 - a. The inability of councils, and in some cases the Chairperson, to provide strategic leadership and direction.
 - b. Role confusion between governance and management.

- c. Tense council / vice-chancellor relationships, structure and composition, and size.
 - d. Failure by members to distinguish between the interests of the institution and the interests of the constituencies which elected or nominated.
 - e. Non-adherence to governance procedures.
 - f. Corruption.
91. Institutions such as the University of Cape Town, University of Witwatersrand have been under scrutiny for low levels of transformation. The University of Cape Town most recently finding its Law Accreditation being under review due to the not meeting transformation criteria in terms of program formulation, make up of lecturers and admission requirements.
 92. Furthermore, following the aesthetically “decisive” interventions by the Department of Higher Education at the University of Cape Town and at the University of South Africa, the concerns raised by academics over the toxicity and misogyny prevalent in universities became validated. The Economic Freedom Fighters in 2023, to this, in Parliament, asked the department of Higher Education why the “decisive” interventions by the Department aren’t mirrored when racism is the concern. The Department admitted to this and committed to correcting it. However, since these are ideological and fundamental aspects that shape the higher education, they will require more intentional intervention strides from the state to be resolved. These should and aren’t limited to policies that protect women and LGBTQI+ in academia and the protection of women leaders in institutions of higher learning.
 93. In the TVET sector there is a crisis of courses not being accredited, and the emergence of fake FET Colleges. Regulation in the sector is poor, with NSFAS dividends often not reaching students due to poor administration, poor data collection in terms of student demographics and numbers, and corruption.
 94. Accommodation remains a prevalent problem. The student housing backlogs as reported by the Presidential Commission on Higher Education and Training, or Heher Commission stood at 300 000 beds for both public universities and public TVET colleges, of which 128 000 was for universities. As is with all indicators, data relating to the TVET sector in terms of housing needs is limited. This shows a deep-rooted problem in how the sector is administered and not taken seriously.
 95. There was however a survey conducted by the Department of Higher Education. The Heher Commission states that, “the housing shortage in TVET institutions was confirmed by the Minister when he stated that DHET carried out a survey of the 50 public TVET Colleges in 2015. The survey showed that for the 710 000 college students, there were only 10 120 beds.”.

96. This situation has not improved and has been worsened by the emergence of landlords who take advantage of needy students while providing substandard accommodation
97. The commission reported that "TVET Colleges can provide accommodation for only 1.4% of students; that is 1 in 70 students. Many of those students travel hundreds of kilometres from their homes in rural areas to the nearest college". For universities, only less than 15% of students can be accommodated by current existing beds capacity. This is far from sufficient, with existing residences being poor in terms of infrastructure. Many are without WIFI access, adequate water and toilet facilities, this is especially bad in previously disadvantaged or black institutions of higher learning.
98. Security remains a problem, resulting in high levels of crime and sexual violence in institutions of higher learning.
99. Library services at many institutions of higher learning are not up to standard, and as libraries have incorrectly begun being deemed as non-essential services funding for the area has been steady at a low 1% - 6%, with little development. Access to material for research is increasingly scarce and the lack of funding and sustaining of libraries has been detrimental, particularly to institutions that have struggled to migrate to digital forms of resource provision due to funding and infrastructural problems
100. In terms of funding, the current National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) is not sufficient to deal with challenges of funding in the sector. There has been an increase in NSFAS qualifying students, but not an adequate provision of funding for students. This has resulted in a phenomenon known as "top-slicing" being practiced by institutions. Where the grant afforded by NSFAS to institutions per qualifying student is cut and divided so as to be spread evenly across a wider range of students.
101. This results in qualifying students receiving less funding than what has been allocated and determined to be necessary per student. The means test for NSFAS qualifying students is inadequate and not sophisticated in how it assesses worthiness for funding. Students are expected to perform and demonstrate their poverty to the highest degree in order to qualify for funding, which infringes on their constitutional right to dignity.
102. Furthermore, the means test is not considerate of the complex economic realities of South Africans, creating a gap known as the "missing middle". These are students who are in essence too poor to pay for their own fees, but at the same time regarded as too wealthy to qualify for NSFAS funding.
103. In the TVET sector funding for programs is scarce and inconsistent, resulting in shortfalls that the institutions are unable to cover, and alarming fiscal instability.

The Heher Commission found that in 2015 there were 664,748 students in programmes known as the 'National Certificate Vocational (NC(V)) as well as Report 191 (NATED) programmes at colleges countrywide whilst the DHET could only fund 429,638 (64%) students. This underfunding continued in 2016 and was projected to continue in 2017 and 2018.

104. The commission further found that "Occupational Programmes include 'learnerships, apprenticeships and skills programmes. These programmes are not funded by the DHET' but are offered at a cost to the client. Colleges work together with SETAs and the National Skills Fund (NSF) to fund these programmes and provide a stipend for needy students." In the year 2017/2018 TVETs were funded at 53%, rather than 80% as per governmental policy, resulting in considerable unrest from both students and staff.
105. The trends of shortfalls being carried by institutions in the TVET sector is continuous. In a briefing given to the portfolio committee on Higher Education and Training by DHET, one Mr Zirk Joubert, Chief Director: Financial Planning, DHET, outlined the budget of the TVET sector, which amounted to R12.9 billion, but with a shortfall of R1 billion (rounded figure). The same briefing found that the current 2019/20 enrolment plan comprised of 562 006 students, against the target of 664 748 indicated in the annual performance plan (APP), hence the shortfall of R1 billion. The Department had requested the colleges to carry that burden.
106. In terms of the University sector, a Report of the Ministerial Committee for the Review of the Funding of Universities (2013) found that 'Meeting the resource needs of the sector will require significant additional funding. An analysis by the Committee found that state funding of higher education (in real terms) has been declining over the years. Between 2000 and 2010, state funding per full-time equivalent (FTE) enrolled student fell by 1.1% annually, in real terms.
107. These are socio-economic realities that impact not only the output rates in terms of graduates from the higher education sector but undermine the developmental and transformation objectives of the country. There is as low intake of black students at institutions of higher learning and low outputs of black graduates.
108. Many students do not complete their studies, and dropout due to the socio-economic realities that hinder them and various forms of alienation. These range from cultural alienation, difficulty in adapting to the higher education system and academic processes and standards that are not in sync with the quality of our basic education sector, racism, homelessness and lack of funding.
109. A study conducted by Inside Education found that more than 40% of student's drop out in their first year. Many citing family responsibility, financial circumstances and socio-economic alienation as the reasons for them dropping

out. A research paper published by the Department of Higher Education and Training, titled Addressing Student Dropout Rates at South African Universities found that only 5% of black and coloured student's graduate from university.

110. This means that coupled with a low intake of black students at universities, there is a low output of graduate and low retention of students in subsequent academic years. This poses a great threat to transformation objectives within academia and research. In addition to this, there is a crisis of unemployment for graduates from the higher education sector, which falls in line with the general unemployment crisis in the country.
111. This means that skilled labourers find themselves jobless, with mounting student debts, and the incentive to enter the tertiary sector as a means of elevating one's material reality are low. As of the fourth quarter of 2023, the unemployment rate in South Africa stood at 32.1 percent. The majority of unemployed individuals had an education level below matric (grade 12), while those that had finished their matric year represented around 34 percent. Graduates had the lowest share of unemployment at approximately 10 percent.
112. Comparatively, The Republic of China which has been a benchmark for all the developmental world that has not been part of the Western dominance of the economy has been doing extremely well. The success rates can largely be accredited to compulsory schooling required at a basic education level and how this has been streamlined qualitatively across the nation, and intensive infrastructural development. China has a strong emphasis on compulsory primary and secondary education, which as we know has a strong impact on the success a student can achieve in tertiary education and their ability to transition.
113. Their high graduate rates up until doctoral level can be accredited to the amount of investment placed into basic education. As of in China there were 207 000 schools for more than 158 million students. In addition to this, 37 million rural students benefit from the Nutrition Improvement Action Plan, where basic food is provided at schools, a program that is about to be cut in South Africa due to austerity
114. The compulsory education at a basic level is critical for transition into the higher education sector, as it lays the foundation to dissuade drop outs and low literacy levels, which aids competence once the higher education sector is experienced.
115. The proof of this is shown in the higher education enrolment rates in China, with the latest available data showing that in In 2022, gross enrollment in higher education reached 59.6%

116. In the same 2022, China reported remarkable levels of existence of various types of higher education centres and record numbers of enrolment for both the young and old. China had 3,013 higher education institutions (HEIs). Among them, 1,239 were regular ones (164 independent colleges included). This included 32 polytechnic colleges, and 1,489 higher vocational education institutes. There was also a total of 253 adult higher education institutes. There were also 234 research institutions training postgraduate students. The number of registered students in all HEIs totaled 46.55 million across the country, an increase of 2.25 million over the previous year.
117. Perhaps most critically, the improving of funding to the vocational sector has resulted in massive economic growth in the public sector, and qualitative growth in the sector itself. The report reads that “China has implemented a number of vocational education promotion projects, such as building demonstrative secondary and higher vocational education institutions, improving vocational education quality and facilitating industry-education integration, which have witnessed the emergence of a wide array of high-performing schools, strong disciplines and high-caliber teacher workforce. In 2017, government funding for vocational education across the country reached 335 billion RMB. The student aid system targeting students from low income families has been improved, providing tuition exemption and grants to 90% and 40% of secondary vocational students respectively and offering scholarships and grants to 30% and 25% of vocational college students respectively.”
118. China is therefore an illustration of how the problems faced by South Africa can be addressed by focus on vocational training, on development of the basic education sector to streamline standards between the two sectors, and the importance of infrastructural development. The importance of post-graduate outputs being high reflects an understanding of the importance of research development, which has an effect on the developmental standards across sectors and sovereignty. China and its successes must therefore serve as a metric for a government of the EFF on how to develop the higher education sector.

(c) On Decolonisation

119. The Economic Freedom Fighters makes a cogent diagnosis of the character of higher education in its founding manifesto, *“It is vital to acknowledge that commonly, the relationship between higher education and ideology reflects the nature and level of class contradictions in society. The history of education struggle in South Africa serves as a testimony to the class contestation of higher learning institutions. The then apartheid regime systematically applied racist,*

supremacist policies in education system for class and racial privilege and benefits of certain individuals and groups."

120. In light of this assessment it would only be fair to concede that the makeup of the curricula in South Africa is not structured to create a socially responsible intelligentsia that will contribute to altering the structural problems of South Africa. Education is conceptualised as a means for capital accumulation, and not necessarily of producing alternative forms of knowledge production, on creating an emerging black intelligentsia and research outputs that will address the economic and social problems of the country and the continent.
121. Decolonial scholar Professor Nelson Maldonado-Torres writes that "coloniality refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations." This means that colonialism defined the very basis of knowledge production and what is considered valid forms of thought, culture, development and scholarship.
122. Colonialism crafted education as a tool for empire expansion, capitalist production and defined concepts that moulded modern humanity and society according to its own metrics. Africa and its colonies therefore became not only subjects of study, but her societies, her knowledge systems, customs and norms were disfigured. Africa was created as a site of extraction, where identities and developmental metrics were set by an Imperialist culture that assumed its own validity over others. It is for this reason that our education systems in South Africa, particularly in areas that are research and development orientated such as higher learning are unable to respond to contemporary post-colonial problems.
123. The education, its purpose was not made to respond to the challenges of Africa, but rather to entrench them. How institutions are constructed at the level of architecture maintains symbolism that celebrates racists as philanthropists, and colonisers as developmental heroes. It is from this frustration that the calls of the falling for statues of the likes of Cecil Rhodes were made, as the statues themselves represented the glorification of racism, capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy.
124. The role of who teaches and how knowledge is transferred is a critical aspect of thought that seeks to undo how colonialism constructed education. Brazilian decolonial scholar and freedom fighter Paulo Freire laments in his seminal text *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* critically on what he coined as the banking theory of education. He writes that, *"A careful analysis of the teacher-student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, reveals its fundamentally narrative character. This relationship involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening object (the students)."*

The contents, whether values or empirical dimensions of reality, tend in the process of being narrated to become lifeless and petrified. Education is suffering from narration sickness. The teacher talks about reality as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable. Or else he expounds on a topic completely alien to the existential experience of the students. His task is to "fill" the students with contents of his narration – contents which are detached from reality . . . Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor . . . This is the "banking" concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits. . . In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing . . . It is not surprising that the banking concept of education regards men as adaptable, manageable beings. The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of the world"

125. Freire here capture the very essence of the relationship between the colonial oppressor and the colonial subject. Colonialism created a reality where it was the custodian of knowledge, and the black people are subservient, empty shells who must receive from the very people who have categorised them as non-beings according to their own metrics. It is that very logic that binds black people in South Africa into a state of doubt, and inability to affect change to their spiritual and material realities, as the only knowledge and production they have had access to be that which has been deposited to them.
126. The analogy of a banking system of knowledge is an ironic truth of the reflection of capitalist modes of knowledge production and their purpose and is what characterises relations of learning at institutions of higher learning. Knowledge is imparted by white lecturers and professors who carry with them the racist and capitalist biases that make up their identity, and it is imparted to an unsuspecting and unquestioning student, who must accept curricula as is.
127. The purpose of decolonisation therefore is to undo the uneven relationship of knowledge production and ensure that education is in sync with the material, spiritual and theoretical needs of a contemporary African society.
128. As Frantz Fanon states that decolonization will always be a violent phenomenon, as it entails the replacing of one species of man with another, in this sense man being a term in reference to humanity itself. This does not always mean violence in the physical sense, but refers to cognitive violence and the process of unlearning methods of teaching and learning which creates subjects of oppression, as one that may be harmful to the existing ideals in ones head.

129. This is a conceptual violence, where unlearning the negative attitudes towards ones own people and situation, give rise to the violent realisation of ones own oppression, and the need to cognitively resist subjugation. Education in South Africa today, needs this, as the norms and understanding of what is normal and abnormal about our existence, and the purpose of pursuing education need to be revisited and taken apart at the seams.

(d) On Science and Technology

130. The elections manifesto of the Economic Freedom Fighters states that, "the EFF government will use science, technology and innovation not as ends in themselves but to produce the knowledge, information, skills and talent needed to support, facilitate and fuel the development and growth of strategic industries and sectors of the economy and society which are central to the overall independence and sovereignty of South African and African people.". This means that scientific development and technological advancement, just as higher education must speak to the developmental needs of South Africa and addressing inequality.
131. As things stand however in South Africa, Science and Technology innovation, research and development, as well as Public Research Institutions do not have mandates that are in line with national priorities. It is a sector that is characterised like all of South Africa by developmental concentration and inequality. The White Paper on Science and Technology adopted by cabinet in 2019 found that, *"The higher education sector is responsible for nearly 90 per cent of all research publications, compared to about 8 per cent for all the science councils and national research facilities combined. Within the university sector, five universities produce more than 60 per cent of research outputs from the sector"*
132. This means that a majority of research outputs in South Africa are concentrated in a sector that is preoccupied largely with theoretical outputs into innovation, and a higher education sector that does not necessarily carry the core responsibility of research innovation that is in line with governmental targets and needs for development.
133. The paper goes further to say that even outputs of the most qualified researchers at an academic level in the higher education sector are concentrated in few institutions, revealing that *"... there are performance gaps between universities and universities of technology, and between historically advantaged and disadvantaged institutions. For example, three-quarters of the country's PhD graduates are produced by only six of its universities."* Industrialisation levels in South Africa are low and pose a threat to the economic and innovative sovereignty of the country.

134. Dependency on foreign innovation perpetuate the unequal trade and economic relations African nations have with the developed nations and stifle the objectives for a growing economy and job creation. The lack of a State-Owned Pharmaceutical company undermines state capacity to develop innovative medical interventions, creating a dependency on private pharmaceuticals that function on profit-based objectives and not objectives of uplifting social and medical ills of South African society.

C. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

(a) Early childhood development

135. Families are at the centre of communities and share the responsibility for children. Family is integral in getting the best environment for children and are key to risk prevention and early detection – the model remedies potential threats to a child's development. In addition, ECD centres should be required to keep a medical record of all learners who enrol. All children between the age of 0 to 6 should receive all vaccination.
136. Families must be equipped with necessary skills and knowledge to create stimulating, caring and safe home environments. ECD centres must involve families through monthly group activities, and health practitioners and other practitioners such as social workers must use these monthly group activities to share information to make homes conducive environment.
137. Access to ECD programmes should be made universal and it must be compulsory for children from ages of three years and upwards to be enrolled in an ECD for free. Parents who do not take their children to ECD centres must be criminalized.
138. ECD curriculum should focus on nutrition programmes, book reading, lessons on health and hygiene and storytelling, and other land-based activities to enhance children's understanding of their surrounding environment.
139. Training of ECD practitioners should be integrated into training of educators. All ECD practitioners should be employed on a full-time basis, with full pay and pension contribution by government. All ECD centres must be registered with the Department of Basic Education. Training of ECD practitioners should prioritise African women and the youth. While unemployment affects people all ages, and races. African women and the youth are affected the most. [Insert stats]. Employment of women and the youth should form integral part of ECD centres and programmes.

(b) Basic Education

140. Basic education should include free decolonised education for all, advancing topics pertaining to indigenous knowledge, sovereignty and economic freedom in the curricula. This form of education should use information and communication technology for teaching, with the aim to achieve universal coverage in computer literacy. Career guidance should also be included as a mandatory subject for all high school learners.
141. Indigenous ways of learning should be introduced to the curriculum on a mainstreaming level. Narrative-driven learning, visualised learning processes, hand-on/reflective techniques, use of symbols/metaphors, land-based learning, indirect/synergistic logic, modelled/scaffolded genre mastery and connectedness to community. These must be adapted to suit the fast-paced development of our societies.
142. This should result in one education system wherein all students fall under one education system and write the same examination, and Independent Examination Board (IEB) will be abolished.
143. All people who have dropped out of school, including domestic workers, sex workers and young girls, should be encouraged and incentivised to return to school including through various form of teaching. Part of the curriculum to train educators should include remedial training. Comprehensive adult education programmes and guarantee educational access by adults will increase literacy levels.
144. The introduction of information and communication technology for teaching does not divorce the use of indigenous ways of teaching, learning and development that prioritise community values, languages and knowledge. Training of teachers should prioritise adequate technological skills to impart to learners. Vernacular languages should be introduced as the foundation of the education system in all provinces.
145. The rate at which government is reopening teacher's training college is too slow and does not consider the fact that there is a serious crisis of educators both qualitatively and quantitatively. There is a need to reopen and build additional teachers training college in all provinces.
146. High technology teacher training colleges must be built and those existing, developed to accommodate the technological resource to equip educators with adequate technological skills to impart to learners.
147. Noting the geographical challenges that directly impact access to education for the poor, all learners who stay more than 2 kilometres away from their school

should be provided for with scholarly transport that directly involved local associations. And in the instance scholar transport isn't a viable intervention for daily commutation, the state must provide hostels for pupils.

148. Specialised education for the autistic must be built and resourced. These schools that focus on the broad autism spectrum must be fully equipped with tailored educational resources and trained staff, to provide inclusive and supportive learning environments for children with autism.
149. Modules and subjects pertaining to introducing knowledge on disabilities and practical lessons on inclusion should be introduced at all levels and at grade-appropriate standards. This should be mandatory and inculcated into the curriculum.
150. Safe and accessible transport for children with disabilities should be provided, with full-based aid in transportation always present. Various types of mobility, technological and human aids for pupils with disabilities w=should be the standard provision by the state.
151. Two means per day must be the standard of provision of nutrition to all learners in all schools.
152. To ensure that the multidimensional needs and talents of pupils are explored and empowered, schools must be integrated with technology in the classrooms, sports facilities that accommodate various sporting codes in all the schools, computer laboratories and a decrease in the teacher to pupil ratio from 1:30 to 1:25.
153. The state must ensure that it is compulsory that each school has a vegetable garden, a primary healthcare facility, a library and computer laboratories.
154. State-led country wide interventions on literacy, reading and comprehension must be implemented with intention to equip all citizens with basic reading skills, writing skills and the ability to count to enable knowledge in all aspects of life and to increase the literacy rate to 98%.
155. All schools must be inclusive of gymnasiums for promotion of healthy lifestyles and physical activity, dedicated science laboratories where learners can perform experiments, libraries with free internet access, and music lessons to improve cognitive skills and stimulation of learners.
156. Personalised strategies for learners who have dropped out should be devised, and furthermore for those who have not dropped out to eradicate the prevalence of drop-outs in basic education.

157. To create a schooling education environment that is comprehensive, schools must employ nurses, social workers, remedial teachers, orthodontists, and physical education trainers.

(c) Higher Education, science and technology

158. Higher Education and training constitute a critical component in the struggle for economic freedom, and here we explain what will constitute transformed higher education and training in South Africa. As addressed in the Founding Manifesto of the EFF, Higher Education and training transformation should necessarily encapsulate the following;

- a. Introduction of free quality well-resourced education for all.
- b. Alignment of skills to industrial sectors,
- c. The expansion of post-secondary education and training.

159. To achieve all these objectives, the political and strategic leadership of higher education should be radically changed, and instead of a Ministry of Higher Education, a body comprising of representatives of Government, Labour, Civil Society, Students, Workers, and Private sector should be constituted to be responsible for Higher Education and Training in South Africa. This body will be responsible for the following:

- a. Admissions and enrolment policies of all institutions of higher learning.
- b. Allocation of annual budgets to institutions of higher learning and training.
- c. Appointment of institutional managers such as Vice Chancellors.
- d. Closing the gap between former historically disadvantaged institutions and historically advantaged institutions.
- e. Ensuring that there is adequate spread of suitably qualified Professors and other Academics across all institutions of Higher Learning.
- f. Standardisation of curriculum across all institutions of higher learning with the aim of ensuring that all academic programmes issued by all institutions of higher learning are of equal quality and globally competitive standards.
- g. Improvement and sustenance of Professors and Academics' remuneration and welfare in all institutions of higher learning.
- h. Determination of infrastructure needed for HE and training expansion.
- i. Interventions in institutions that do not meet the nationally set objectives.
- j. Normalisation and standardisation of institutional fees prior to the introduction of free education for all.

(d) Free quality education

160. By free quality education for all, we refer to fee-free quality higher education for all. What this means is that instead of collecting fees from individual students in order to provide them with education, institutions of higher learning should be

adequately funded through a central system so that the recipients of higher education and training are not bound to pay any fees.

161. Free quality education also means that South Africa's education system should be liberated from the orthodox indoctrination which has defined it for many years due to its colonial-cum-apartheid system and neo-liberal post-apartheid. Institutions of higher learning should be bastions of free thoughts and contending ideas, where superior logic triumphs, and not suppressed because it is not part of the curriculum. With education free, it must be compulsory for all learners to pursue post-secondary education and training at universities, universities of technology and TVET colleges.
162. The Fee free quality education should be funded through three sources, which are 1) The Pension Fund Levy, 2) The Skills Levy, 3) Government Direct allocation and 4) The Corporate Income Levy. These four models will be able to source and allocate adequate funding for higher education in South Africa. In addition to fee free quality education, Parliament must pass a law that will zero-rate all educational apps and content in all electronical gadgets such as computers, laptops, tablets and phones.

(e) Alignment of skills to industrial sectors

163. Higher Education and training should be closely linked to practical work in order to train capable students with adequate knowledge and experience of what they are doing. Very few academic qualifications programmes in South Africa's institutions of higher learning and training are linked to actual work and industrial training and this is totally inappropriate. Such kind of training is similar to teaching potential drivers how-to drive-in theory, and expect them to be drivers without practical driving training.
164. Those who are studying electrical engineering should practically interact with industries that deal with electrical engineering. Those who are studying law should interact with the country legal system and allocated certain legal responsibilities.
165. Those who are studying accounting should perform practical work of assisting small and medium enterprises with accounting systems and methods while they are still students. This should apply to all spheres of education with the aim of relating and linking theoretical education with practice.

(f) Expansion of post-secondary training and education

166. The purpose of education and strategies of disseminating knowledge need to be redefined and remodelled. The problem in South Africa is not necessarily a shortage of institutions of higher learning, but rather an inadequate use of the

existing capacity in strategic economic and developmental zones. Instead of long-term projects such as building new institutions, the administrative capacity of existing institutions must be utilised to develop strong vocational and theoretical subsidiary campuses and departments across the country, to curb the concentration of people in particular provinces and institutions and stratify the student populace.

167. This means for example that instead of a department of mining and engineering that will be based in Johannesburg in the case of the University of the Witwatersrand, a subsidiary institution can be established utilizing the existing administrative capacity in a region that is preoccupied with mining in the current era, such as in the North West and across the platinum belt. There must be comprehensive input as to how to improve research outputs that speak to the socio-economic demands of South African society.
168. The EFF must develop strategy on how to expand and transform the research system and facilitate knowledge diffusion. Through stratifying the provision of infrastructural development for science and technology innovation. Upgrading of knowledge and innovation infrastructure at the level of the state so that dependency is not placed on actors that do not have the social responsibility to keep innovation in sync with South African developmental needs.
169. A culture of innovation and science literacy must be created within the public sector and across state-owned entities. There must be local consumption of innovative products to stimulate inward industrial development and growth.

(g) Accommodation in institutions of higher learning

170. Land must be expropriated without compensation in order to intervene comprehensively with the accommodation crisis in the higher education sector.
171. All abandoned and state-owned hijacked buildings must be repurposed and refurbished into state-controlled residences that will be on par with norms and standards for residences and have sufficient infrastructure to cater for student needs and a conducive learning environment.

(h) Repurpose TVET Colleges

172. A commission of inquiry ought to be done on the misuse of state funds particularly in the TVET sector. Transformation objectives in the sector must be aware of the separate development between Previously Disadvantaged Institutions, Previously Advantaged Institutions and the TVET sector and be biased towards the infrastructural, social and economic needs of the poorest areas. Guidelines and regulations that oversee governance and operations at TVET colleges must be reviewed and strengthened and reviewed.

173. There must be a determined effort at establishing data collection measures and measures for accountability in the TVET sector to curb corruption and mismanagement. There must be a curriculum review of all courses and vocational training in the higher education sector. Teaching methods, practical's and the educational environment in general must create critical students.
174. Disciplines such as the sciences, engineering and mathematics must comprise of an aspect of the social sciences in order to promote an attitude of acquiring skills in order to be part of contributing to the social and developmental needs of the country. There needs to be a deliberate promotion of vocational skills and training within the education sector in South Africa in order to collapse the hierarchy that currently exists in terms of funding and preference at higher education and training.
175. Curricula around automation, digitisation, robotics and coding must be introduced at an early stage of our education system so as to create a smooth transition into the TVET sector. This serves to equip young people with skill sets that will equip them not only to exist in certain labour sectors due to having learnt particular subjects but capacitate them to be able to exist within the emerging reality and be flexible within that reality.

PAN AFRICANISM AND PROGRESSIVE INTERNATIONALISM



DISCUSSION DOCUMENTS



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A. INTRODUCTION

1. Every sovereign state must craft and implement a foreign policy that defines its relationships with other countries, both in Africa and across the globe, based on the current global political dynamics and the unique challenges facing the African continent
2. The EFF, positioning itself as the "government in waiting," recognizes the growing interest from both African and global stakeholders in what its foreign policy approach would be if it were to take power in South Africa. This interest extends to how an EFF-led government would relate to both ruling and opposition parties across the continent and internationally.
3. As global and continental politics evolve, the 3rd National People's Assembly of the EFF must develop an International Relations policy that provides clarity and certainty to these stakeholders. This policy will outline the EFF's vision for South Africa's role on the global stage, particularly its stance on issues such as anti-imperialism, Pan-Africanism, and economic emancipation for the African continent.
4. In line with the principles of the EFF's Founding Manifesto, its foreign policy must advocate for the dismantling of global imperialism, promote African unity and development, and foster justice-based international relations. This vision will ensure that the EFF's approach is aligned with global progressive movements while prioritizing the development and self-determination of Africa as a whole.

B. THE EFF MANIFESTO ON FOREIGN POLICY

5. The EFF Founding Manifesto anchors the EFF foreign policy on the doctrine of progressive internationalism. In the context of the EFF, progressive internationalism refers to a foreign policy framework that promotes solidarity, cooperation, and alignment with global movements and nations that advocate for social justice, economic equality, anti-imperialism, and the dismantling of neo-colonial power structures.
6. The EFF's vision of progressive internationalism emphasizes:
 - a) Anti-imperialism: Opposition to global imperialist powers that exploit Africa's resources and dictate its economic policies, as well as rejection of Western-dominated institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.

- b) Pan-Africanism: Strengthening unity and cooperation across African nations, fostering collective economic and political independence, and combating neo-colonialism. The EFF seeks to advance African sovereignty, self-determination, and economic liberation through shared prosperity.
 - c) Global Solidarity: Aligning with and supporting left-wing, socialist, and liberation movements around the world that challenge global capitalism, racial inequality, and environmental degradation. This also involves forming alliances with nations that resist imperialist hegemony, such as Cuba, Venezuela, and other socialist-leaning countries.
 - d) Economic Justice: Advocating for a global redistribution of wealth and resources, particularly calling for reparations and the end of exploitative practices by multinational corporations that dominate African economies. The EFF pushes for trade relationships that are fair and mutually beneficial to developing countries.
 - e) Peace and Security: Promoting diplomatic solutions to global conflicts while opposing military interventions led by imperial powers. The EFF envisions a world where African nations are not manipulated into geopolitical conflicts that serve foreign interests.
7. In essence, the EFF's progressive internationalism aims to reshape global power dynamics, ensuring that Africa and other marginalized regions have equitable standing in global affairs while fostering solidarity with movements that challenge global capitalist exploitation.
 8. The concept of progressive internationalism in the context of the EFF draws from our official policies, speeches by the President, and ideological framework outlined in our Founding Manifesto.
 9. The EFF is an anti-imperialist, Pan-Africanist, and socialist-oriented party, advocating for global solidarity with left-leaning movements and countries that resist capitalist exploitation and neo-colonialism. This vision is further emphasized in various public addresses and party documents which highlight our commitment to social justice, economic equality, and an African-centred approach to international relations.
 10. The EFF Founding Manifesto provides that: *"The EFF's internationalism is premised on building solidarity and working relationships with all movements in the world that identify ideologically with anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. In this regard, the EFF will ideologically and politically support movements that seek the economic decolonisation of the African*

continent. The EFF will also advocate for free trade across the entire African continent, with common tariffs for goods and services from country to country. The EFF will also advocate for the ultimate integration of the African continent through the erosion and eventual elimination of unnecessary borders, which, in the case of South Africa will entail the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland borders in a manner that involves and includes the participation and approval of those countries. This will also be encouraged in other parts of the African continent. The EFF will also advocate for common infrastructure for transportation (roads, railways, harbours, etc), electricity, and water. Africa should use its resources to benefit all the people of the African continent in a manner that will lead to collective upliftment."

11. The Economic Freedom Fighters is a revolutionary movement deeply rooted in progressive internationalism, committed to aligning with and advancing the global struggle against imperialism. Central to the EFF's mission is the belief that the most decisive blow against global imperialist forces can only be delivered by first dismantling imperialist domination within South Africa. This must be achieved through economic emancipation, driven by the radical and transformative development of the African economy, ensuring that Africa is no longer subjugated to foreign economic control.
12. Furthermore, the EFF emphasizes that the time for mere reconciliation is over; the focus must now shift to justice across the African continent. This justice must manifest in the full and irreversible socio-economic liberation of all Africans, breaking the chains of neo-colonialism and ensuring that Africa's wealth benefits its people. The movement calls for solidarity with all progressive global forces, to unite in the common cause of liberation, ensuring that Africa and the Global South can stand as equals in a new, just global order.

C. CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT

13. The foreign policy of South Africa has evolved significantly through the leadership of Presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, and currently, Cyril Ramaphosa. Each administration shaped foreign relations with a mix of Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, and multilateral engagement while contending with the pressures of a post-colonial global order.
14. President Nelson Mandela (1994–1999): Under Mandela, South Africa's foreign policy was driven by human rights, anti-colonialism, and non-alignment. His administration focused on restoring South Africa's role in the

international community after apartheid. Mandela's foreign policy was grounded in moral diplomacy, positioning South Africa as a champion of peace, human rights, and democracy globally. Multilateralism played a crucial role, with South Africa supporting peace-building efforts in Burundi and championing the fight against global injustice through bodies like the United Nations (UN). However, President Mandela also faced criticism for decisions like the handover of the Lockerbie bombing suspects to Western powers, seen by some as yielding to imperialist pressure and also what was then referred to as loud diplomacy that led to the hanging of Ken Saro-wiwa by the Nigerian military dictator of General Sani Abacha.

15. President Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008): President Mbeki's foreign policy marked a shift towards the African Renaissance, where the focus was on African self-reliance and leadership in global affairs. He played a pivotal role in the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). His approach, often described as "quiet diplomacy," particularly regarding Zimbabwe, reflected his preference for dialogue over confrontation. President Mbeki also emphasized South-South cooperation, aligning with emerging markets through platforms like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and advocating for reforms in global governance institutions like the UN Security Council. However, he faced criticism for cooperating with the U.S. during the rendition of an alleged suspect in the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, perceived as bending to Western influence.
16. President Jacob Zuma (2009–2018): President Zuma's foreign policy was a blend of his predecessors, focusing on Africa-first diplomacy while integrating more economic-oriented strategies. Under President Zuma, South Africa became a founding member of BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), emphasizing a shift towards economic diplomacy from Western economy dependency and reinforcing South-South relations. While he continued to prioritize African issues, President Zuma faced major criticism for South Africa's vote in favour of a no-fly zone over Libya, a decision that facilitated NATO's intervention and ultimately led to the death of President Muammar Gaddafi, which destabilized Libya and angered many in Africa. His administration was also marked by controversies, including South Africa's attempted withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to the Sudan President Omar al-Bashir debacle, raising questions about his commitment to multilateralism.

17. President Cyril Ramaphosa (2018–Present): President Ramaphosa's foreign policy has been largely shaped by contemporary global challenges, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic. He has focused on vaccine equity and strengthening multilateral institutions like the World Health Organization (WHO). President Ramaphosa continues to emphasize Pan-Africanism through initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), promoting economic integration across Africa. South Africa remains active in BRICS, and the Ramaphosa administration continues to advocate for reform in global governance systems to reflect the growing influence of emerging economies. However, his government has also faced criticism for failing to fully implement the National Assembly's resolution to cut diplomatic ties with Israel, viewed as yielding to Western imperialist pressure. The amorphous policy stands on Ukraine and NATO aggression against Russia is the cause for concern. The South African government has been applauded for the International Court of Justice case to protect Palestinians against Israel's aggression.
18. Pan-Africanism and African Unity: All four presidents have consistently highlighted South Africa's leadership role in advancing African unity, peace, and socio-economic development. However, all four presidents failed dismally in achieving true Pan-Africanism and African unity.
19. Multilateralism: Each administration has strongly supported multilateral engagement through bodies like the UN, AU, and BRICS, recognizing the importance of collective global governance. However, all four presidents could not master the courage to reign on their AU counterparts who are despotic and are champions of human rights abuses.
20. Peace and Conflict Resolution: South Africa, under all presidents, has played a mediating role in regional conflicts, with a particular focus on Southern Africa and the broader continent. The unabated human rights abuses in Swaziland and Western Sahara are the epitome of an ineffective policy approach by all the presidents of South Africa.
21. South Africa's trajectory reflects the tension identified by Fukuyama⁹ noting that foreign policy in the modern era is a balancing act between national interests and the constraints imposed by global powers and multilateral institutions.

D. THE AFRICAN UNION, AFRICAN PARLIAMENT AND THE UN IN PERSPECTIVE

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992)

22. The Economic Freedom Fighters approaches the African Union (AU), Pan-African Parliament, and the United Nations (UN) from a standpoint rooted in anti-imperialism, Pan-Africanism, and the pursuit of economic emancipation for the oppressed masses of Africa. The EFF recognizes these institutions as critical battlegrounds for ideological and geopolitical struggles, where African sovereignty and self-determination must be fought for and safeguarded against global imperialist forces who have captured most of the member states of the AU.
23. The EFF acknowledges the historic role of the African Union as a vehicle for promoting unity, peace, and development across the continent. However, the current AU structure remains a tool for neo-colonial influence, dictated by imperialist interests from the West. The AU's failure to act decisively on issues such as regional and continental integration, poverty, unemployment, landlessness, and political instability reflects a deep-seated structural weakness.
24. Pan-African Parliament, in its current form, lacks the teeth to make binding decisions or enact transformative legislation.
25. Furthermore, PAP has a tendency of inconsistency in that it has excluded membership of the progressive military regimes of the Sahel region whilst condoning the undemocratic regime of the absolute monarch in Swaziland.
26. The United Nations is an inherently undemocratic institution that continues to uphold the dominance of Western imperialist powers through the UN Security Council, where African nations are side-lined in decision-making processes that affect global peace and security.
27. The EFF views the UN as an imperialist instrument that perpetuates global inequality, especially through its failure to reform the Security Council, which excludes African countries from having veto power. Africa's absence from the most critical decision-making body in the UN demonstrates the institution's contempt for African sovereignty.
28. The EFF believes that the true emancipation of Africa will not come through the current structures of the AU, PAP, and UN unless they undergo radical transformation. The EFF will lead the charge in ensuring that African nations, through these bodies, chart a path to economic independence, unity, and self-reliance, away from the grasp of global capitalism and neo-imperialism.

29. The EFF advocates for the dismantling of the Western-dominated international system, advocating for a new world order rooted in equitable global governance where African interests are prioritised, and the global South takes its rightful place in shaping global policies.
30. In the words of Hans Morgenthau, "The struggle for power and recognition in global politics continues to define the dynamics between sovereign states and their place in the world order¹⁰." South Africa and Africa's position in this evolving order will only be secure when its people control their own destiny, and this control must be reflected in the policies and actions of institutions like the AU, PAP, and UN.
31. The 3rd National People's Assembly must chart a bold path for Africa's engagement with these institutions, grounded in revolutionary ideology and unwavering commitment to economic freedom in our lifetime.
32. The EFF's role is to lead Africa in confronting the systemic inequalities perpetuated by the AU, PAP, and UN, transforming these institutions into tools for the total liberation of the African continent.
33. The future of Africa will be written by those who dare to dismantle the chains of imperialism, and the EFF is at the forefront of this battle. Through a revolutionary foreign policy that prioritises the interests of the African working class, the EFF will ensure that Africa's liberation is not postponed but realised in the present generation.

E. THE AFRICAN REGIONAL BODIES

34. The African regional bodies in the broader struggle for Pan-African unity and socio-economic emancipation are critically important. These regional bodies — such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — represent the mechanisms through which Africa can consolidate its strength against imperialist forces and realize the vision of an independent, and self-sufficient continent. However, the EFF is resolute in its belief that these bodies must undergo a radical transformation to fulfil their potential and advance the African Revolution.

¹⁰ Hans Morgenthau , *Politics Among Nations*

35. The EFF views regional bodies with enormous potential to spearhead the economic and political integration of Africa. However, they have largely fallen short due to their conservative and pro-capitalist orientation, which limits their effectiveness in advancing the economic liberation of the working class and the poor.
36. The EFF calls for the regional bodies to adopt a socialist agenda focused on the redistribution of wealth and resources within the African continent. The regional bodies must stop being a protector of neo-liberal policies and instead champion land reform, nationalising key industries, and eradicating poverty.
37. The EFF advocates for the establishment of a unified regional bodies armed force that will defend the African continent from foreign intervention and protect its resources from exploitation. The African army must also be tasked with peacekeeping missions within the continent, ensuring stability without relying on Western powers.
38. The EFF propose the creation of regional parliaments with legislative powers that move beyond mere consultation, driving the agenda of Pan-Africanism and ensuring democratic accountability across member states of regional bodies.
39. The recent surge in military coups in the Sahel underscores the need for new approaches in regional governance.
40. Regional bodies must prioritize breaking away from the colonial legacies that tie member states to former imperial powers such as France and the CFA Franc zone.
41. The EFF calls for the immediate rejection of neo-colonial monetary structures and the establishment of a truly independent West African currency that promotes self-reliance.
42. The EFF stands in solidarity with the revolutionary movements that have emerged in the Sahel region. Regional bodies should be a platform for supporting progressive military and civilian movements that overthrow comprador regimes and install governments committed to the emancipation of the African people.
43. The EFF advocates for the regional bodies to cut ties with the West and adopt policies that uplift the working class.

F. INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES

44. The global political and economic landscape has experienced significant shifts, especially with the rise of multipolarity and the decline of unchallenged Western hegemony. The EFF understands that South Africa's struggle for true economic freedom is intrinsically linked to the dynamics of international power structures. The International Balance of Forces refers to the complex interplay of global actors, institutions, and economic powers that shape the prospects for revolutionary change in South Africa, Africa, and the broader Global South.
45. The EFF firmly opposes the neoliberal agenda driven by Western powers, which seeks to entrench imperialist domination through economic control and military intervention. In this context, we must analyse the current international order to identify allies, adversaries, and opportunities for forging a new internationalism that is aligned with the principles of Pan-Africanism and socialism.

a) Historical Context and Current Dynamics

46. The EFF recognizes that global capitalism is in crisis. The dominance of the U.S.-led imperialist forces is increasingly contested by the rise of alternative powers, such as China and Russia, as well as the resurgence of left-wing and socialist movements across Latin America and parts of Europe. The unipolar world that characterized the post-Cold War era, led by Western capital, has given way to a more multipolar reality, with varying centers of influence challenging Western hegemony.
47. South Africa's foreign policy under ANC governance has been consistently compromised by its subservience to Western capitalist interests, evident in its continued membership in neo-colonial institutions such as the Commonwealth and its acquiescence to NATO-led military interventions. The EFF advocates for a foreign policy that aligns with the global working class and the oppressed masses of the world.

b) Western Imperialism and the African Continent

48. The United States and its NATO allies continue to impose economic and military dominance over Africa through institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. These imperialist institutions use debt and economic coercion to impose structural adjustment programs that

devastate African economies, stripping away sovereignty and undermining the ability of African nations to pursue independent development paths.

49. The European Union and former colonial powers, notably France, maintain exploitative relationships with African countries through economic agreements and military interventions, particularly in West and Central Africa. The EFF condemns these interventions and calls for a complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from the African continent.

c) China and Russia: Strategic Partners in the Struggle Against Imperialism

50. In the multipolar world that is emerging, China and Russia have played pivotal roles as counterweights to U.S. and European imperialism. China, in particular, has expanded its influence in Africa through trade, infrastructure development, and investment, primarily under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the EFF acknowledges China's support for African development, we must remain vigilant to ensure that such relationships are mutually beneficial and do not replicate the extractive patterns of neo-colonialism.

51. Russia has re-emerged as a key player in the global balance of forces, offering military and diplomatic support to nations resisting Western imperialism. South Africa's membership in BRICS, alongside China and Russia, offers strategic opportunities to challenge the dominance of Western institutions like the IMF and World Bank. The EFF believes BRICS must evolve into a vehicle for revolutionary change, promoting the development of alternative financial institutions that serve the interests of the Global South.

d) Latin America: A Beacon of Revolutionary Struggle

52. The EFF draws inspiration from the revolutionary movements in Latin America, particularly in countries like Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia, which have resisted U.S. imperialism and pursued socialist development models. The rise of left-wing governments in Latin America signifies the global potential for socialist resurgence and challenges the neoliberal order. The EFF stands in solidarity with these movements and calls for South-South cooperation that advances the cause of socialism and economic emancipation.

e) Reform of International Institutions

53. The EFF advocates for the complete overhaul of international institutions like the United Nations (UN), the IMF, and the World Bank. These institutions have failed to address the needs of the oppressed and instead serve as instruments of imperialist powers. The reform of the UN, including the democratization of the Security Council, is necessary to ensure that African nations and other countries in the Global South have a meaningful voice in global governance. Furthermore, the EFF demands the cancellation of Africa's debt and the establishment of alternative financial institutions that prioritize human development over profit.

G. ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE

54. The EFF has consistently taken a firm stance against Israeli aggression, particularly in the context of the ongoing oppression of the Palestinian people. The EFF views Israel's actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and other occupied territories as acts of colonial violence, apartheid, and imperialism, which are incompatible with principles of justice, self-determination, and human rights.

55. From the EFF's perspective, Israel's policies and military actions towards Palestinians are a blatant continuation of settler colonialism, reminiscent of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The systematic dispossession of Palestinian land, the blockade of Gaza, and the routine violence inflicted on Palestinian civilians are seen as manifestations of Israel's expansionist agenda, rooted in racial supremacy and supported by Western imperial powers, particularly the United States.

a) Solidarity with Palestine

56. The EFF stands in unwavering solidarity with the Palestinian people in their struggle for freedom and independence. The party regards the fight for Palestinian liberation as interconnected with broader struggles against imperialism, colonialism, and racial oppression worldwide. As South Africans, who have emerged from the horrors of apartheid, the EFF argues that it is the moral and revolutionary duty of all Africans to oppose any form of colonial oppression, including the Israeli occupation.

57. The EFF has consistently called for;

- a) The Immediate Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Against Israel: Similar to the BDS movement that helped dismantle apartheid in South Africa, the EFF advocates for a global movement to isolate Israel economically, diplomatically, and culturally until it complies with international law, ends its occupation of Palestinian land, and grants full human rights to Palestinians.
- b) The Expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador: The EFF demands that South Africa sever all diplomatic ties with Israel, including expelling the Israeli ambassador and closing the Israeli embassy in South Africa. The party views any diplomatic relations with Israel as a tacit endorsement of its apartheid policies.
- c) Recognition of Palestine as a Sovereign State: The EFF calls for full and unequivocal recognition of Palestine as an independent and sovereign state, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The party condemns the Israeli annexation of Palestinian lands, including Jerusalem, as illegal under international law and an affront to Palestinian sovereignty.
- d) International Pressure for Accountability: The EFF advocates for Israel to be held accountable for its war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of international law. This includes taking Israeli officials and military leaders to international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) for prosecution over atrocities committed against Palestinians.

58. The EFF views Israel's actions not in isolation but as part of a broader imperialist agenda supported by Western powers. The United States, in particular, is singled out as the principal enabler of Israeli aggression through its military aid and diplomatic protection. The party condemns the hypocrisy of Western nations that preach human rights and democracy while turning a blind eye to Israeli atrocities. The EFF calls for an end to Western double standards, where imperialist interests consistently override the pursuit of justice.

59. In this context, the EFF also criticizes the South African government for failing to take decisive action against Israel, accusing it of pandering to Western interests and betraying the legacy of South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle.

60. The EFF insists that true Pan-Africanist and revolutionary forces must stand firm against all forms of imperialism, including the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

61. Ultimately, the EFF believes that peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through the dismantling of the Israeli apartheid system and the establishment of a single, democratic, and secular state where Jews and Palestinians live as equals. The party rejects the so-called "two-state solution" as untenable under current conditions, given Israel's continued settlement expansion and its refusal to grant full rights to Palestinians.
62. The EFF envisions a revolutionary outcome in which Palestinians are fully liberated, the occupation is dismantled, and the Israeli apartheid state is brought to an end. This vision is rooted in the broader EFF commitment to global anti-imperialism and the fight for justice for all oppressed peoples.

H. THE OCCUPATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA BY MOROCCO

63. The EFF has taken a strong stance in support of the liberation of Western Sahara from the Moroccan occupation, considering it as one of the last remaining colonial occupations in Africa. The EFF views the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara as an affront to the principles of self-determination, decolonization, and African unity, values that lie at the core of the EFF's political ideology.
64. Western Sahara, formerly a Spanish colony, has been under illegal Moroccan occupation since 1975, despite the United Nations and the African Union (AU) affirming the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination. The EFF condemns Morocco's continued occupation of the territory as a violation of international law and a betrayal of the decolonization process on the African continent. The party draws parallels between the situation in Western Sahara and other colonial struggles, including South Africa's fight against apartheid.
65. The occupation has resulted in the displacement of thousands of Sahrawi people, many of whom live in refugee camps in neighbouring Algeria. The EFF denounces the human rights abuses committed by the Moroccan regime, including the suppression of political dissent, unlawful detentions, and the exploitation of Western Sahara's natural resources, such as phosphate and fisheries, which are plundered without benefiting the Sahrawi people.
66. The EFF expresses unwavering solidarity with the Sahrawi people and their legitimate representative, the Polisario Front, which has been leading the struggle for the independence of Western Sahara. The party recognizes the

Polisario Front's armed and political struggle as a legitimate resistance against colonial occupation, much like the liberation movements that fought against apartheid in South Africa and other colonial regimes across the continent.

67. The EFF calls for increased support from the African Union and the international community for the Polisario Front and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which has been recognized by several African and non-African states, despite Morocco's attempts to undermine this recognition through diplomatic and economic pressure.
68. The EFF is critical of Morocco's re-admission into the African Union in 2017, arguing that the AU compromised its principles by allowing a colonial occupier to join the organization while it continues to subjugate the people of Western Sahara. The EFF believes that this decision undermined the AU's credibility as a body committed to decolonization, unity, and the defense of African sovereignty.
69. For the EFF, Morocco's membership in the AU should be conditional upon its recognition of Western Sahara's independence and its withdrawal from the occupied territory. Until then, the EFF insists that Morocco remains in violation of the AU's own Constitutive Act, which enshrines the right of all African peoples to self-determination and independence.
70. The EFF urges African states, particularly the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to adopt a more assertive and united position in demanding the immediate decolonization of Western Sahara. The party views this as a critical test of the continent's commitment to Pan-Africanism and the principle that Africa must be free from all forms of foreign domination, including the internal colonialism practiced by Morocco in Western Sahara.
71. In this regard, the EFF has consistently advocated for stronger sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Morocco until it relinquishes its hold on Western Sahara. The party also calls for African countries that maintain close economic and diplomatic ties with Morocco to reconsider their relations, as continued support for the Moroccan regime undermines the broader cause of African unity and liberation.

I. THE EFF PERSPECTIVE ON SWAZILAND STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY

72. The EFF firmly support the democratic aspirations of the people of Swaziland (Eswatini) and has consistently condemned the repressive monarchy under King Mswati III. The EFF sees the struggle for democracy in Swaziland as part of the broader African liberation movement, where the last vestiges of autocratic rule must be dismantled to ensure genuine freedom, human rights, and socio-economic emancipation for all Africans
73. The EFF holds that the system of absolute monarchy in Swaziland is outdated, undemocratic, and oppressive, symbolizing the ongoing subjugation of the people by a ruling elite. The monarchy under King Mswati III has maintained power through authoritarian practices, which include the banning of political parties, the violent suppression of dissent, the control of the media, and the exploitation of the nation's resources for the benefit of the royal family and its allies.
74. The EFF views King Mswati's regime as a neo-colonial dictatorship that continues to impoverish the masses while entrenching the wealth and privilege of the monarchy. For the EFF, the king's lavish lifestyle, while the majority of Swazi people live in poverty, represents the stark inequality and injustice that must be uprooted in order to establish a truly democratic society.
75. The EFF stands in solidarity with the democratic forces in Swaziland, particularly the progressive movements, unions, and civil society organizations that have been at the forefront of the struggle for political reforms. This includes support for the People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), and other grassroots organizations that have been demanding the abolition of the absolute monarchy and the establishment of a multiparty democracy.
76. The EFF applauds the bravery of the people of Swaziland, who have repeatedly protested against the monarchy despite facing brutal repression. The party views the ongoing resistance in Swaziland as an expression of the popular will for change and the realization of the inalienable right to self-determination and freedom from tyranny.
77. The EFF calls for an immediate end to the absolute monarchy in Swaziland and the establishment of a democratic system of governance based on the will of the people. This includes:

- a) The Legalization of Political Parties: The EFF demands the lifting of the ban on political parties in Swaziland, allowing for free political expression and competition in a democratic framework.
- b) Free and Fair Elections: The EFF advocates for the organization of free, fair, and transparent elections that will allow the people of Swaziland to choose their leaders and determine their future.
- c) Constitutional Reform: The party calls for a complete overhaul of Swaziland's constitutional framework, to create a democratic republic that respects the rule of law, human rights, and the separation of powers. The new constitution must guarantee the rights of all Swazi citizens, including freedom of speech, assembly, and the press.
- d) Dismantling of Repressive Institutions: The EFF demands the dismantling of the repressive institutions that have maintained the monarchy's grip on power, including the royal police and military, which have been used to crush dissent and intimidate opposition figures.

J. WHAT IS TO BE DONE

78. The EFF believe that the future of Africa and its place in the global order must be rooted in a policy of radical economic transformation, genuine sovereignty, and revolutionary Pan-Africanism. In line with its founding principles, the EFF outlines a clear policy direction for Africa and the world, emphasizing the need to dismantle neo-colonialism and imperialism while fostering unity, economic self-reliance, and the defence of Africa's autonomy in global affairs.

a) Pan-Africanism and African Unity

79. The EFF's core belief is in building a united and sovereign Africa, free from the shackles of imperialism. It envisions the African continent as a powerful, cohesive political and economic bloc capable of standing on equal footing with other global powers. This vision extends to creating a unified African military force, a common currency, and a single African government—a true realization of the African Renaissance:

- a) The EFF Support the restructuring of the African Union (AU), and regional bodies to make them more effective in achieving political and economic unity.

- b) The EFF Promote the creation of African-owned financial institutions, such as a Pan-African Bank, and advocate for a single currency to reduce dependence on Western financial systems.
- c) The EFF Call for the harmonization of laws, trade, and movement across Africa to foster intra-continental trade and development.

b) Economic Emancipation and Land Expropriation

80. A cornerstone of the EFF's policy for Africa is economic emancipation through land expropriation without compensation and the nationalization of strategic industries. The EFF argues that Africa's wealth must serve its people, not foreign interests. By taking control of resources like land, minerals, and energy, African nations can break free from the neo-colonial stranglehold and begin to develop economies that prioritize the needs of Africans.

81. Across the Continent, as a means of redressing historical injustices, the EFF believes in:

- a) The implementation of policies for land expropriation without compensation.
- b) Nationalisation of key industries, particularly in sectors like mining, energy, and agriculture, to ensure that the wealth generated benefits the people, not foreign multinationals.
- c) Create self-sustaining economies through industrialization and value-added production (beneficiation) instead of reliance on raw material exports.

c) Non-Alignment and Continental Sovereignty

82. The EFF promotes a policy of clear partisanship and abandonment of the liberal policy of non-alignment, where Africa refuses to be a pawn in the power struggles of global superpowers like the United States and the European Union. Instead, Africa must engage with the world on its terms, ensuring that all partnerships and agreements serve the continent's interests.

83. The EFF promotes a policy wherein African Union member states:

- a) Withdraw from exploitative trade deals and agreements that compromise Africa's sovereignty.

- b) Resist military interventions and foreign military bases on African soil, particularly under the guise of counter-terrorism efforts by Western powers.
- c) Scrutinize relationships with emerging powers to ensure they do not replicate the exploitative models of Western imperialism.

d) Internationalism and Solidarity with the Global South

84. The EFF aligns itself with progressive global movements and stands in solidarity with the Global South in their struggles against neo-imperialism.

85. The EFF supports the building of strong alliances with countries in Latin America, Asia, and other parts of the world that have historically suffered from imperialism. These partnerships are seen as key in resisting Western hegemony and achieving mutual prosperity.

86. The EFF promotes a policy wherein African Union member states:

- a) Strengthen ties with nations in the Global South to foster an anti-imperialist global alliance.
- b) Promote South-South cooperation in trade, technology, education, and defence to reduce dependency on Western powers.
- c) Support the establishment of international bodies that represent the interests of the Global South, such as the BRICS grouping, while pushing for reforms in existing institutions like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund.

e) Environmental Sustainability and Food Security

87. Recognising the devastating impact of climate change, the EFF believes that Africa must take a leading role in developing sustainable solutions to environmental challenges. At the same time, the continent must achieve food security by prioritising agriculture and agribusinesses that are owned and operated by Africans.

88. The EFF promotes a policy wherein African Union members state:

- a) encourage the use of renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

- b) Implement sustainable agricultural practices that not only feed Africa but also make the continent a global leader in food production.
- c) Support climate adaptation programs that protect Africa's vulnerable communities from the effects of climate change, while holding Western nations accountable for their disproportionate contribution to global warming.

89. The AU must be radicalized to become a revolutionary body committed to the full liberation of African economies from foreign control. The African Union Agenda 2063 should be accelerated, and its focus should shift from mere economic integration to genuine economic sovereignty. This includes rejecting IMF and World Bank policies that maintain African economies in perpetual dependency.
90. Radical restructuring of the AU Commission, with a strong emphasis on anti-imperialist leadership that reflects the revolutionary aspirations of the African masses and Full economic integration of the continent through a unified African currency and a continental economic strategy that rejects neoliberal models with Immediate and unambiguous opposition to foreign military bases and interventions on African soil, as they undermine the sovereignty and stability of the continent.
91. The EFF envisions a Pan-African Parliament that is not merely consultative but exercises legislative powers to promote the economic and political liberation of Africa, the transformation of the PAP into a legislative body, with full power to enforce policies across member states, particularly those related to land reform, industrialization, and resource nationalization.
92. PAP must actively promote the unification of African militaries under one defence structure to protect the continent from external threats and imperialist invasions, as seen in Libya and other parts of Africa.
93. The PAP should be restructured to represent not only the ruling elites but also revolutionary movements and civil society organizations that genuinely reflect the interests of the African working class.
94. The EFF calls for the reform of the UN Security Council to include permanent African representation with veto power, reflecting the population and global importance of the continent.

95. The UN's role in Africa should be minimized, with AU-led peacekeeping missions taking precedence over UN interventions, which are often influenced by the West's geopolitical and economic interests.
96. African nations, under the leadership of revolutionary movements like the EFF, should withdraw from UN structures that continue to impose sanctions and resolutions that weaken African states and stifle their development.
97. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) believe that for Africa to truly liberate itself from the shackles of foreign control, the African Union (AU) must be radicalized into a revolutionary body. This transformation is essential for the full emancipation of African economies and the attainment of true economic sovereignty. The EFF holds that the current trajectory of the AU, marked by slow progress towards Agenda 2063, must be accelerated. Economic integration alone is insufficient—what Africa requires is the complete rejection of Western neoliberal models that have historically kept the continent in a state of dependency.
98. The EFF calls for a bold departure from IMF and World Bank policies, which continue to perpetuate African economies in cycles of debt and exploitation. Genuine economic sovereignty demands that Africa control its resources, set its own developmental agendas, and build its economy on revolutionary and socialist principles, with the African masses at the forefront of this struggle.
99. The AU must undergo radical restructuring, with a focus on anti-imperialist leadership that reflects the revolutionary aspirations of the African people. A new era of continental economic integration is necessary, anchored by a unified African currency and a continental economic strategy that vigorously opposes the existence of foreign military bases and any external intervention on African soil. Such interventions, whether military or economic, undermine the sovereignty and stability of Africa, serving only to protect Western geopolitical interests.

K. THE ROLE OF THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT (PAP)

100. The EFF envisions a Pan-African Parliament (PAP) that is transformed into a powerful legislative body with full authority to enforce decisions and policies that advance the political and economic liberation of Africa. The PAP must take decisive action on critical issues such as land reform, industrialization, and resource nationalization across member states. These efforts will fundamentally shift the balance of power from foreign

corporations and imperialist entities back to African states, allowing the wealth of Africa to benefit its people rather than external powers.

101. Moreover, the PAP must play a leading role in promoting the unification of African militaries under a single defense structure, ensuring that Africa is protected from imperialist invasions, as seen in Libya and other parts of the continent. The defense of Africa must be in the hands of Africans, free from the influence of Western military alliances and interests.
102. To truly represent the people, the PAP must be restructured to include not just the ruling elites but also revolutionary movements and civil society organizations that reflect the aspirations and struggles of the African working class. The voices of those most marginalized by global capitalism must be heard in shaping the future of the continent.

a) Africa on the Global Stage

103. The EFF also demands comprehensive reform of global institutions like the United Nations (UN). The UN Security Council, in particular, must be reformed to reflect Africa's significance, with permanent African representation and veto power. This is critical for ensuring that African voices are not sidelined in global decision-making processes, as has historically been the case. African nations must assert themselves on the global stage, no longer as subjects of Western hegemony, but as sovereign powers in their own right.
104. The role of the UN in Africa should be minimized. The EFF calls for AU-led peacekeeping missions, which will place African issues in African hands. UN interventions in Africa often serve Western geopolitical and economic interests, further entrenching the continent's dependence on foreign powers. AU-led missions, guided by revolutionary principles, will prioritize the true needs and interests of African people.
105. In this regard, the EFF calls on revolutionary movements and progressive governments across the continent to withdraw from UN structures that continue to impose sanctions and resolutions that weaken African states. These punitive measures, dictated by Western imperialists, must be rejected in favour of policies that uplift and empower the African people.

L. WHAT IS TO BE DONE

106. Africa's liberation is not a matter of negotiation—it is a matter of struggle. The EFF stands as the vanguard of this struggle, advancing a radical Pan-Africanist vision for the continent and rejecting all forms of imperialism and colonial legacies. The time has come for African nations to unite under the banner of economic sovereignty, social justice, and revolutionary leadership.
107. The EFF calls for;
- a) The Acceleration of Agenda 2063: With a clear focus on economic sovereignty, resource control, and the industrialization of Africa.
 - b) The Transformation of the AU and PAP: These bodies must be overhauled to reflect the aspirations of the African people and serve as vehicles for the political and economic liberation of the continent.
 - c) A United African Defense Force: To protect the continent from external threats and ensure that Africa's sovereignty is never compromised by foreign military forces.
 - d) The Dismantling of Neo-colonial Structures: The rejection of IMF, World Bank, and Western economic interventions that perpetuate Africa's dependency.
 - e) Permanent Representation in the UN Security Council: With veto power, to ensure Africa's interests are safeguarded in global governance.
108. The struggle for Africa's liberation continues. The EFF remains steadfast in its commitment to lead this struggle, both in South Africa and across the continent. As Africa moves toward a future defined by true independence, economic justice, and social equity, the EFF calls on all revolutionary forces to unite in this noble cause.

THE ECONOMY: STATE-LED INDUSTRIALISATION

DISCUSSION DOCUMENTS



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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), formed in June 2013, has now existed for 11 years as the only truly revolutionary political movement on the African continent that places the economy at the centre of its political programme. Even the notable developments in the Sahel region of the African continent in the past 5 years, particularly in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso – culminating in the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023 – while challenging neo-colonialism, focus on collective defence as the primary strategy for achieving stability¹¹. However, in contrast, the EFF places economic emancipation at the forefront of all its programmes.
2. By placing the economy at the centre of its political programmes, rooted in the recognition that all other freedoms are meaningless without economic freedom, the EFF stands firm as a movement for economic emancipation in its sincerest sense. This is the foundation of the EFF's founding manifesto, which defines the organisation as a radical movement committed to achieving economic freedom in our lifetime.
3. This means that the organisation must always maintain absolute clarity on the question of ownership, control, and redistribution of the economy in all its forms, for the benefits of the masses. This understanding must be located within a thorough examination of the evolving dynamics of capitalism, both domestically and globally, as well as developments in geopolitical struggles, all of which must inform our political programmes.
4. There will be temptations to deviate from the core mission of the EFF – **economic freedom in our lifetime**. These pressures may arise from internal and external forces, pushing the movement towards short-term gains that lack a solid ideological foundation. The danger lies in compromising principles over convenience. We must remain vigilant, for economic freedom is not just one of the reasons the EFF was formed, but it is the very essence of our existence, and protecting this mission is non-negotiable.
5. The organisation, must, therefore, recognises that unlike political freedom, economic freedom may be more difficult to explain and understand, even though it talks to every day struggles of jobs, transport, food security, energy, service delivery etc. This is because economics, while a simple social construct, is today presented as a highly complicated technical subject, as though it were a natural system that cannot be changed.

¹¹ Mali's Assimi Goïta, Burkina Faso's Ibrahim Traoré and Niger's Abdourahamane Tiani have put together a federation of more than 72 million people to fight the failures of neo-colonial puppets who not only perpetuated colonisation, but embroiled their countries in corruption and compromises, doing the bidding of former colonisers after taking power beginning in 2020.

6. This is the consequence of the dominance of a particular school of thought—the neoliberal orthodox school. This ideology promotes the belief that capitalism is the best system for allocating resources, that it does not need regulation by politics or the state. According to this school, the state's role is merely to support the capitalist system, which is supposedly the best mechanism for growing the economy and creating jobs. The false promise here is that when capitalists create jobs, everyone will benefit from their wealth, something we know to be entirely untrue.
7. This neoliberal doctrine has been aided by its acceptance and unquestioning implementation over the past 30 years by neocolonial puppets within the former liberation movement and the National Treasury. These forces have been controlled and praised by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), hailed as models of excellence. Yet, under their leadership, South Africa remains the most unequal society in the world, characterised by extreme poverty, rampant unemployment, and soaring crime rates.
8. The organisation, together with other revolutionary, fearless, radical, and militant activists, non-government organisations, and all progressive forces in South Africa, across the continent, in the diaspora, and the world must challenge this domination in all spaces including academia and policy decision making spaces as part of the fight for economic emancipation. We must also confront the dominant teachings in favour of more progressive, scientific, and anti-neocolonial heterodox economics.
9. As a result, the organisation must exercise patience with the poor, the oppressed, and the working class, who many not immediately understand the EFF's core mission and not give the organisation majority votes to attain state power through elections in the immediate. Our revolutionary patience will be a reflection of our commitment to the education and awakening of the masses and the working class, so that they too can fully grasp the importance of the struggle for economic freedom.
10. This also underscores the necessity of integrating this knowledge into our political education programmes, ensuring that every fighter and revolutionary understands the historical and present economic conditions that sustain oppression, and the radical alternatives that the EFF stands for.

B. CONTEXT OF THE PERSPECTIVE

11. The EFF will hold its 3rd National People's Assembly in December 2024. The purpose of this economic perspective is to facilitate discussions both internally and externally, and to assess the state of the economy within the context of the organisation's Founding Manifesto, adopted at the

National People's Assembly on "What is to be Done", held on 26 July 2013 in Soweto. This perspective updates the previous analyses published for the 1st and 2nd National People's Assembly. It will also serve as a foundation for considering the political programme to be adopted by the 3rd National People's Assembly, on how the organisation will actively influence the character of South Africa's economy and agitate for transfer of ownership of the economic wealth to the majority of Africans.

12. To achieve this, the perspective will focus on the following tasks:
 - (a) Provide an update on the diagnoses of South Africa's crises today
 - (b) Propose solutions on what is to be done
13. The update on the diagnosis, while grounded in the historical context captured in the Founding Manifesto, will prioritise key developments from the past five years. These include the deepening racialisation of South Africa's economy, crisis of joblessness and poor economic growth, the persistent energy and logistics crisis, continued de-industrialisation, the entrenchment of financialisation, and the lack of state investment in essential infrastructure due to incompetent and incoherent fiscal and monetary policy.
14. Similarly, the proposed solutions will not be exhaustive but will consider current economic developments, both domestically and internationally. In their character and form, the solutions are rooted in the recognition that the EFF is a political party of the working class. This stands in stark contrast to other political parties, which are founded on the ideals of the propertied classes, as highlighted in the Founding Manifesto.

C. DIAGNOSES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S CRISES TODAY

(a) Deepening racialisation of South Africa's economy

15. In South Africa, despite Africans holding political power and some degree of state control for the past 30 years, the economy remains concentrated in the hands of a white minority. This is the direct consequence of the former liberation movement's failure to translate political power into economic power, which is necessary for the true free development of all Africans. As a result, the failure to transfer ownership of the economic wealth that sits in the hands of a few perpetuates racialised inequality. The face of wealth remains white, while black people continue to represent poverty, joblessness, and violent crime.
16. To fully appreciate the extent and deepening of the racialisation of South Africa's economy, one simply needs to examine key socio-economic indicators according to race. For example:

- i. Life expectancy, the average number of years a person can be expected to live based on current mortality rates, is a key indicator of a population's health and well-being. It also reflects access to healthcare, income, and safe living conditions. According to Statistics South Africa's mid-year population estimates for 2024, life expectancy in South Africa is now 66.5 years, an increase from 53.6 years in 2005. However, life expectancy for black people remains significantly lower, at 62.2 years, compared to 72.7 years for non-Black Africans¹². This means that white people are able to use their economic wealth to access better living conditions, health facilities, and security.
- ii. Unemployment in South Africa is disproportionately higher among black people, particularly among the youth. Using the expanded definition of unemployment (which includes all people who are unemployed, even those who have given up looking for work), South Africa's unemployment rate stands at 41.9%, or 12.1 million unemployed people. Of this, 10.9 million are Black Africans, compared to 207,000 white unemployed people¹³. Unemployment is even higher amongst the youth. More than 70% of young people between 15 and 24 years old are unemployed, and more than 3 million young people in the same age group are not in employment, education, or training (NEET)¹⁴.
- iii. Black Africans consists of disproportionately higher number of people who are not economically active compared to white people, at 13.5 million compared to mere 871,000 for whites in terms of Statistics South Africa report of Economically Active Population report of August 2024¹⁵.
- iv. A 2017 report compiled by Statistics South Africa found that Black Africans are generally more affected by poverty compared to Indian/Asian and white people¹⁶. Approximately 64% of Black Africans live in poverty, compared to a mere 1% of white people.
- v. According to the 2023 Employment Equity report released by the Department of Employment and Labour, white people occupy 62% of top management positions and 50.1% of senior management roles, despite only accounting for 7% of the total population. In contrast, Black Africans occupy only 16.9% of top management and 26.4% of senior management roles, despite representing 81.7% of the total population.

¹² <https://www.spi.net.za/the-unequal-face-of-death-in-south-africa/#:~:text=Life%20expectancy%20is%20very%20different,Africans%2C%20this%20was%2062.2%20years.>

¹³ Statistics South Africa. (2024). Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Statistics South Africa. Pretoria. [<https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2024.pdf>]

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0211&SCH=73893

¹⁶ Statistics South Africa (2017). SA Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of Absolute Poverty between 2006 and 2017. Statistics South Africa. Pretoria.

- vi. While the data by the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Commission is questionable and must be treated with serious suspicion because of the wide practice of fronting, corruption and exploitation of black workers as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) beneficiaries, according to their 200 Report, Black Africans owned 22.3% of the financial sector, a decline from 31.80% in 2017 despite being the majority¹⁷.
 - vii. In a presentation for Kagiso Capital Conference on BEE held in October 2023, Duma Gqubule makes an important observation that between 2009 and 2022, there was a reversal of black ownership on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and government effectively killed its own empowerment policy due to fatal policy design errors and compromises that were made during the political processes of developing the BEE Codes and sector charters in the mining and finance sectors. This is confirmed by the report commissioned by the National Treasury in 2017, which found that BEE companies and trusts owned 1% of the market capitalisation of the JSE's top 25 companies at the end of December 2016¹⁸.
 - viii. According to the 2023 Employment Equity report released by the Department of Employment and Labour, white people occupy 62% of top management and 50.1% of senior management positions despite only accounting for 7% of the total population, while Black Africans account for only 16.9% of top management and 26.4% of senior management despite accounting for 81.7% of the total population.
17. Whilst this is not an exhaustive list, it is a clear indication that the colour of one's skin continues to determine one's economic standing in post-apartheid South Africa. These measures reflect a harsh reality: if white people were living in their own country with these figures, they would be ranked among the top 10 developed nations in the world. They would stand alongside countries like Switzerland, Norway, Hong Kong, Iceland, Australia, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and Singapore in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), as developed by the United Nations¹⁹.
18. However, white people do not live on some isolated island. Their opulence, wealth, and secure comfort continue to depend largely on the exploitation of Africans, particularly the exploitation of African women.

¹⁷ Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Commission. (2022). Final Report: National Status and Trends on B-BBEE Transformation Report 2022. <https://www.bbbeecommission.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/2022-NATIONAL-STATUS-REPORT.pdf>

¹⁸

https://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2017/2017100301%20ownership%20monitor%20-%20sept%202017.pdf

¹⁹ <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/country-insights#/ranks>.

They thrive on the backs of the unemployed and deliberately excluded majority, especially women, who remain systematically barred from meaningful participation in the economy. This is part of maintaining a reserve army of labour, where a large unemployed population is kept suppressing wages and preserve profits for capitalists. Despite the enormous cost to the economy—reduced consumer demand, increased social welfare costs, underutilisation of human capital, and depressed wages—this system entrenches inequality, crime, and stifles meaningful economic growth.

19. In March 2022, the World Bank reported that South Africa is the most unequal country in the world, with inequality in per capita consumption about 50% higher than the average for upper-middle-income countries. The report also stated that the country has made little progress in reducing this inequality. Two key observations must be made about the report. Firstly, the report fails to acknowledge that this inequality is racial, and that the white minority enjoys the higher per capita consumption. Secondly, if even institutions like the World Bank are now admitting that South Africa is the most unequal country in the world, it is clear that no amount of fictional narratives by the government can conceal this reality.
20. This glaring inequality is not a matter of coincidence, but a deliberate result of the post-apartheid economic order. It continues to ensure that the wealth remains in the hands of a few, while the black majority is condemned to poverty and exclusion. The racialisation of South Africa's economy is no longer deniable—it is entrenched in every aspect of life, and it will persist as long as the capitalist structure remains intact.

(b) Crises of joblessness and poor economic growth

21. South Africa is facing a crisis of joblessness that threatens national security. It is indisputable that the former liberation movement has failed to transform the economy in the post-apartheid era. This failure is partly due to the absence of a strong national economic security strategy that would have allowed the country to pursue economic policies aimed at both the de-racialisation of the economy and the transfer of ownership to the majority of the people, particularly Africans. Instead, the post-1994 government has failed to create sustainable employment.
22. There are just over 25 million people in South Africa who are considered part of the labour force—those within the working-age (15 years and older) population who are employed or unemployed²⁰. Of these, only 16.6

²⁰ Statistics South Africa. (2024). *Quarterly Labour Force Survey*. Statistics South Africa. Pretoria. <https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2024.pdf>

million are employed. Shockingly, 11.4 million of those employed are in the informal sector, and a mere 3.1 million are employed in agriculture.

23. The total number of unemployed people is 12.1 million, people who are capable, willing and want to work to feed their families but are excluded. This figure includes more than 3.1 million discouraged workers—people who have looked for work but cannot find any employment and have given up. The organisation must continue to reject the attempt to report a lower unemployment rate by excluding discouraged workers from the official unemployment figures. Whether a person is actively seeking employment or not, the reality is that they remain unemployed. There is no scientific merit or basis for the continued reporting of the so-called official unemployment rate, which serves only to artificially lower the real rate of unemployment and joblessness.
24. What is even more alarming about South Africa's joblessness crisis is the number of young people who are not in employment, education, or training (NEET). According to Statistics South Africa, in the second quarter of 2024, there were approximately 10.3 million young people aged 15 to 24 years, of which 35.2% were NEET, and this number continues to grow. This means that more than 3.6 million young people are effectively pushed to the margins of society, to drugs, crime and being in perpetual state of being dependence, denied any meaningful role in the economy or social participation. This situation presents a looming revolt and crisis with the potential to destabilise South Africa as we have come to know it over the past 30 years.
25. The simple reality is that no economy anywhere in the world can create sustainable jobs without deliberate state intervention. The state must actively engage in both growing the economy and creating jobs simultaneously. The idea that economic growth must come first, driven primarily by the private sector and foreign investors, is a dangerous misnomer. The past 30 years of South Africa's economic history and the instability to create sustainable jobs are a testament to this failure. The undeniable fact is that the South African economy has performed dismally since the transition to democracy in 1994.
26. Furthermore, South Africa's GDP per capita has stagnated for the past 15 years and is projected to decline further for another three years. By 2025, GDP per capita will be lower than it was in 2007. The situation has been particularly dire in the past five years, with GDP growth failing to exceed 2%. The 4.7% growth rate seen in 2021 was not the result of any meaningful restructuring of the economy but simply due to the reopening of the economy after the COVID-19 pandemic.
27. Even during the period of notable GDP growth between 2004 and 2007, when the economy grew by 4.6% in 2004, 5.3% in 2005, 5.6% in 2006, and

5.4% in 2007, there was no corresponding increase in sustainable job creation despite baseless claims by former President Thabo Mbeki²¹. According to the labour market indicators, the total number of employed individuals increased only marginally from 11.6 million in 2004 to 13.6 million in 2007²². However, this increase was offset by the growing number of unemployed individuals, which only dropped from 4.1 million in 2004 to 3.9 million in 2007—a negligible improvement considering the significant GDP growth over the same period.

28. The real issue lies in the quality of jobs created and the inability of the economy to absorb the labour force. For instance, the unemployment rate remained persistently high, declining only slightly from 26.2% in 2004 to 21.0% in 2007. Additionally, the labour force expanded from 15.7 million in 2004 to 17.2 million in 2007, with a high number of discouraged work-seekers, whose exclusion from the official unemployment rate concealed the full extent of joblessness. These figures demonstrate that GDP growth during this period did not translate into significant improvements in employment, revealing the structural weaknesses of a capitalist economy dependent on private sector growth without state intervention and state-led industrialisation.
29. Part of the reason why South Africa's economy cannot grow and create sustainable jobs is because it remains concentrated in a few geographic areas. This is a legacy of colonial spatial planning, which continues to entrench a racialised economy and deepen inequality. For example, Gauteng province, which covers less than 2% of South Africa's land surface and is home to 24.9% of the population, accounts for 33.1% of the country's economic activities²³. If you add KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, this number increases to 62.9%.
30. This means that only three provinces have meaningful economic activities, resulting in vast disparities between provinces. This disparity becomes even more pronounced when examining the viability of many of South Africa's municipalities. Under the current model of funding for service delivery—based on cost-recovery and treating public services such as water and electricity as commodities provided to those who can pay—many municipalities are not viable. The idea that people will earn an income, pay rates and taxes, and pay for electricity, water and sanitation is based on very incorrect assumptions if economic activities take place only in few places.

²¹ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ZA>

²² Statistics South Africa. (2009, September). Labour Force Survey Historical Revision. Statistics South Africa. South Africa.

²³ Statistics South Africa. (2023 September). Provincial gross domestic product: experimental estimates, 2013-2022. Statistics South Africa. Pretoria. [<https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/D04411/D044112022.pdf>]

31. Only metropolitan municipalities (Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, Cape Town, eThekweni, Nelson Mandela Bay) and a few large municipalities (Rustenburg, Mbombela, and Polokwane), many of which are located in these three provinces, are able to sustain themselves. The exceptions are Buffalo City in the Eastern Cape and Mangaung in the Free State who were given the status of a metro, yet they don't share the characteristics with other metropolitan municipalities.
32. Most people know that unless they move to a metropolis or a large municipality, they are likely to be excluded from economic participation or meaningful employment. While it is the nature of capitalist economies to concentrate in metropolitan areas, in South Africa, this follows colonial and apartheid spatial planning, which was deliberately designed to keep Africans poor and confined to informal settlements and rural areas. Even with the concentration of economic activities in a few geographic spaces, the reality is that many Africans still live in overcrowded informal settlements near pockets of extreme wealth. This wealth, of course, remains overwhelmingly in the hands of the white minority.

(c) The persistent energy and logistics crisis

i. Energy crisis

33. The Founding Manifesto, previous economic perspectives, and election manifestos have largely covered the challenges that have plagued Eskom and led to South Africa's energy insecurity and crisis since 2007. In this perspective, we will not be repetitive in rehashing the history of Eskom's deliberate collapse. Instead, we will focus on addressing recent developments in the privatisation of energy generation, the unbundling of Eskom, and the impact of these moves on energy security.
34. It is safe to say that since 2007, South Africa has experienced rolling blackouts, which later became a regular occurrence. Eskom's incapacity to generate sufficient electricity to meet demand reached crisis levels between 2019 and 2023, when blackouts became a daily occurrence.
35. In essence, without delving into unnecessary repetitive narratives, South Africa's energy crisis is due to the following interrelated reasons:
 - i. Failure to build additional generation capacity despite clear warnings that the existing generation capacity would not be able to meet growing demand. These warnings were contained in the 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa.
 - ii. The failure by the post-apartheid government to control coal supply, particularly the price and quality of coal used in coal-fired power stations. An analysis of Eskom's coal price contracts revealed that Eskom

pays its suppliers, particularly in its contract with Glencore and other big companies, more than R344 per tonne allowed by NERSA. Even worse, Eskom pays large companies double what small coal mining companies charge. The higher the price of coal, the more expensive it becomes to generate electricity. Through cost-based tariffs that Eskom advocates, electricity becomes unaffordable. In 2019, the Minister of Minerals and Petroleum Resources, Gwede Mantashe, stated that "at these prices of electricity, this economy is going to collapse²⁴." This remains a threat even today.

- iii. Delays in commissioning and building the Medupi and Kusile power stations, alongside rampant price escalations due to corruption and maladministration. Both projects, which began in 2007, exceeded their initial budget by more than R300 billion, all while Eskom accumulated a debt of over R400 billion, guaranteed by the state²⁵. Companies such as ABB have admitted to corruption and agreed with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to pay back R2.5 billion. This so-called "two-pronged strategy" to deal with corruption by prosecuting perpetrators and recovering stolen money must be rejected²⁶. It appears the NPA selectively uses punitive measures against white people and multinational corporations, while maximally prosecuting and imprisoning black individuals.
- iv. One critical issue, yet to be fully understood due to a lack of proper investigation by Eskom, the NPA, and the government, is the role of Cyril Ramaphosa and the late Pravin Gordhan in the collapse of Eskom. The media's efforts to protect these figures further obscure the truth. We do not know the extent of their efforts to bring down Eskom in order to create space for private role players to exploit the energy sector, particularly private generation of electricity. These companies, which have massive profits tied to the collapse of Eskom's monopoly, benefited from Gordhan's determined push to close coal-fired power stations and hire incompetent individuals with no experience in running complex organisations, let alone one generating electricity. Now Eskom has acknowledged the improper handling of closure of Komati power station in Mpumalanga in 2022, which was closed without alternative replacement of 1000 Megawatts and livelihood for communities.
- v. Eskom has signed Purchasing Power Agreements (PPAs) with various Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to source electricity at agreed prices. NERSA allows Eskom to sell electricity at R0.90/kWh, but the prices

²⁴ <https://mg.co.za/article/2019-10-11-00-the-high-price-of-coal-connections/>

²⁵ Tshidavhu, F and Khatleli, N. (2020). An assessment of the causes of schedule and cost overruns in South African megaprojects: A case of the critical energy sector projects of Medupi and Kusile. *Acta Structilia*. Vol. 27(1). <http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/24150487/as27i1.5>

²⁶ <https://www.npa.gov.za/media/step-towards-accountability-state-capture-corruption-eskom-abb-pay-over-r25-billion-punitive>.

agreed with IPPs through these PPAs average R2.2/kWh. This means that the price Eskom pays for electricity from IPPs is far higher than what it can sell it for, leading to significant financial losses. The unit cost of coal is R4/MWh, nuclear is R106/MWh, Eskom-owned Open Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGTs) cost R7/MWh, while IPPs charge an exorbitant R2.3/MWh. For those who idolise the free market and its so-called invisible hand, it is an oxymoron. Firstly, Eskom is forced into transactions for a product that it can produce itself at a far lower price than what these IPPs offer. Secondly, the idea that the private sector cannot compete with Eskom, and instead needs the state to regulate how much electricity Eskom can generate using coal, exposes the fallacy of the free market in this context.

- vi. Lastly, the deliberate collapse of Eskom was also driven by the neglect of power stations through the starvation of maintenance budgets. Cutting maintenance budgets left power stations vulnerable to unplanned interruptions and generation units' breakdowns, which in turn fuelled loadshedding. Initially, we were told of issues such as wet coal during rainy seasons and poor coal quality, and while there was some truth to these claims, the real issue was the systematic underfunding of maintenance. Gordhan went so far as to recruit retired apartheid-era engineers, in collaboration with Afriforum-led Solidarity, giving credence to the arrogant notion of white superiority. This suggests that black engineers cannot manage complex systems, yet Gordhan was content to appoint someone like Andre de Ruyter, who later proved to be wholly incompetent and, as we would learn from the very same Gordhan, may well have been criminal.
36. There may be more reasons that feed into the energy crisis. There are some, like Thabo Mbeki who now and again are tempted to rewrite the history because of the inability to acknowledge both mistakes and limitations. Instead, he would have us believe his revisionist fantasies that Eskom's management deliberately caused an electricity crisis and load shedding because people in charge of coal power stations did not replenish coal in 2007.
 37. However, what cannot be denied is the fact that energy crisis was calamitous for South Africa's economy. A 2020 report prepared for Eskom, titled "Estimating the economic cost of loadshedding in South Africa, "estimated that load shedding cost the South African economy early R35 billion in the 12 years between 2007 and 2019"²⁷. This period excludes the peak of crisis between 2019 and 2023, a 4 year period of literal darkness.

²⁷ https://www.nersa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Appendix-C_Estimating-the-Economic-Cost-of-Load-Shedding-in-South-Africa-Report.pdf

38. Recent developments indicate more than six months of uninterrupted power supply, alongside a stabilisation of generation capacity, particularly through the reduction of diesel expenditure. According to Eskom, the Energy Availability Factor (EAF) has averaged 63% year to date, with Kusile, Majuba, and Camden being the top-performing power stations, each maintaining an EAF above 70%²⁸. In August, Eskom announced its outlook for the summer period, from 01 September 2024 to 31 March 2025, which detailed the likelihood of a loadshedding-free summer. This projection seems credible and should be applauded, especially given the positive impact of the new management team, which has been liberated from the shackles of Gordhan's clandestine project to collapse Eskom and privatise electricity generation and transmission.
39. The recent work of Eskom's board and management vindicates the position long held by the EFF. It has become evident that Eskom was being deliberately sabotaged to pave the way for the private generation of electricity, leaving the state-owned utility as a hollow shell, a shadow of its former glory. The unbundling of Eskom into separate entities for Generation, Transmission, and Distribution is nothing short of dismembering a body and expecting it to function effectively. This plan, driven by greed, has been executed by puppets serving the interests of their capitalist masters, not the people of South Africa. It is now clear that the collapse of Eskom was engineered to enrich private interests, while the public bears the burden of escalating energy costs and instability and it must be rejected.
40. However, a new problem looms on the horizon. There is an attempt to increase electricity tariffs to align them with so-called "realistic" cost recovery pricing. In August 2023, NERSA announced that Eskom would be permitted to recover over R8 billion through the Regulatory Clearing Account (RCA) for the 2021/22 financial year. Eskom had initially applied for an RCA of R23.9 billion, but the regulator approved just under R8.1 billion, adjusting R15.8 billion out of the application.
41. It is not as though electricity has been cheap since the beginning of loadshedding. Reports indicate that since loadshedding began in 2008, electricity prices have increased by a staggering 450%, far exceeding the 98% inflation rate over the same period²⁹. This trajectory is deeply flawed because electricity was never intended to be sold purely on a cost recovery basis. It was meant to be a cornerstone of the country's livelihood, industrialisation, and a pillar of national economic security. If

²⁸ <https://www.eskom.co.za/loadshedding-suspension-remains-in-force-following-more-than-six-months-of-uninterrupted-power-supply-achieving-efficiencies-of-r11-33-billion-in-year-on-year-reduction-on-diesel-expenditure/>

²⁹ <https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/744295/how-much-prepaid-electricity-will-cost-in-south-africa-after-the-2024-price-hikes/>

this trend continues, we may find ourselves with sufficient generation capacity, but very few people able to afford electricity.

ii. Logistics Crisis

42. While the focus has been on the energy crisis, a parallel crisis has been unfolding in the logistics sector. This logistics crisis has begun to strangle the economy in much the same way as the energy crisis, affecting trade and the movement of goods due to failing ports and rail networks. The South African Association of Freight Forwarders has characterised the logistics crisis as presenting an even greater economic risk than the energy crisis³⁰. In fact, the association argues that South Africa has not had a functional logistics network for the past decade, with terminal efficiency declining by 28% compared to internal targets.
43. At the heart of this logistics crisis lies the deliberate collapse of the state-owned Transnet and its subsidiary, Portnet. Transnet's performance hit a new low in 2022, when Richards Bay, the main coal export harbour, processed only 50 million tonnes—the lowest volume since 1993. This occurred despite high international coal prices and a surge in demand from Europe, which was grappling with the interruption of gas supplies from Russia due to sanctions imposed during military operations. Private coal exporters have increasingly chosen to export via Maputo, while farmers have begun shipping their produce from Walvis Bay in Namibia.
44. To put this crisis into perspective, according to the Roadmap for Freight Logistics System in South Africa, adopted by the government in 2023, general freight volumes have plummeted. Freight volumes transported via the rail network declined from 226 million tonnes in 2018 to just 149.5 million tonnes in 2023. The roadmap identifies several reasons for the underperformance of rail freight³¹:
 - i. Historical underinvestment in the rail network.
 - ii. The lack of available rolling stock and poor maintenance of existing equipment.
 - iii. Serious issues such as theft and vandalism of network infrastructure.
 - iv. Operational inefficiencies within Transnet.
45. The collapse of the freight rail system has led to a significant shift from rail to road transport, with large trucks now carrying freight that once moved by rail. This has placed immense pressure on small towns along national road networks, as trucks move coal from mines to ports. The surge in road freight transport on South Africa's highways has also led to an increase in fatal accidents, with trucks playing a significant role in these crashes. A

³⁰ <https://www.freightnews.co.za/article/south-africas-logistics-crisis-lions-share-economy-risk>

³¹ https://www.transport.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Freight_Logistics_Roadmap_092023DRAFT.pdf

study by the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) revealed that heavy vehicles with a gross vehicle mass above 3,500 kilograms (trucks) account for 9.4% of all fatal crashes on South African roads, despite making up only 3.3% of registered vehicles³².

46. Beyond causing crashes, South African roads in many small towns were never designed to endure the heavy truck traffic now passing through them. This has led to the rapid deterioration of infrastructure, with roads plagued by potholes, cracking, rutting, and damaged pavements. A city like uMhlathuze is one of the hardest hit by this influx of trucks. In the past, coal was transported through rail, and the town never experienced such a high volume of truck traffic. The cost of this logistical crisis, much like the energy crisis, is catastrophic for the economy.
47. The ongoing collapse of South Africa's freight rail system has been cynically used to justify the privatisation of this critical sector. For decades, there was no space for private competitors to challenge Transnet, which boasted a long history of service and managed the longest railway network in Africa, with more than 31,000 track kilometres. Transnet's dominance in freight rail was unmatched, and the state-owned enterprise ensured that the movement of goods remained in public hands, serving the broader economy rather than private profit. However, the current crisis has been deliberately manufactured to create space for private sector entry, under the guise of inefficiency and mismanagement. The failures of Transnet were engineered, not inevitable, and now the private sector is being presented as the solution to a problem that was created by neoliberal forces.
48. The privatisation of ports, such as Grindrod's involvement in Richards Bay, and the opening up of railway tracks to private operators must be rejected. This so-called public-private partnership is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to hand over public infrastructure to capitalist interests. Allowing private companies to control critical logistics infrastructure will only serve to deepen inequality, further entrench monopoly control, and erode state sovereignty over essential services. The state should be strengthening public ownership and control of logistics, not selling off assets to the highest bidder under the pretence of efficiency and public private partnership. This is nothing less than the betrayal of the working class and a continuation of the neoliberal project to dismantle state-owned enterprises for the benefit of a few.

(d) Continued de-industrialisation

³² Road Traffic Management Corporation. (March 2023). Fatal truck and Bus Crashes in South Africa. Road Traffic Management Corporation. South Africa.
https://www.rtmc.co.za/images/rtmc/docs/research_dev_rep/Fatal-Truck-and-Bus-Crashes-in-SA---March-2023.pdf

49. Since the post-apartheid era, South Africa has experienced a profound failure in industrial policy, leading to widespread de-industrialisation and a shrinking manufacturing sector. In the early 1990s, manufacturing contributed over 23% to the GDP, while the financial sector accounted for just over 11%. Today, these roles have reversed, with manufacturing reduced to 12.9% and the financial sector now dominating at over 20%. This shift reflects the government's failure to pursue inward industrialisation, a necessary step for building sustainable industries and labour-absorbing factories that could produce basic consumables for the population.
50. Instead of investing in local production, the state opened South Africa's economy too early, exposing domestic industries to foreign competition, particularly in the textile sector. Flooded by cheaper goods from around the world, South Africa's manufacturing sector could not compete, leading to the closure of factories and a devastating loss of jobs. Between 1994 and 2005, de-industrialisation accelerated aggressively, with factories closing down and millions of jobs being lost.
51. To make matters worse, the government's industrial strategy over the past 30 years has been characterised by confusion and a lack of coordination between key economic bodies such as the National Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, and, at times, the Department of Economic Development. These institutions operated in silos, with no clear cohesion in their economic policies, further undermining efforts to drive industrial growth.
52. In an attempt to counteract this decline, the state shifted towards a "tax incentive assembling scheme" rather than a genuine industrialisation policy. This approach saw companies being offered significant tax breaks to set up operations in South Africa, but instead of establishing factories, they created mere assembly plants. These plants contribute little in terms of local content, and the components they use—particularly in sectors like the automobile industry—are often of minimal value, requiring limited technology and skill.
53. Meanwhile, South Africa's retail sector is dominated by imported finished goods, while the country continues to export unprocessed raw materials and mineral resources. This trade imbalance underscores South Africa's failure to build a robust industrial base that adds value locally, while contributing to the dependence on foreign markets for consumables.
54. The establishment of five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) was another attempt by the government to create jobs and stimulate industrialisation. However, these SEZs have been largely ineffective, with only a fraction of them operational and fewer than 14,000 jobs created—a negligible number in a country facing mass unemployment. Despite R10

billion in state investment in these zones, this amount is trivial compared to the R200 billion spent annually on social grants, and there has been no credible tracking of the real impact on job creation.

55. At the core of these failures lies the dominance of speculative financial capital, which has diverted investment away from long-term, productive industries. Non-financial corporations, which once reinvested profits into expanding production, have shifted their focus to financial instruments, prioritising short-term gains over real economic growth and job creation. This financialisation of the economy has led to an alarming concentration of wealth, with the wealthiest 10%—predominantly white—owning 90% of the country's wealth.
56. The consequences of financialisation and de-industrialisation have been catastrophic. Instead of directing capital towards industries that could generate sustainable jobs and growth, South Africa's economic trajectory has become locked in a cycle of wealth concentration, speculative capital, and rising inequality. The collapse of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) as a driver of innovation and manufacturing further underscores this decline. Once at the centre of South Africa's industrial strategy, the IDC is now barely involved in meaningful manufacturing projects.

(e) Entrenched financialisation of South Africa's economy

57. The financialisation of the South African economy is a trend that, while not new, is often under-acknowledged in public discourse and political activism. In the early 1990s, manufacturing contributed more than 23% to GDP, while the financial sector accounted for just over 11%. This has since reversed, with the financial sector now dominating, as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) has been turned into a gambling platform for those chasing quick returns, what we call 'hot money.'
58. Financialisation has profoundly reshaped South Africa's economy over the past few decades. This refers to the increasing dominance of financial motives, institutions, and elites within the economy, often at the expense of real, productive investment. Since the early 1990s, South Africa has followed the global neoliberal trend, prioritising the growth of the financial sector over industrial development and job creation.
59. One of the most significant impacts of financialisation has been the shift away from long-term productive investment in the real economy, particularly in sectors such as manufacturing and infrastructure. Instead, financial capital has been redirected toward short-term speculative investments, primarily in financial markets and real estate.

60. For instance, non-financial corporations, which traditionally reinvested profits into productive assets, have increasingly allocated capital to financial markets. Post-1994, the acquisition of financial assets by these firms rose dramatically, often at the expense of fixed capital formation. By 2010, non-financial corporations were dedicating a large portion of their capital to financial instruments like shares and derivatives, which offer short-term returns but contribute little to long-term economic growth or job creation.
61. Moreover, financialisation has led to an alarming concentration of wealth. The wealthiest 10% of South Africans, predominantly white, control 90% of the country's wealth. This skewed ownership is exacerbated by the growing influence of financial institutions and markets in everyday life. South Africa's financial sector is highly developed, with financial market capitalisation at 320.6% of the country's nominal GDP in 2022—far exceeding global averages. This has made the financial sector a dominant force in economic decision-making, with policies crafted more to attract speculative capital inflows than to encourage real, sustainable economic growth.
62. At the household level, financialisation has deepened inequality. Wealth accumulation through financial instruments—such as pensions, equities, and insurance—is accessible to a small minority, while the majority, lacking disposable income, remain excluded. This exclusion is worsened by high levels of debt, as many South Africans rely on credit to finance consumption, further entrenching financialisation in the economy. For example, by 2011, 53% of all loans extended to the private sector were to households, predominantly in the form of mortgage lending, which further fuelled the real estate market instead of productive sectors of the economy.
63. The financialisation of the South African economy, though aligned with global neoliberal trends, has deepened the structural inequalities inherited from apartheid. It has contributed to capital flight, jobless growth, and heightened economic vulnerability. The 2008 global financial crisis, driven by speculative bubbles, exposed the fragility of this economic model. The South African economy, reliant on short-term capital inflows, was hit hard by the crisis, underscoring the unsustainability of an economic system built on financial speculation rather than real, productive investment.
64. As a result, financialisation has exacerbated wealth concentration, reduced productive investment, and increased inequality in South Africa. It has diverted capital away from sectors that could generate sustainable growth and employment, entrenching a model of economic apartheid where wealth and power remain concentrated in the hands of a few.

(f) Incompetent and incoherent fiscal and monetary policy

i. Fiscal Policy

65. Fiscal policy in South Africa is meant to reflect how much tax the state collects, where it collects it from, and how that money is spent. The democratic process should ensure that Parliament makes these decisions through legislation, primarily the appropriation bill, which should reflect the will of the people. In cases of insufficient funds, the decision to borrow should also be under parliamentary control, including determining where and under what conditions the state should borrow.
66. However, despite the legislative framework meant to ensure democratic oversight, the past 30 years have seen the National Treasury dominate the fiscal policy process, essentially dictating terms to Parliament. Whatever the National Treasury, via the Minister of Finance, proposes, is treated as if it were unquestionable. This has led to a fiscal framework rooted in neoliberal ideology, which prioritizes the reduction of the state's role in the economy and places the private sector at the forefront. As a result, this policy has become the root cause of South Africa's de-industrialisation, mass unemployment, and the erosion of state capacity.
67. The fiscal policy that dominates South Africa today has fully embraced austerity—championing budget cuts, reducing state capacity, and outsourcing the delivery of essential services to the private sector. This has severely affected critical areas such as healthcare, education, and law enforcement. In education, for example, there have been widespread teacher retrenchments, as evidenced by the Western Cape government's decision to cut teaching posts. This trend is not new. Many government departments have seen posts frozen, and when employees resign or retire, these positions remain vacant, or they are filled by inexperienced and temporary workers, such as those hired through the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). In municipalities, the situation is even more dire. When experienced technicians resign or retire, they are replaced with seasonal workers, further reducing the quality of public services. The EFF has correctly characterized this as the exploitation of desperate unemployed people.
68. This mentality of shrinking the state's role has left three key failures in its wake:
 - i. Failure to use public spending to drive re-industrialisation and job creation: The South African government spends over R1 trillion annually on goods and services, yet there is no coherent plan to use this spending to influence manufacturing, spatial development, or job creation. Instead of leveraging public procurement to stimulate industrial growth, the state has limited itself to a support role, allowing the

private sector to dominate. This mindset, driven by austerity, has rendered the state incapable of taking on large-scale industrial or infrastructural projects, leaving it reliant on the private sector to deliver services.

- ii. Neglect of critical infrastructure development: South Africa has failed to invest adequately in vital infrastructure such as energy, logistics, and security. The country's energy infrastructure, including the failure to build new generation capacity, is near collapse, as is the railway system. This neglect is not accidental—it is the result of prioritizing budget cuts over long-term infrastructure development. The lack of investment has placed South Africa's essential infrastructure, such as water systems and waste management, at breaking point. Instead of expanding and maintaining these systems, the focus has been on slashing budgets.
- iii. Mounting debt without productive outcomes: South Africa's debt stands at R5.21 trillion, or 73.9% of GDP. However, this debt has not been used to build the critical infrastructure necessary for economic growth or job creation. Rather, the country is left with massive debt without any corresponding developmental achievements. Compounding the issue, much of this debt is held by foreign investors, which ties South Africa further into a neo-colonial relationship with international capital markets. Instead of borrowing on favourable terms from domestic institutions, such as the South African Reserve Bank, the country is borrowing from foreign markets under unfavourable conditions, further indebting itself while gaining nothing in return.

ii. Monetary Policy

- 69. While the National Treasury makes most of the decisions that affect macroeconomic policy, such as the misguided 2022 decision to allow pension fund investors to move more money offshore (a decision they later admitted was flawed), it is the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) that draws much of the attention. This is largely due to its responsibility for decisions on the repo rate, which directly impacts the interest we pay on all our debt. The higher the repo rate, the more expensive our debt becomes, thus increasing the cost of borrowing across the economy.
- 70. South Africa remains one of the few countries where the central bank is still privately owned. This ownership structure ensures that the SARB's mandate remains narrowly focused on maintaining price stability, framed under the constitutional provision to ensure "balanced and sustainable economic growth." However, this mandate is strictly limited to inflation control, and as a result, the SARB plays little to no role in addressing the broader developmental needs of the country.

71. The fact that private individuals, including foreigners, are allowed to own shares in the Reserve Bank raises serious national security concerns. It perpetuates the colonial and neo-colonial control of South Africa's economy, with the SARB operating under a framework designed to benefit a small elite at the expense of the masses. The SARB continues to serve the interests of these shareholders, much like any other private company, despite its profound influence on public policy and economic growth. The SARB decides the rate and speed of economic growth, controls the availability of resources for both the state and the private sector, and oversees the financial sector that dominates every aspect of life in South Africa.
72. Yet, this institution is said to operate "independently" from political oversight. Its rare appearances in Parliament are mere formalities, with the Governor's appointment being handed down by the President and the finance minister. In reality, however, the decisions are shaped by the whims of the so-called markets—JSE, IMF, World Bank, and Rating Agencies—while politicians merely rubber-stamp them.
73. Nationalizing the SARB is not just an economic necessity; it is a political imperative. Bringing it under the control of democratically elected leadership would ensure that it functions in the interest of the people rather than for private shareholders. Once ownership is in the hands of the state, the next vital discussion must center on whether the SARB's current mandate, enshrined in the Constitution, is sufficient to address the country's developmental and industrialization needs.
74. Thus far, during the process of financialization of South Africa's economy, the SARB has primarily operated for the benefit of banks and foreign investors who chase short-term returns—what is often referred to as "hot money." These investors, concerned only with quick profits, are protected at all costs, even at the expense of job creation and industrialization. In the meantime, there has been little to no transformation in the financial sector. Despite amending the Banks Act through a private member's bill introduced by the EFF, and later passed in the Financial Matters Amendment Act of 2019—allowing for the establishment of state-owned banks—South Africa still lacks an operational state-owned bank. This failure is a testament not only to the SARB's lack of interest in transformation but also to its alignment with the interests of financial oligarchs.
75. If we examine the concentration of financial institutions, banks, and insurance companies, we find a disturbing truth: just five banks (Standard Bank, FNB, ABSA, Nedbank, and Capitec) control 90% of total banking assets in South Africa. This extreme concentration of power in the hands of a few oligarchs exposes the failure of the SARB and current monetary policy to drive real transformation in the financial sector. The

consequences of this lack of competition are severe. These banks, motivated by profit maximisation, have little interest in offering affordable loans, particularly those aimed at fostering industrialisation and supporting manufacturing. The high cost of credit and stringent lending criteria stifle small businesses and industries that could otherwise drive economic growth and job creation.

76. With limited competition, there is no pressure on these banks to innovate or provide more inclusive financial products. If there were more banks, particularly state-owned banks that are not driven solely by profit, credit could be allocated more efficiently. A state-owned bank could offer affordable loans specifically geared towards industrialisation, local investment, and job creation, ensuring that financial resources are directed towards sectors that contribute to the development of the economy. The dominance of private banks, however, means that the issuing of credit remains primarily directed towards short-term profit-generating ventures, such as consumer credit and real estate, with little consideration for the long-term developmental needs of the country. This failure to direct money into productive sectors further entrenches inequality and leaves the majority of the population excluded from meaningful economic participation.
77. The revival of the South African Reserve Bank Bill in the National Assembly in September 2024 represents an important step towards necessary reforms. It is a long-overdue measure aimed at addressing the issue of ownership. But nationalization is only the first step. The next critical task is to re-examine the SARB's mandate and determine whether its focus on inflation targeting has been effective in addressing the structural inequalities in the economy, or if it has simply served to entrench the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. This should include the appointment of the Governor and Deputy Governors of the Central Bank to be made by Parliament through a transparent process, with interviews held publicly, similar to the process for appointing judges, ensuring that the leadership of the central bank is accountable to the people and reflects the democratic will of the nation.
78. The current concentration of financial power, the SARB's narrow mandate, and its role in protecting short-term capital over long-term economic transformation demonstrate the need for urgent reform. Nationalizing the SARB and reorienting its mandate to promote employment, affordable credit for industrial projects, and broader access to capital are essential to securing South Africa's economic future. The failure to act will only serve to further entrench the economic exploitation of the majority by a privileged minority.

D. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

79. To effectively address the various crises identified in the diagnosis, the following solutions must be aligned with the Economic Freedom Fighters' (EFF) core principles and its Founding Manifesto. These proposals not only affirm the previous economic perspectives and election manifestos but also emphasize the urgency of transforming South Africa's economy into one that prioritizes the well-being of the masses over capitalist profit. The organisation must remain steadfast in rejecting neoliberal policies, fighting for state-led industrialisation, and advocating for the nationalisation of key sectors.
80. In light of the deepening racialisation of South Africa's economy, the **EFF** must take a firm stance and advance the following measures to dismantle the systemic inequality and economic marginalisation of black people, especially Africans, that continues to plague the country:
- (a) **Affirm the necessity of state-led economic transformation.** The EFF must continue to push for the nationalisation of key industries, including mining, banking, and telecommunications, ensuring that the wealth generated by these sectors is used for the collective benefit of all South Africans. Nationalisation must be accompanied by a robust reindustrialisation programme that creates jobs, particularly for the youth and historically marginalised groups, while fostering local industries that produce goods for domestic consumption.
 - (b) **Reject the neoliberal policies that have perpetuated economic inequality.** The EFF must firmly oppose any attempts by the government or capitalist institutions to privatise essential public goods and services. The organisation must call for the cancellation of policies that promote private ownership and control over the country's economic assets, which continue to benefit the white minority at the expense of the black majority.
 - (c) **Continue to call for the immediate implementation of land expropriation without compensation.** The EFF must continue to demand that land, the foundation of wealth, be returned to the black majority, with a focus on equitable redistribution and productive use for housing, agriculture, and industrial development. This process should be tightly aligned with economic programmes that empower African women, youth, and rural communities, thereby reversing centuries of dispossession and exploitation.
 - (d) **Affirm the importance of a minimum wage and job creation policies.** The EFF must advocate for the creation of jobs through direct state employment in sectors such as infrastructure development, healthcare, education, and renewable energy. The state should also enforce a living wage for all workers to uplift the working class and reduce reliance on the reserve army of labour that serves to depress wages and maximise profits for capitalists.

- (e) **Reject Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) in its current form.** The EFF must call for the cancellation of B-BBEE policies that have been exploited by a select few and have failed to create genuine economic empowerment for the majority of black South Africans. Instead, the organisation must continue to call for radical economic empowerment policy that prioritises ownership transfer, jobs creation, and wealth redistribution in favour of the working class and marginalised communities.
 - (f) **Reject racialised inequality in management and ownership.** The EFF must oppose the continued concentration of top management and ownership in the hands of white South Africans. The organisation should advocate for laws that ensure black Africans, especially women, are given priority in senior management positions and ownership stakes across all sectors of the economy, particularly in industries that remain dominated by a white minority.
 - (g) **Call for a comprehensive social safety net.** The EFF must demand the expansion of social welfare programmes to support the unemployed and those living in poverty. This includes increasing social grants and providing universal access to quality healthcare, housing, and other basic services to ensure that all South Africans, regardless of race, have access to the means necessary to live with dignity.
81. To address the crises of joblessness and poor economic growth, the **EFF** must remain committed to radical economic transformation that prioritises the majority of South Africans, particularly the black working class, and Africans, who have been systematically excluded from economic participation. The following proposals are essential for rectifying the structural failures of the post-apartheid economy:
- (a) **Affirm the need for a state-led economic development strategy.** The EFF must advocate for an economic security strategy that places the state at the centre of job creation and industrialisation. This will involve direct state intervention in the economy, with a focus on developing key industries, ensuring broad ownership of economic assets, and reducing dependence on the private sector and foreign investors.
 - (b) **Reject the neoliberal model of economic growth driven by the private sector.** The organisation must oppose the dangerous misnomer that economic growth must precede job creation, and instead call for simultaneous state intervention in both areas. The EFF should advocate for the cancellation of policies, programmes and initiatives that prioritise the private sector over state-led development in strategic sectors, which has failed to create sustainable jobs over the past three decades.
 - (c) **Call for the reindustrialisation of South Africa's economy.** The EFF must demand state-led industrialisation, particularly in underdeveloped regions, through investment in infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and manufacturing. This should be supported by policies that promote local

production, especially in provinces outside of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape.

- (d) **Affirm the importance of spatial economic planning to address the concentration of wealth.** The organisation must advocate for the redistribution of economic activities across the country to reduce the geographic disparities that perpetuate inequality. This will require a deliberate state effort to invest in the economies of smaller towns and rural areas, with a focus on creating local industries and jobs.
- (e) **Reject the current model of service delivery funding based on cost-recovery.** The EFF must call for the rejection of the commodification of essential services like water and electricity. Instead, the state should fund these services as public goods to ensure equitable access, regardless of one's income or location. The organisation should advocate for policies that treat access to basic services as a fundamental right, not a privilege reserved for those who can afford to pay.
- (f) **Call for the establishment of a comprehensive youth employment programme.** The EFF must demand that the state creates jobs for young people through massive public works programmes in sectors like infrastructure development, renewable energy, and digital innovation very different from EPWP, in a manner that create long term sustainable jobs, with sufficient training linked with artisan skilled based education programmes. This will provide young people with meaningful employment opportunities while addressing the country's most pressing developmental needs.
- (g) **Affirm the need to reform the informal sector.** The organisation must advocate for the formalisation and support of the informal sector, which accounts for a significant portion of South Africa's workforce. This will include providing access to financial services, legal protections, and training for informal workers, ensuring that they can transition into the formal economy and contribute to sustainable economic growth.
- (h) **Call for the prioritisation of economic development in municipalities.** The EFF must demand that municipalities receive adequate funding to drive local economic development, especially in smaller towns and rural areas. The state should invest in local industries, infrastructure, and service delivery, creating jobs and improving living conditions for all citizens, not just those in major cities.

82. To address the persistent crises in energy and logistics, the **EFF** must take decisive action to restore state control, protect public assets, and reject neoliberal attempts to privatise critical sectors. The following proposals are essential for overcoming the structural challenges posed by the deliberate collapse of Eskom and Transnet, and for ensuring energy security and efficient logistics infrastructure for the benefit of the people:

- (a) **Affirm the need for Eskom to remain a state-owned and fully functional entity.** The EFF must continue to reject the privatisation of energy generation and the unbundling of Eskom into separate entities for

Generation, Transmission, and Distribution. This dismemberment serves only to weaken the utility's capacity to operate effectively, and it must be opposed in all forms. The state should strengthen Eskom by investing in maintenance, upgrading power stations, and expanding capacity, rather than selling off assets to private interests.

- (b) **Reject the privatisation of energy generation.** The EFF must firmly oppose the introduction of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and the reliance on Purchasing Power Agreements (PPAs) that force Eskom to purchase electricity at inflated prices. These agreements are designed to enrich private companies at the expense of the public, and they undermine Eskom's ability to provide affordable electricity. The organisation must advocate for the cancellation of these contracts and for Eskom to generate its own electricity at lower costs.
- (c) **Call for a state-led energy transition.** The EFF must push for the development of new state-owned renewable energy projects, ensuring that the transition to clean energy is driven by public interests rather than private profits in addition to building additional nuclear generation capacity. This includes investing in wind, solar, and hydropower projects that create jobs, reduce electricity costs, and ensure energy security without relying on exploitative private entities.
- (d) **Affirm the need for state control over the entire coal value chain. The EFF must reject the notion that simply regulating coal prices will solve the crisis in energy production. Instead, the state must take complete control of the coal value chain—from mining to transportation to delivery at power stations—under the management of Eskom. This approach will ensure that coal supply is secure, prices are fair, and quality is maintained, all while eliminating the exploitation of Eskom by private coal suppliers. By nationalising the coal value chain, the state can guarantee that the critical resource needed for power generation is used efficiently and in the public interest, ensuring that Eskom can provide affordable electricity to all South Africans.**
- (e) **Reject further electricity price hikes.** The EFF must oppose any attempts to increase electricity tariffs under the guise of "realistic" cost recovery. The organisation must demand that electricity remains affordable for all South Africans, particularly the working class and poor, and that Eskom's financial sustainability is achieved through better management and state investment, not by passing the cost onto consumers.
- (f) **Call for the restoration of Transnet's rail freight capacity.** The EFF must demand that the state invests in revitalising the rail network, repairing infrastructure, and increasing the capacity of Transnet to transport goods efficiently. The organisation must reject the shift from rail to road transport, which has placed immense pressure on road infrastructure, increased traffic accidents, and damaged the environment. A functioning rail network is essential for the economy, and the state must take immediate steps to restore Transnet's dominance in this sector.
- (g) **Reject the privatisation of ports and rail infrastructure.** The EFF must oppose the so-called public-private partnerships that allow private

companies to control South Africa's ports and railway networks. The privatisation of critical logistics infrastructure will only deepen inequality and enrich a few at the expense of the public. The state must retain full ownership and control over these strategic assets, ensuring that they serve the needs of the broader economy rather than private profits.

- (h) **Affirm the need for public investment in logistics infrastructure.** The EFF must push for significant public investment in ports, railways, and roads, with a focus on modernising infrastructure, creating jobs, and improving efficiency. This investment must be directed towards expanding the capacity of public infrastructure, not selling it off to private companies. The state must play a central role in ensuring that logistics systems are robust, reliable, and capable of supporting economic growth.
- (i) **Call for a comprehensive plan to maintain and upgrade energy and logistics infrastructure.** The EFF must advocate for a coordinated strategy to ensure that both energy and logistics infrastructure are maintained, upgraded, and expanded to meet the country's developmental needs. This includes prioritising maintenance budgets for Eskom power stations and Transnet rail networks, ensuring that critical infrastructure is not allowed to deteriorate due to neglect.

83. To combat the ongoing de-industrialisation and financialisation of South Africa's economy, the **EFF** must take bold steps to reinvigorate local industries, restore state-led manufacturing, and reject policies that prioritise speculative financial capital over real economic growth. The following proposals are crucial for reversing the damage caused by neoliberal economic strategies, ensuring that the country's industrial base is rebuilt to create sustainable jobs, reduce inequality, and foster long-term economic development for the benefit of the majority.

- (a) Affirm the need for a state-led reindustrialisation policy. The EFF must advocate for the state to lead an aggressive reindustrialisation drive, focusing on building sustainable industries and labour-absorbing factories. This requires prioritising local production of basic consumables and reducing reliance on imports. The state must invest in sectors such as manufacturing, textile, and agriculture, creating jobs and rebuilding South Africa's industrial capacity.
- (b) Reject the **"tax incentive assembling scheme"** as a substitute for industrialisation. The EFF must oppose the current model of offering tax breaks to companies that establish mere assembly plants with minimal local content. The organisation must push for real industrialisation policies that foster local production, skill development, and the use of advanced technologies. Incentives should be linked to the establishment of full-scale factories that add significant value to the local economy.
- (c) Call for the state to take control of the industrial development agenda. The EFF must demand a coordinated industrial strategy led by the state, with clear cooperation between the National Treasury, the

Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Electricity and Energy, and Department of Transport. The organisation must push for these departments to work together under a unified policy framework that prioritises long-term industrial growth over short-term speculative gains.

- (d) Affirm the importance of local manufacturing in Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The EFF must demand that SEZs be restructured to promote meaningful industrialisation and job creation. These zones should focus on producing goods for local consumption and export, with an emphasis on industries that absorb labour and generate sustainable employment. The organisation must call for stricter oversight to track the actual job creation and ensure that SEZs deliver on their intended purpose. Furthermore, there must also be an SEZ designated specifically for the film industry, strategically located in Gauteng, to support the growth of local film production, foster creative industries, and enhance South Africa's global competitiveness in media and entertainment.
 - (e) Reject the dominance of financial capital and speculative investments. The EFF must oppose the current economic model that prioritises financialisation over productive industries. The state must redirect investment towards long-term industrial projects that create jobs, boost local production, and contribute to real economic growth. The organisation must advocate for policies that curb the influence of speculative capital and promote reinvestment in productive sectors.
 - (f) Call for the revitalisation of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The EFF must demand the revival of the IDC as a key driver of industrial innovation and manufacturing. The IDC must be reoriented towards supporting meaningful manufacturing projects that add value to South Africa's economy and create jobs. The state must provide the IDC with the resources and mandate necessary to lead the reindustrialisation agenda effectively.
84. To combat the entrenched financialisation of South Africa's economy, the **EFF** must take decisive action to redirect capital from speculative financial markets toward real, productive investment. The following proposals are essential to reversing the damage caused by the dominance of financial elites and creating a more equitable economy that prioritises job creation, industrialisation, and economic transformation. The EFF must advocate for reforms that:
- (a) **Reject the over-reliance on speculative financial capital:** The EFF must oppose policies that prioritise financial markets and speculative capital over long-term, sustainable economic growth. The focus must shift from maximising profits for financial elites to creating meaningful employment and fostering industrial development.
 - (b) **Call for state control over strategic sectors:** The EFF must advocate for the state to take a leading role in directing capital to sectors such as manufacturing, infrastructure, and industrial development, which have

been neglected in favour of the financial sector. This includes using state institutions like the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to fund productive investments that create jobs and stimulate economic growth.

- (c) **Affirm the need for a state-owned bank:** The EFF must continue to call for the full implementation of state-owned banks to ensure that affordable credit is made available for industrial projects and broader economic participation. The state bank would counter the dominance of the five major banks, which control the majority of banking assets and serve the interests of the financial oligarchs.
- (d) **Demand the nationalisation of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB):** The EFF must continue to demand the nationalisation of the SARB, bringing it under the control of the state and democratically elected leadership. This would ensure that the SARB operates in the interest of the people rather than serving the narrow interests of private shareholders and foreign investors.
- (e) **Expand the mandate of the SARB:** The EFF must call for the SARB's mandate to be broadened beyond inflation targeting. The new mandate should include promoting employment, affordable access to capital, and driving industrialisation, ensuring that the central bank plays an active role in addressing South Africa's developmental needs.
- (f) **Appointment of Governor and Deputy Governor of SARB:** Demand the appointment of Governor and Deputy Governors of the Central Bank to be made by Parliament through a transparent process, with interviews held publicly, similar to the process for appointing judges, ensuring that the leadership of the central bank is accountable to the people and reflects the democratic will of the nation.
- (g) **Strengthening South African Revenue Services:** Continue to call for the strengthening of the South African Revenue Services to combat illicit financial flows, which deprive the country of much-needed resources for transformation.
- (h) **VAT reduction and corporate tax:** Continue to call for reduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) from 15% to 14%, and increase corporate income tax to ensure transfer of wealth to majority.
- (i) **Transformation of the National Treasury:** Call for the transformation of the National Treasury as a critical, as in the hands of reactionary forces, this institution has been used to undermine efforts to transfer wealth to the African majority.

E. STATE-LED INDUSTRIALISATION

85. Everything outlined above lays the foundation for a bold 5.5-year plan that will re-industrialise South Africa through a state-led strategy, rooted in progressive procurement policies and a robust infrastructure development agenda. The following section presents a 5.5-year plan that aims to re-industrialise South Africa through a state-led approach, primarily anchored on strategic procurement, infrastructure

development, and localisation. The fundamental premise is that the state must take an active role in directing industrial policy, focusing on specific sectors that will drive both immediate and long-term economic benefits.

(a) Industrialisation through Strategic Procurement

86. One of the key mechanisms for state-led industrialisation is through the effective use of procurement. Government spending on procurement exceeds one trillion rand annually, a figure that represents a significant portion of the national budget. By redirecting this spending towards local industries, the state can support job creation and industrial growth.
87. Procurement must not only focus on the buying of goods from the private sector but should set clear developmental objectives. The state, through its various departments and institutions, should prioritise the procurement of locally produced goods across various sectors, thereby stimulating domestic demand and fostering industrialisation.
88. The sectors to be prioritised include:
 - (a) **Textiles:** All linen and textiles used by state institutions (clinics, hospitals, correctional services, and the military) should be sourced locally. This would revitalise the South African textile industry, which has been in decline due to competition from imports.
 - (b) **Food:** All food consumed in state institutions, including schools, hospitals, and prisons, must be sourced from local farmers and agro-processors. This policy should particularly target regions like Limpopo (avocados) and Mpumalanga (citrus), ensuring local agricultural sectors benefit from state procurement policies.
 - (c) **Pharmaceuticals:** The procurement of medicines and other health products for public hospitals and clinics should focus on local manufacturing to reduce dependency on foreign imports.
 - (d) **Stationery and Printing:** School stationery, office supplies, and special documents like identity cards and driver's licenses must be printed locally. This will support local paper and printing industries.
 - (e) **Automobiles:** Vehicles used by the police, military, and government departments must be sourced from local manufacturers, ensuring that state procurement supports the automotive sector.
89. By strategically directing this procurement expenditure, the state can stimulate local industries and ensure that procurement contributes to industrial development, rather than merely facilitating the importation of foreign goods.

(b) Industrial Inputs for Infrastructure Development

90. The second pillar of state-led industrialisation is the development of industries that supply inputs for infrastructure projects. South Africa's significant infrastructure backlog, especially in housing and transport, offers an opportunity to foster local industries that produce the materials required for construction projects.
- (a) **Housing:** The housing backlog in South Africa exceeds 2.5 million units, with an additional 600,000 required in the Western Cape. The government must ensure that construction materials—bricks, cement, steel, and timber—are sourced from domestic producers.
 - (b) **Educational Infrastructure:** In addition to housing, there is an urgent need for more student accommodation. The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) has plans to build 300,000 student beds at the 26 universities and 50 TVET colleges, a project that should be redesigned to support industries that produce construction materials.
 - (c) **Road Infrastructure:** Of the 750,000 kilometres of road network in South Africa, 459,548 kilometres are still gravel and require upgrading. SANRAL's Horizon strategy proposes the upgrading of 15,000 kilometres of provincial roads, but this should be increased to 100,000 kilometres. Domestic industries must be prioritized in producing materials such as bitumen, concrete, and road-building equipment.
 - (d) **Rail Infrastructure:** Transnet Freight Rail's network of 30,400 kilometres of track must be revitalised to shift more freight from road to rail, reducing road congestion and wear. Domestic steel and concrete producers must be supported in supplying materials for rail infrastructure development.

(c) Localisation: Building Competitive Value Chains

91. South Africa's industrialisation strategy must also focus on localisation, ensuring that raw materials are processed into higher-value goods domestically rather than exported as unprocessed products. This will create jobs and increase the country's export earnings by adding value to raw materials before they are shipped abroad.
- (a) **Agro-processing:** Instead of exporting raw agricultural products like avocados from Limpopo, grapes from the Western Cape, or citrus from Mpumalanga, the state must invest in agro-processing plants. These plants should process agricultural products into higher-value goods like juices, oils, and packaged foods. The state should also build local processing plants for livestock and dairy products to reduce dependence on imports.
 - (b) **Mining and Mineral Beneficiation:** South Africa's vast mineral resources must be leveraged for industrialisation. Instead of exporting raw minerals, the state must invest in plants that smelt, refine, and manufacture these minerals into finished products such as steel and automotive

components. Industries must also be created around the beneficiation of platinum, gold, and iron ore.

- (c) **Plastics and Glass:** The country must also prioritise the development of industries that produce plastic and glass products, given the abundance of natural resources like timber and silica. Local timber from regions like Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal can support furniture and paper production industries.

(d)Energy Infrastructure: The Role of Coal and Nuclear Power

- 92. A critical component of state-led industrialisation is the development of energy infrastructure. The state must take control of the entire coal value chain, ensuring that coal mining, transportation, and energy production are aligned with national industrialisation objectives. The construction of additional coal-fired power stations must be tied to the development of domestic industries that produce the necessary infrastructure components, such as turbines, generators, and transmission equipment.
- 93. At the same time, the development of nuclear power stations presents an opportunity for industrial growth. The construction of nuclear plants requires a range of specialised inputs, from concrete and steel to high-tech components like reactors and cooling systems. The state must ensure that as many of these inputs as possible are produced locally, creating new industries and supporting existing ones.

(e)Supporting Digital Startups and Innovation

- 94. The state must also focus on supporting digital startups and innovation. This involves the creation of industrial hubs that provide the infrastructure necessary for startups to thrive, including affordable internet, electricity, and physical space for operations. Furthermore, the state must provide affordable loans and grants to startups that source locally manufactured inputs for their operations. In some cases, the state can offer offtake agreements or pay upfront for goods and services, absorbing the risk and allowing startups to grow without financial constraints.

F. CONCLUSION

- 95. In conclusion, while state-led procurement is essential for driving industrialisation, the role of financial institutions, particularly the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), is critical in ensuring the effective allocation of capital towards local investment and targeted employment. The PIC, which manages over R2.6 trillion in government pension funds and unemployment insurance, must be leveraged to prioritise investments that support industrialisation, rather than simply seeking profitable returns. This capital can be deployed to support key industries, such as manufacturing, infrastructure, and agro-

processing, ensuring that the state plays an active role in driving re-industrialisation and creating sustainable jobs. The SARB, similarly, must be reformed to focus on developmental objectives that go beyond inflation control and price stability, ensuring that monetary policy supports long-term industrial growth.

96. The PIC's resources present an untapped opportunity for funding state-led industrialisation. Rather than waiting for the private sector to take the lead, the state, through the PIC, can make direct investments in critical sectors like energy, transport, and manufacturing. By doing so, the state can create the necessary infrastructure to support industrial growth and ensure that capital is directed towards projects that generate jobs and local production. This would align the PIC's investment strategy with national economic objectives, rather than being driven solely by profit motives that benefit a narrow group of financial elites.
97. Ultimately, the state's financial resources, managed through institutions like the PIC and SARB, are more than sufficient to fund the re-industrialisation of South Africa. What is required is a deliberate political strategy to mobilise these resources towards productive sectors of the economy. By taking direct control of capital allocation, the state can drive industrial expansion, create sustainable jobs, and ensure that local industries are developed in a way that benefits the majority of South Africans. The key lies in harnessing the financial power already available within state institutions to build a self-sufficient, industrialised economy.

STATE CAPACITY



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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), since its inception, have been the only political movement to provide a clear position on the role of the state and government. Activists must understand the significance of the state and government in the struggle for economic freedom in our lifetime, and why the EFF contests state power.
2. We need the state to take charge of the economy, as it is through economic power that we will nationalize strategic sectors of the economy and ultimately achieve true economic freedom. Those who have previously had the opportunity to wield state power in the past 30 years but failed to take control of the economy never had the intention to do so, and they must not be trusted to do so in the future.
3. The Founding Manifesto, adopted at the National Assembly on What is to be Done on the 26th and 27th of July 2013, says, "Economic Freedom Fighters will contest political power, because we are guided by the firm belief that we need political power in order to capture the state and then transform the economy for the emancipation of black South Africans, especially Africans."
4. The Founding Manifesto goes further to identify seven non-negotiable cardinal pillars for economic freedom in our lifetime. One of these pillars is, "building state and government capacity, which will lead to the abolishment of tenders." There are three components to this cardinal pillar: (a) building state capacity, (b) the state as a driver of economic development, and (c) the abolishment of tenders.
5. This discussion policy paper will begin by briefly exploring the evolution of the state, defining what the state is, and what state capacity means, all guided by the Founding Manifesto. It is important to note that this is an updated version, reflecting recent developments over the past five years, while the essence and analysis remain as relevant today as ever. The paper will proceed to discuss four themes: (a) building state capacity, (b) state infrastructure and maintenance capacity, (c) the state as a driver of economic development, and (d) state-funded research, innovation, and invention. Each theme will include a brief background on the current status, challenges, and proposals on what is to be done.

B. WHAT IS THE STATE?

6. Studies in political economy and development economics continue to emphasize the importance of the state, and state capacity, to explain why some countries achieve economic growth, human development, and manage resources efficiently while achieving stable and safe environment for their people.
7. An important question we must continue to ask is: what is the state, and what is state capacity? To answer these questions, we must draw inspiration from the broad Marxist-Leninist tradition and Fanonian schools of thought in our analysis of the state, as accurately captured by the Founding Manifesto. In doing so, we must be careful not to become overly academic and theoretical, in such a way that our analysis and proposals on what is to be done to build state capacity are disconnected from reality or fail to resonate with fighters on the ground, who remain the heartbeat of the movement.
8. Additionally, as a movement, we must do this to avoid becoming statist or falling into statism, as warned by the Founding Manifesto. Statism can be described as the belief that the state should control everything. Many, including those in academia and civil society, have accused the EFF of such beliefs, failing to appreciate the EFF's contribution to the discussion on the state and state capacity. This is done deliberately, to mischaracterize the EFF as advocating for a "bureaucratic authoritarian regime," without any conceptual basis. This accusation is also used as a fear-mongering tactic, to suggest that if the EFF were to gain political power and capture the state, the Constitution would deteriorate—an assertion based on nothing but intellectual laziness and shallowness.
9. The Founding Manifesto clearly states, "the attainment of Economic Freedom entails that multinationals and private ownership of the commanding heights of the economy will be discontinued, and all economic wealth directed to the ownership and benefit of all people." The Founding Manifesto further emphasizes that "this will happen through various and combined forms of common and collective ownership, ranging from state ownership and control, co-operatives, and workers' ownership and control of the key sectors of the economy. State ownership is, in this context, an elementary component which will lead to more progressive forms of collective ownership, control, and benefit, and therefore is not narrow State-capitalism."

10. Vladimir Lenin's book, *The State and Revolution*, published in 1917, offers insights into defining the state. He quoted Engels's work, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, where Engels says:
11. The state is by no means a power forced on society from without. The state is equally not 'the reality of the ethical,' 'the image and reality of reason' as Hegel maintains. The state is a product of society at a certain stage of development; the state is the recognition that this society has become entangled in irresolvable contradictions with itself, that it is divided into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to escape. But in order that these antagonisms—classes with conflicting economic interests—might not devour each other and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society becomes necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, keeping it within the bounds of 'order.'
12. And the power, which has arisen out of society but placed itself above it and increasingly alienated itself from it, is the state.
13. In the same book, Lenin also quotes Karl Marx, who defined the state as "an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another. It is the creation of order, legalizing and perpetuating this oppression by moderating the clashes among these classes." While legitimate questions may arise as to whether this definition still captures the essence of the state today, it is crucial to appreciate that Marx's understanding of the state evolved over time.
14. Lenin wrote this book over a hundred years ago, yet his references to Engels and Marx demonstrate the enduring significance of their revolutionary and scholarly work. The movement must continue to be guided by scientific tools and revolutionary thought that withstand the test of time.
15. However, this is not to say that the concept of the state as described by Engels and Marx, and quoted by Lenin, has not evolved. Issues like nationhood, feminism, climate change, and changing relations between the state and capital have deepened the inquiry into what the state is. Thus, a nuanced understanding of the developmental state is required before answering the question: What is to be done?
16. There is no doubt that state-market-society relations have evolved well beyond the early characterizations of the state, even though these

definitions, coupled with insights into capitalism's contradictions and economic crises, remain among our most powerful conceptual tools. Despite the evolution in these relationships, many Marxists continue to believe that the state remains an instrument for the domination, oppression, and exploitation of the economically weak—particularly those without ownership of the means of production, including land—by the rich and the owners of capital. The state, as a tool, cannot be understood separately from the economic structure of society, which is why Marx argued that political organization aligns with economic organization.

17. In 1970, Louis Althusser, a Marxist philosopher, wrote *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, wherein he summarized the 'Marxist theory of the state,' viewing the state (1) as a repressive state apparatus, (2) emphasizing the distinction between state power and state apparatus, and (3) noting that the objective of class struggle is state power, and the use of the state apparatus reflects the class objectives of those in power. Althusser broadened the idea of the state to include institutions previously considered outside state control, such as the church, education, media, law enforcement, courts, and the family. However, this theory has been challenged, with critics arguing that Althusser underestimates the autonomy of these institutions.
18. Bob Jessop, a contemporary scholar, defined the state in three aspects during a 2014 lecture organized by the Centre for Labour Studies: (a) the territory controlled by the state, (b) an apparatus that makes collectively binding decisions for (c) a resident population subject to state authority. These aspects are commonly associated with general state theory from philosophers as early as Max Weber. Jessop's focus on the 'state apparatus' highlights institutions and organizations whose accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions in the name of the common interest or general will.
19. However, the boundaries of concepts like institutions, organizations, collectively binding decisions, and the general will are contested in society. Jessop's definition serves as an entry point to understanding the state, but it is not definitive. As Ha-Joon Chang, a Cambridge University economist, has noted, there are no scientifically defined boundaries for concepts like the state or market, as these are fundamentally political positions.

20. Contemporary feminist scholars, such as Wendy Brown and Sylvia Walby, have also contributed significantly to our understanding of the state. Brown critiques neoliberalism's impact on the state, highlighting how gendered dynamics shape governance and marginalize feminist struggles for equality within the state apparatus. Walby, in her analysis of patriarchy and the state, emphasizes that state policies, institutions, and structures reflect broader patriarchal power relations, necessitating a feminist approach to understanding state capacity and governance. These feminist perspectives are crucial for grounding state discussions in contemporary struggles for gender equity and inclusivity in governance.
21. Geopolitical shifts must also be considered. The rise of the Global South, with China at the forefront, challenges the U.S.- and Europe-dominated world order. This shift signals a potential reconfiguration of state-market relations, with nations in the Global South advocating for greater sovereignty over their economies and challenging neoliberal orthodoxy. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations, in particular, have been exploring alternatives to Western-dominated financial institutions, which further underscores the evolving role of the state in global governance. The state, in this era, cannot be understood without acknowledging the growing influence of emerging economies and their efforts to reshape international political and economic norms.
22. This brings us to an important point. In the Founding Manifesto, as stated in the introduction, we assert that the EFF will contest political power to capture the state and transform the economy. This is because the institutions and organizations that function as collectively binding in society are central to the reproduction of capital relations, i.e., the relationship between the capitalist class, which owns the means of production, and the working class, which sells its labor to capital.
23. As such, we must continue to hold the firm belief that we cannot transform the economy without the state. The idea that the economy and the state are separate is a deliberately crafted illusion to support arguments that the state should play a minimal role in the market. However, Marxist theorist David Harvey, in works like *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, argues that neoliberal policies depend heavily on the state, as it is the state that makes laws favoring deregulation, privatization, and outsourcing of public goods and services.

24. Otherwise, there is a risk of economic and political struggles occurring within the logic of the free market and a mere representative state, without considering class struggles. In his 2004 book *The Liberal Virus*, the late Marxist scholar Samir Amin argues that class consciousness is diluted by the illusion of separating the economy from the state, to support the logic of capital accumulation. This has reduced democratic spaces for substantive discussions on state capacity, with decisions about the state now influenced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), rating agencies, and the financial sector.
25. For the purposes of this discussion paper, we encourage continued debate on important questions of citizenship, nationality, subjecthood, legitimacy, stability, rule of law, and civic participation. This includes looking at the historical and contemporary works of Marxist philosophers and other progressive scholars, such as Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, Naomi Klein, Thomas Piketty, and feminist scholars, to rethink the state in times of overwhelming market failure and geopolitical shifts. This ensures that we go beyond generic analyses of the state and consider substantive policy proposals in an era of globalization and economic crisis. We will continue to view the state as a product of society at various stages of development, central to the process of accumulation in both stability and crisis periods, and as an entity that cannot be separated from the economy.

C. STATE CAPACITY AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

26. State capacity refers to the ability to enforce law and order, collect and allocate taxes, and provide essential goods and services. This capacity must be harnessed to transform the economy, ensuring the redistribution of economic benefits to the majority, eliminating poverty and unemployment, and improving the quality of life for all. The state, through government, must deliver better services such as healthcare, education, social services, and environmental protection. Additionally, the state must build and maintain infrastructure and foster an inspired, skilled, and well-paid workforce.
27. In South Africa, government is established by the Constitution. Section 40 of the 1996 Constitution outlines that government is divided into three spheres: national, provincial, and local. These spheres are described as distinctive, interdependent, and interrelated. This means they must work together to perform their constitutional functions and deliver services to

the people, while making decisions within the law, independent from one another.

a) National and Provincial Government Functions

28. The Constitution assigns certain functions to be jointly performed by the national and provincial governments, referred to as "concurrent competence" under Schedule 4. These include:

- (a) Administration of indigenous forests
- (b) Agriculture
- (c) Airports (excluding international and national airports)
- (d) Animal control and diseases
- (e) Consumer protection
- (f) Cultural matters
- (g) Disaster management
- (h) Education (excluding tertiary education)
- (i) Health services
- (j) Housing
- (k) Indigenous and customary law
- (l) Industrial promotion
- (m) Language policy and regulation of official languages
- (n) Media services provided by provincial governments
- (o) Nature conservation (excluding national parks and marine resources)
- (p) Pollution control
- (q) Population development
- (r) Property transfer fees
- (s) Public transport
- (t) Provincial public enterprises
- (u) Public works (limited to provincial government needs)
- (v) Regional planning and development
- (w) Road traffic regulation
- (x) Soil conservation
- (y) Tourism
- (z) Trade
- (aa) Traditional leadership
- (bb) Vehicle licensing
- (cc) Welfare services

29. Some responsibilities, however, are reserved exclusively for the national government, particularly where noted in the Constitution.

b) Provincial Government Functions

30. Specific functions are solely the responsibility of provincial governments, as listed in Schedule 5 of the Constitution. These include;
- (a) Abattoirs
 - (b) Ambulance services
 - (c) Provincial archives (excluding national archives)
 - (d) Provincial libraries
 - (e) Liquor licenses
 - (f) Provincial museums
 - (g) Provincial planning
 - (h) Provincial cultural matters
 - (i) Provincial recreation and amenities
 - (j) Provincial roads and traffic
 - (k) Veterinary services (excluding regulation of the profession)
31. Provincial governments are also responsible for monitoring and supporting local governments, as outlined in Section 155(6)(a) of the Constitution. This includes promoting the development of local government capacity to enable municipalities to perform their functions effectively.

c) Local Government Functions

32. Municipalities, with the support of provincial governments, are responsible for delivering services directly to communities. Their functions, as outlined in the Constitution, include;
- (a) Air pollution control
 - (b) Building regulations
 - (c) Child care facilities
 - (d) Electricity and gas distribution
 - (e) Firefighting services
 - (f) Local tourism
 - (g) Municipal airports
 - (h) Municipal planning and health services
 - (i) Municipal public transport
 - (j) Stormwater management in built-up areas

- (k) Trading regulations
- (l) Water and sanitation services (limited to potable water supply and waste-water management)

33. Additionally, municipalities are responsible for;

- (a) Beaches and amusement facilities
- (b) Billboards and public advertisements
- (c) Cemeteries, funeral parlors, and crematoria
- (d) Public cleanliness
- (e) Control of public nuisances and liquor-selling undertakings
- (f) Facilities for animal care and burial
- (g) Fencing and fences
- (h) Licensing of dogs and food-selling undertakings
- (i) Local amenities and sports facilities
- (j) Municipal markets, abattoirs, and parks
- (k) Municipal roads and street lighting
- (l) Noise pollution control
- (m) Public places and refuse management
- (n) Street trading, traffic, and parking

34. Post-1994 government has operated, and continues to operate, in a manner that is incoherent, wastes resources, fails to allocate human resources properly, and cannot deliver services to all the people. Government is supposed to deliver basic services such as water, electricity, housing, roads, sanitation, etc., as mandated by the Constitution.

35. However, the post-1994 government has weakened its capacity to provide many of these services, and as a result, it is not able to deliver them effectively. The poor level of service delivery is evident in the increasing intensity and frequency of service delivery protests. In 2018, more service delivery protests were recorded across the country than in any other year since 2005. In many cases, the main grievances cited during these protests are the lack of access to water and electricity, as well as poor-quality non-municipal services that fall under the responsibility of either national or provincial governments, such as education and policing.

36. South Africa loses about 1.1 trillion litres of water annually and has a backlog of 250,517 kilometres of water pipelines. To eradicate the housing

backlog, the government must build 3.9 million houses at an estimated cost of over R658 billion. Additionally, 351,468 kilometres of roads remain unpaved. The state is unable to address these backlogs due to its lack of capacity nor it is able to provide credible updated reports, particularly of water leakages.

37. Since the government is incapable of delivering many of these services, it depends on private companies to perform these functions through tenders and outsourcing. Outsourcing is when the government contracts an outside private company to provide services on its behalf. This is formalized through a service level agreement, which specifies the functions the private company is responsible for delivering, as well as timelines and costs.
38. Mr. Willie Mathebula, then acting Chief Procurement Officer at the National Treasury, testified at the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture in August 2018 that the government spends an estimated R800 billion on outsourced services, a figure which has increased to over R1 trillion in the past 5 years. This figure includes expenditure by national, provincial, and local governments, as well as state-owned enterprises. Outsourcing has significant political implications due to the vast amounts of money involved, and the system is easily manipulated by state officials, politicians, and the private sector. The private sector, in turn, engages in corrupt practices such as collusion and price-fixing.
39. Corruption in the outsourcing and tendering system has resulted in the state paying inflated prices for goods and services, with kickbacks and bribes being a common feature. Notable examples of corruption related to tenders and outsourcing include:
 - (a) The Transnet locomotive tender, where a business case to purchase 100 locomotives costed Transnet R509 million more than it should have.
 - (b) The construction of the 2010 World Cup stadiums, where construction companies engaged in collusive tendering (bid rigging), including the practice of cover pricing, which is prohibited under the Competition Act of 1998.
 - (c) A R200 million tender awarded to Intaka, a water purification company, which sold equipment at inflated prices to the Departments of Health in KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Cape. The tenders were awarded without following proper procedures,

with R13 million in illegal payments made to officials involved in processing the tenders. John Block, the Chairperson of the ANC in the Northern Cape at the time, was also a director of the company.

- (d) Rand Water awarded a tender to Africa Pipe Industries (API), whose bid was R14 million higher than that of a rival supplier that met tender specifications. As a result, the Gauteng High Court interdicted the tender worth a total of R168 million.
 - (e) PRASA awarded a branding contract to Brand Leadership, which was improperly inflated by R10 million, leading to a total cost of R19 million instead of the initial R9 million.
 - (f) Angelo Agrizzi, the COO of Bosasa, testified at the State Capture Commission about bribes totalling R432 million to government officials to secure inflated contracts.
40. Since Cyril Ramaphosa took office in 2018, there have been numerous commitments to fight corruption. However, corruption has not only persisted—it has worsened, including scandals involving Ramaphosa himself.
- a) Former Minister of Health Dr. Zweli Mkhize was forced to resign after it emerged that a R150 million communications contract was awarded to Digital Vibes, a company run by Mkhize's assistants in his office, with his son also benefiting.
 - b) In 2023, the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) reported to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts that it was investigating eight civil matters before the courts, involving contracts valued at close to R8 billion. These cases were related to procurement irregularities and the delivery of poor-quality coal, which damaged Eskom's coal-fired power stations and contributed to unplanned interruptions and severe loadshedding.
 - c) During the COVID-19 pandemic, millions were stolen by government officials through personal protective equipment (PPE) procurement. The SIU investigated over 600 companies that were awarded contracts totalling R5 billion, with many of them found to be corrupt.
 - d) Ramaphosa himself faced controversy when US\$580,000, hidden in a sofa at his Phala Phala game farm, was stolen. An independent panel appointed by the Speaker of Parliament in the 6th Parliament found

that Ramaphosa had serious questions to answer regarding this incident.

- e) The failed attempt to sell South African Airways (SAA) for a mere R51 to the Takatso Consortium raised serious concerns about transparency and the undervaluing of state assets. The deal was widely criticized as it appeared to benefit private interests at the expense of the public.
 - f) Corruption in coal contracts continues, despite Eskom having stabilized electricity generation, while tariffs are still set to increase.
 - g) The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has come under scrutiny for striking questionable deals with companies like ABB instead of pursuing maximum prosecution. This lenient approach appears to favor white-owned European companies, raising concerns about inconsistent justice mechanisms.
41. Corruption under Ramaphosa has not only become rampant but is now also severely impacting critical service delivery areas. Auditor-General reports have consistently shown that irregular, fruitless, and wasteful expenditure in procurement creates opportunities for corruption and weakens state capacity. Over the past five years, corruption has continued to collapse the state's ability to deliver essential services to the people.
42. Each sphere of government has state-owned entities (SOEs), companies, and business enterprises. At the national government level, there are more than 360 state-owned entities, including companies, SETAs, institutions of higher learning, constitutional institutions, and business enterprises.
43. The majority of state-owned entities do not operate with the purpose of making a profit. Instead, they work alongside government departments as enabling units to deliver services to the people. If they charge for services, the prices should not be driven by profit but by the minimum administrative cost. These administrative costs usually cover basic functions such as printing and photocopying, and they serve as a preventive measure to discourage the public from wasting state resources. Departments linked to these entities provide the majority of the funds to cover operational costs.

44. Other entities include museums, regulatory entities such as the National Credit Regulator (NCR), the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR), the Competition Commission, and various research institutions.
45. There are also state-owned companies that operate to offer market-related services and compete with privately owned companies. These companies function like normal businesses, competing in some cases with both public and private enterprises. Most of these companies do not receive subsidies from the state to cover their operational expenses (e.g., salaries, rent, maintenance, and equipment). They are expected to raise income through the sale of goods or services. Examples include Airports Company South Africa (ACSA), Air Traffic and Navigation Services Company, Alexkor, AMSCOR, Denel, the Development Bank of South Africa, Eskom, the Post Office, Transnet, South African Airways (SAA), and Telkom. A company like the Post Office competes with DHL, SAA competes with British Airways, and Telkom competes with Vodacom, MTN, and Cell C.
46. Even though the government does not directly fund the operational expenses of these SOEs, it acts as a guarantor when SOEs borrow money. This means that if an SOE cannot repay its loans, the state has the responsibility to cover the repayments.
47. According to the National Treasury budget document tabled in Parliament by the Minister of Finance during his budget speech, government guarantees for SOEs currently stand at R478.5 billion in 2023, a decline from R529 billion in 2019. Eskom is responsible for the majority of these guarantees, amounting to R341.6 billion.
48. Additionally, a significant portion of guarantees has been allocated to independent Power Producers (IPPs) totalling R208 billion, making it the second-largest guarantee after Eskom. This substantial backing for IPPs has raised concerns, as it appears to safeguard private sector profiteering in the energy sector. The justification for these guarantees has been called into question, especially since Eskom did not require this competition under normal circumstances. The IPPs were introduced under the premise of Eskom's failure to meet energy demands during the height of the energy crisis. However, with Eskom now reportedly stabilizing and generating sufficient power—aside from the energy crisis challenges—these guarantees for IPPs increasingly seem unwarranted.

This arrangement risks being perceived as a planned misallocation of public funds rather than a necessary measure to address energy needs.

49. While the government provides guarantees for SOEs to borrow money, this has not led to significant infrastructure development or improved service delivery. Instead, most SOEs face financial and operational difficulties, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of strategic direction. This is particularly so when these SOEs are expected to operate like private companies.
50. State-owned entities are an expression of state ownership and control over strategic sectors of the economy and serve as a foundation for sustainable economic transformation. The EFF's founding manifesto advocates for a strong developmental state with the political power and technical capacity to give developmental mandates to SOEs, private corporations, and state-owned companies.
51. The compliance of SOEs and the private sector with developmental targets should not be voluntary but mandatory. It cannot be left to the "hope" that private, foreign-owned companies will voluntarily support the developmental agenda. The state must use its SOEs to drive job creation, poverty reduction, and sustainable development.
52. Unlike the Western trend of reducing state capacity and ownership to make room for profiteering from public services, China has maintained significant control over its SOEs in strategic industries. By 2003, China had established the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which supervises state-owned assets and ensures the SOEs' adherence to policy. This centralized oversight has resulted in increased economic performance and tax contributions from Chinese SOEs. [Update]
53. Globally, SOEs have become increasingly influential. According to a 2015 PWC report, SOEs grew from 9% to 23% of the Fortune Global 500 between 2005 and 2015, driven by the rise of Chinese SOEs.
54. In South Africa, the fast-tracking of privatization has extended beyond SOEs to essential services such as water and sanitation. This privatization process is not being carried out directly but through reforms championed by the National Treasury and President Ramaphosa under Operation Vulindlela. These reforms are designed to manage resistance from the

progressive forces who denounce privatisation while pushing the privatization agenda forward through other more indirect means.

55. The trend in the Western economies, by Western economies we refer to the United State and Europe economy, has been to retreat from state-ownership of enterprises. However, and ownership control in a paper published in Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS') Asian Paper Volume 4 Article 6 titled 'Chinese strategic state-owned enterprises', Mikael Mattlin argues that China on the other hand has maintained significant ownership control over SOEs operating in industries that are strategic, while relinquishing control of less important enterprises. Chinese lessons on management, growth and use of SOEs remains central and relevant.
56. In 2003, China established the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) under the State Council. The State Council of the People's Republic of China, namely the Central People's Government, is the highest executive organ of State power, as well as the highest organ of State administration. The State Council is composed of a premier, vice-premiers, State councillors, ministers in charge of ministries and commissions, the auditor-general and the secretary-general. The premier of the State Council is nominated by the president, reviewed by the National People's Congress (NPC), and appointed and removed by the president.
57. ASAC website states that, 'authorised by the State Council, in accordance with the Company Law of the People's Republic of China and other administrative regulations, SASAC performs the investor's responsibilities, supervises and manages the state-owned assets of enterprises under Central Government and enhances the management of state-owned assets. This means that SASAC responsibility is to increase the value of the SOEs assets, supervise SOEs through statistics and auditing, manage the process to determine how much workers and top executives are paid, and see to it that policies in place are implemented.
58. In the past, several oversight functions were formerly scattered in various government agencies. The creation of the SASAC centralised many of these functions and unapologetically it follows socialist market economy. SOEs that were selected to fall under the control of SASAC were selected by government to form the basis from which China's future top global companies will be created. According SASAC 2018 report on economic

performance of state-owned and state holding enterprises, SOEs paid taxes of 1.5 trillion yuan (R3.1 trillion) to government.

59. It is not only China that has SOEs that are self-funding, pay taxes and dividends to government. According to a 2015 PWC report, titled 'State-Owned Enterprises: Catalysts for public value creation', SOEs are an influential and growing force globally and the report shows that the proportions of SOEs among the Fortunes Global 500 has grown from 9% in 2005 to 23%, and this was driven particularly by the growth of Chinese SOEs.
60. Other countries like United Arab Emirates, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India and Brazil have SOEs that are active internationally and engage in trade. All over the world, SOEs play far greater role to provide public goods, limit private and foreign ownership in the local economy and increase access to public services in making certain goods and services more affordable because of cross-subsidisation. Cross-subsidisation in the context of SOEs is when an SOE charges a lower price than a market price because it is subsidized by government ownership in the SOEs. It is not a recent whereby state intervene in the economy to improve service delivery through SOEs. Historically, especially after the Second World War, the rapid increase of the world economy happened primarily because of high levels of state intervention through SOEs.
61. However, there is no single acceptable model of SOEs ownership. Other countries keep full ownership whereas others keep partial ownership with strategic equity partners. Strategic equity partner is when a private company own shares in an SOE informed by a strategic contribution either finance, expertise, value chain and for state capacity. It will also include the ability to produce, build and maintain public service and infrastructure in an efficient and effective way of doing it.
62. Factors to consider when looking at model to manage SOEs include the value an SOE create for society, efficient management of SOE and protection of domestic economy to lessen dependence on foreign capital.
63. In the case of South Africa, the state used SOEs to build the economy as early as the 1920s. A paper by Stephen Greenberg, published by the Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN) in 2006, titled "The State, Privatisation and the Public Sector in South Africa", demonstrate that SOEs were used to provide basic infrastructure and create

employment especially for 'poor whites' workers. The state also played a major role in the growth of manufacturing industry in South Africa through SOEs such as Iron and Steel Corporation (Iskor), South African Forestry Company (Safcol), South African Coal and Oil Company (Sasol), which was initially planned as a private company but because there was no resources, the state intervened and invested resources, and other chemical and mineral beneficiation entities.

64. In the mid-1970s, Afrikaner capital called for reduction in state ownership and control of key areas of the economy, and this was started through partial privatisation of Sasol in the early 1980s. The White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation by the apartheid government made a case for privatisation in areas such as catering, laundry, cleaning, security services, construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, dams, water purification works.
65. The post-1994 democratic state took political power but continued with policies set out by the state in the dying days of apartheid. Initially, the liberation movement started by saying nationalisation of the mines, banks, and monopoly industries is their policy. This was said in 1990, however, by 1996, things had changed, and privatisation was said to be a fundamental policy of the liberation movement. The recent trends towards privatisation of SOEs is not new. Instead, it is continuation of a project that was started by the apartheid state and advocated for by Afrikaner capital.
66. One thing that has remained consistent in the process of privatisation of South Africa's SOEs is the participation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Patrick Bond shows in his book, titled "Elite Transition", published in 2000 that the IMF sent advisory teams to South Africa to help the apartheid government move to neoliberal policies, and privatisation of state assets was one of the IMF recommendations. The recent economic paper by Minister of Finance Tito Mboweni is essentially a replica of the IMF recommendations contained in the report after the 2018 visit.
67. The EFF's founding manifesto calls for concrete steps to establish and strategically support state-owned companies, such as a state housing-construction company, a state roads-construction company, a state cement company, a state pharmaceutical company, a state-owned mining company, and a state food-stocking company. These companies

would ensure affordable access to essential services and goods for all South Africans. [Update]

68. South Africa must use its SOEs to expand their footprint across the African continent. Investments by entities such as Transnet should not be driven by profit but by the need to build Africa's infrastructure, transfer skills, and develop the continent's economy. These state-owned companies will be supported by state-ownership of critical parts of the value chains in which these companies operate so that they produce essential inputs into the economy on a non-profit-maximisation basis.
69. South Africa must also use state-owned entities with the capacity to do big business to expand their footprint to the African continent. This should be markedly distinct from the way the Western Powers (the US and European Union) and China do business in Africa. Investment by Transnet in the continent should leave massive footprints concerning skills transfer, the development of the communities where investments happen, the payment of tax, reinvestments, corporate social investment, safety standards, compliance with labour laws and regulations and the fundamental economic development of these countries.
70. South Africa's established state-owned enterprises and semi-owned parastatals, such as SAA, the Airports Company of South Africa, Eskom, Telkom, Denel, Safcol and other public entities such as the SABC, Infranco and Sentech should begin to invest in the development of the African continent. While avoiding adventurism, these investments should not be driven by the narrow pursuit of profit making, but the need to develop Africa's infrastructure, logistics, systems and communications in a manner that will transfer skills and create sustainable employment opportunities for many people in the continent, thus contributing to development. The important question is, how should a developmental state manage SOEs to efficiently lead structural economic transformation and development in the continent?
71. The challenge ahead is how a developmental state can manage SOEs to efficiently lead structural economic transformation and development across the continent.

D. STATE INFRASTRUCTURE AND MAINTENANCE CAPACITY

72. South Africa's water and sanitation infrastructure has shown alarming signs of deterioration in recent years. Out of 995 sanitation systems, only 22 were awarded the prestigious Green Drop certification in 2022, a stark decline from the 60 Green Drops awarded in 2013. This significant drop in performance highlights a concerning reduction in the quality of wastewater treatment across the country. Additionally, the percentage of municipal systems rated to be in a critical state has risen from 29% in 2013 to 39% in 2022. These figures demonstrate the deteriorating condition of the wastewater treatment systems, increasing the risk of untreated effluent being discharged into watercourses, threatening both public health and the environment.
73. In the bulk water sector, the situation is similarly troubling. Despite having a well-established national bulk water resource infrastructure, including dams and water transfer schemes, 34% of South Africa's 1,186 water supply systems were rated as being at high to critical risk of failure in 2022. Water losses have also reached a critical point, with 41% of treated water being lost to leaks and illegal connections. The water quality is concerning, with only 40% of systems achieving microbiological compliance, and a mere 23% meeting chemical compliance standards.
74. The road infrastructure paints a mixed picture. While South Africa's national roads, largely managed by SANRAL, maintain a relatively good condition with only 7% in poor or very poor condition, the provincial and local road networks are in a state of accelerated decline. Many provincial roads, particularly in the major urban areas, are rated as substandard, with some municipalities failing to publish regular assessments of road conditions. Reactive maintenance, such as pothole repairs, has become the norm, rather than the regular preventative maintenance needed to extend the lifespan of road infrastructure.
75. The sanitation sector continues to show significant disparities, particularly in rural areas where access to improved sanitation remains a challenge. While 84.1% of households now have access to improved sanitation (such as flush toilets), approximately 16% of households still rely on pit latrines or open spaces. This uneven access, combined with the declining standards of wastewater treatment, exemplifies the severe strain on South Africa's sanitation infrastructure. Municipalities are struggling to maintain existing systems, leading to further degradation and increased public health risks.

76. The decline in South Africa's infrastructure is largely attributed to poor state capacity and the increasing reliance on external contractors through a flawed tender system. Many municipalities lack the internal skills and resources to effectively manage and maintain critical infrastructure, leading them to depend heavily on external contractors. This over-reliance has created a perverse incentive for some contractors, who benefit from the ongoing deterioration of infrastructure, as it increases their chances of being awarded repeat contracts for repairs and maintenance. The state's inability to build internal technical capacity has allowed this cycle to persist, where infrastructure is poorly maintained or allowed to degrade, ensuring future tenders are issued. As a result, the focus remains on short-term fixes rather than long-term sustainable solutions, perpetuating the downward spiral of service delivery and infrastructure quality.

E. STATE FUNDED RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION

77. One of the complementary pillars in the EFF Founding Manifesto states that the EFF will advocate for and implement programmes that use science and technology as contributors to sustainable livelihoods. The manifesto further calls for the construction of a High Technological Institute, which would focus on innovation and research in technology, aiming to develop technological instruments and gadgets in South Africa.
78. Research that supports the development of new, innovative products and services is crucial, as it has the potential to facilitate economic growth and improve the quality of life. Research and development (R&D) requires dedicated resources, and countries that have invested in R&D have enjoyed unprecedented levels of economic growth.
79. For example, China has relied heavily on its manufacturing capabilities for many years to support its economic development, emerging as one of the pioneers in industries led by research, development, and innovation. As the country continues to develop, China's government continues to allocate more resources toward R&D, which feeds into industrial growth. In 1991, China's R&D spending was US\$13 billion (R197 billion), accounting for just 0.7% of its GDP, ranking eighth in the world. By 2021, China's R&D expenditure had increased to US\$562 billion (R8.6 trillion), which is now about 2.4% of its GDP, making China the second-largest spender on R&D globally, just behind the US.

80. To put China's R&D growth in perspective, consider the United States' R&D spending during the same period. In 1991, the US spent US\$237 billion (R3.6 trillion) on R&D. By 2021, this had risen to US\$674 billion (R10.3 trillion), representing 3.1% of its GDP. [Update]
81. In contrast, South Africa's R&D spending has declined over the years. In 1991, South Africa was ranked 23rd globally, with R&D spending amounting to R42.4 billion, which was 0.8% of the GDP. However, by 2021, South Africa's contribution to R&D had decreased to R35.7 billion, representing only 0.62% of the GDP—less than what the country was spending in 1991. This is despite government tax incentives and a target to spend 1.5% of GDP on R&D. [Update]
82. Globally, about 10 countries account for 80% of R&D spending, and in these countries, business sectors are responsible for most of the expenditure. In South Africa, however, it is government and universities that lead in R&D spending, while the business sector lags behind.
83. In terms of human capital, South Africa has approximately 42,533 people working in R&D, a relatively small figure compared to other BRICS countries. For instance, Brazil has 316,499, China has 3,710,580, India has 528,219, and Russia has 778,155 people involved in R&D. This low figure is particularly concerning given South Africa's aspirations to be a competitive player in the global innovation landscape. [Update]
84. For the past 20 years, the post-1994 government was guided by the White Paper on Science and Technology published in 1996. It aimed to (a) promote competitiveness and job creation, (b) enhance the quality of life, (c) develop human resources, (d) work toward environmental sustainability, and (e) promote an information society and knowledge generation.
85. While progress has been made in expanding research and development opportunities—especially the participation of black people and women—this has not resulted in the level of competitiveness or job creation needed to address the country's unemployment crisis. The research and development activities in South Africa have not significantly improved the quality of life for the majority, as many continue to live in overcrowded and impoverished conditions. Instead, much of the R&D is focused on creating comfort for a minority and big business, primarily in

sectors that benefit from digitization and financialization. Meanwhile, inequality, environmental degradation, and poverty have worsened.

86. There is a clear lack of research, innovation, and development in South Africa that has led to large-scale industrialization or transformed how the state delivers services. Instead, manufacturing continues to decline, and millions face retrenchments across all sectors.
87. The White Paper on Science, Technology, and Innovation adopted by Cabinet in March 2019 fails to address one of the central constraints on the performance of research, innovation, and development: the bias toward advancing the interests of big business, multinational corporations, and wealthy individuals. Other issues, such as insufficient policy coherence, inadequate monitoring and evaluation, and a poor environment for innovation, are the result of misguided research priorities that prioritize profit over human welfare.
88. Furthermore, the research, innovation, and development landscape in South Africa often exploits underpaid and under-recognized scientists who sometimes lose the rights to their inventions. In many cases, their research is taken without proper compensation, stifling motivation and innovation.
89. The significance of R&D extends beyond economic development. Countries that invest in new innovations—whether in defense capabilities, economic security, statecraft, or solving societal and human development challenges—position themselves to shape the future. For example, R&D plays a critical role in advancing technological defense systems, ensuring energy security, and preparing nations for global shifts in healthcare, sustainable development, and climate change resilience. Countries that prioritize R&D are not just addressing immediate challenges but also securing their future and improving their citizens' quality of life through long-term, sustainable development.

F. STATE AS A DRIVER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

90. To drive real economic growth and industrial development, the state must play a central and strategic role, acting as a driver of economic transformation, job creation, and societal progress. The post-1994 South African government has unfortunately failed to exercise this role effectively, opting instead for superficial changes through initiatives like Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) while allowing capitalists to dictate

the terms of economic development. As a result, the economic imbalances and inequalities of the past have been reproduced, with state capacity continuing to deteriorate and economic development remaining fragmented and incoherent.

91. In order to establish a true developmental state, South Africa must reposition the state apparatus to drive industrial growth and development through strategic government interventions, particularly by leveraging public procurement and infrastructure investment to catalyze broad-based economic benefits. The state can and should use its immense purchasing power and policy frameworks to target key industries, create jobs, and simultaneously address pressing societal challenges. A true developmental state is one that operates independently of capitalist interests, develops its own strategic economic vision, and has the technical and political capacity to implement this vision effectively.

G. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

(a) Public procurement as a catalyst for economic development

92. One of the most powerful tools available to a state is public procurement. By aligning public spending with developmental objectives, the state can stimulate key industries, create jobs, and foster innovation. Rather than being seen as merely a routine administrative function, public procurement should be viewed as a strategic lever to guide industrial policy and structural economic transformation.
93. Take, for example, the construction of roads. If approached with a strategic developmental mindset, the procurement of road construction services could be used not just to improve infrastructure but to drive new cities, areas of trade, and regional economic hubs. Roads are more than just pathways for vehicles; they connect regions, enable the flow of goods and services, and can serve as the foundation for new industrial zones, residential areas, and trade centers. Each road built should be seen as an opportunity to plan for future growth, creating jobs not just in the immediate construction but also in the long-term industries that will grow around these new routes.
94. Consider the historical example of post-war Europe. After World War II, European nations, particularly through the Marshall Plan, used public procurement and state-directed investment to rebuild their economies. Infrastructure projects were not only about rebuilding physical structures

but also about modernizing the economy. In Germany, for example, the government leveraged procurement to rebuild factories, develop transportation networks, and stimulate the auto industry. The construction of highways (the Autobahn) was not just about connecting cities but about fostering industrial development in key regions, laying the groundwork for Germany's economic revival and positioning it as an industrial powerhouse.

95. Similarly, in France, the state used public procurement to rebuild its rail networks, highways, and energy infrastructure, creating jobs, boosting industrial capacity, and ensuring the country had a modern, integrated economy. These efforts weren't isolated—they were carefully planned to ensure that public investment led to downstream industrial benefits that lifted entire regions and industries.
96. In the South African context, this model can be replicated. Public procurement in construction, for instance, could be tied to initiatives that promote local manufacturing of construction materials, training and upskilling of workers, and urban development. When the state commissions new roads, railways, and bridges, it should require that materials are sourced from domestic industries and that a percentage of the workforce is drawn from underemployed populations, particularly the youth. This approach ensures that procurement contracts do more than just deliver physical infrastructure—they contribute to long-term economic growth, skills development, and job creation.

(b) Infrastructure Investment: Building an Industrial Ecosystem

97. Beyond procurement, infrastructure investment must be used as a cornerstone of South Africa's industrial strategy. Infrastructure is not just about building roads or power stations; it should serve as the foundation for broader industrial ecosystems that foster economic inclusion. Each major infrastructure project—whether it be energy, transportation, or housing—should have a well-thought-out plan for downstream industries that can grow as a result of the investment.
98. Take the example of energy infrastructure. If South Africa builds new power plants or invests in renewable energy, this should not be done in isolation. The construction of energy plants should be tied to the development of local manufacturing industries that produce components like turbines, solar panels, and batteries. The state should also

create incentives for research and development in green technologies, allowing South African companies to innovate and take advantage of the global shift toward renewables.

99. In Scandinavian countries, for example, infrastructure investment in renewable energy has been directly linked to industrial policy. Denmark's aggressive investment in wind energy did not just lead to the production of clean power; it also fostered the development of a globally competitive wind turbine industry. The government supported local companies through public procurement, creating a local market for wind turbines, which then enabled these companies to export their technologies globally. Similarly, Norway's infrastructure investments in hydropower allowed it to develop expertise in energy technologies, which it now exports to other countries.
100. For South Africa, infrastructure investment in sectors such as housing, transport, and digital infrastructure could be tied to the development of new industries. For example, building new housing developments in underdeveloped regions should be accompanied by investments in local supply chains for building materials, construction technologies, and sustainable urban planning techniques. By coordinating infrastructure projects with industrial policy, the state can ensure that downstream benefits are widespread, and that local industries are nurtured to provide sustainable employment opportunities.

(c) Shifting the Focus: From Profit Maximization to Social Development

101. One of the key problems with South Africa's current approach to economic development is the over-reliance on capitalist interests to drive growth. Private companies, particularly in the financial sector, often dictate the terms of economic interventions, with a focus on profit maximization rather than broad-based development. This needs to change. A developmental state must be driven by the need to provide affordable and sustainable services to the people, not by maximizing profits for private shareholders.
102. This is where the state's control over state-owned enterprises (SOEs) becomes crucial. SOEs should not operate with the primary goal of generating profit; instead, they should be guided by developmental mandates. The state must enforce compliance with its developmental targets through a carrot-and-stick system, ensuring that both SOEs and the private sector contribute to the country's industrialization goals. SOEs

like Eskom, Transnet, and PRASA should be reoriented towards creating jobs, supporting local industries, and addressing social issues, rather than simply focusing on short-term financial performance.

103. In conclusion, for South Africa to truly transform its economy, the state must become the primary driver of industrial development. By leveraging public procurement and infrastructure investment, the government can stimulate industries, create jobs, and address social inequalities. This will require a clear strategic vision, strong political will, and the technical capacity to implement large-scale projects that benefit the many, not just the few. South Africa's developmental state must prioritize social development over profits, using its immense resources to build a more inclusive and sustainable economy.

(d) Insourcing and intra-state procurement

104. The EFF has led by example and advocated for insourcing in legislatures and our councillors have sponsored motions of insourcing of cleaners, security guards, gardeners and general maintenance workers. Due to the intervention and leadership of the EFF, more than 4 000 security guards are insourced in the City of Johannesburg, with a salary of R10 000 per month, medical aid, pension and uniform. The EFF Caucuses in Nelson Mandela Bay, City of Tshwane, and all municipalities that did not have outright winners in 2016 local government elections are engaged in programmes that will lead to the insourcing of workers. However, as the EFF, we firmly proposed that government and SOEs must abolish tenders and insource workers on a full-time basis.
105. To abolish tenders, it will require amendment to the current legislation and introduction of a new legislation. A legislation to abolish tenders must provide an overall framework of insourcing of services that the state and government need on a regular basis to delivery services. The legislation will replace the current system of wholesale outsourcing of services and functions requested by the state to address administrative problems created by outsourcing, corruption in the tender system and improve quality and accountability in service delivery.
106. Insourcing legislation should clearly prescribe services, limits outsourcing and promote job security. The following services must be prescribed as services to be insourced by all organs of the state;

(a) Cleaning services

- (b) Security guard services
- (c) Gardening, horticulture and landscaping services
- (d) Banking services
- (e) IT services
- (f) Professional of catering services in all hospitals, correctional services and other government facilities.
- (g) Accommodation of government departments include police stations.
- (h) Travel services
- (i) Management, maintenance and repair of government vehicles
- (j) Building and maintenance of all infrastructure i.e. schools. Hospitals, roads, sanitations, dams and other infrastructure.

107. The legislation must also provide for a skills audit of all employees and require a database containing the skills of all employees to promote fair labour practices and training of workers. The legislation must clearly state that all organs of the state including all spheres of government, state-owned entities and state-owned companies must insource all the prescribed services. The EFF is in the process of tabling an Insourcing private member bill to these effects and the Bill is in drafting stages.

108. When we call for insourcing, we are not saying that government and SOEs must do everything including things that are not practical. In instances where services prescribed cannot be insourced, the legislation must provide for mechanism to exempt an organ of the state from insourcing. However, the process to exempt an organ of the state from insourcing should be informed by clear criteria which will not be easily manipulated for political and corrupt means. These should include interest of national security, prescribed services only needed can be obtained from international supplier or it is in the public interest.

109. There are also SOEs that offer services which government departments and other SOEs outsources to third party service providers. For example, in 2016, the National Treasury awarded a transversal contract to Vodacom for 20 governments department with the highest telecommunications spend. The contract was for Vodacom to deliver cell phones devices, airtime, data and overall infrastructure. Transversal contract is a contract that is facilitated by the National Treasury centrally for goods or services that are required by one or more than one government department and SOES. Other example of transversal contracts that the National Treasury has facilitated for various provinces

and departments include a tender for medical equipment, courier services, and vaccines.

110. Therefore, we must pass a law to establish intrastate procurement whereby a government department or SOEs cannot go out and tender services that can be procured from a government department or SOEs. The legislation must allow for a standing memorandum of authority (MoU) between entity that provide services and all other departments and SOEs that needs the services.
111. For example, all government departments and SOEs that needs Courier services must sign a standing MoU, and in instances were the services that are needed cannot be procured from within government and SOEs, exemption legislation.

(e) State-owned companies and strategic equity partner

112. The NPA must re-affirm the resolution of the first and second NPA and the founding manifesto, that a strong developmental state should necessarily have the political power and technical capacity to give developmental mandates to SOEs.
113. The attempt to privatise the remaining SOEs must be rejected. But the 3rd NPA must go beyond rejecting privatisation, it must also reject privatisation of delivery of essential services such as water and sanitation, even in the absence of an SOE.
114. If privatisation of SOEs like Eskom, Denel, Transnet and others, continues, the state will have no capacity to intervene in the economy to build much needed capacity and create much needed jobs under a different democratically elected government that has intentions to implement socialism taking into account South African context and characteristics.
115. All SOEs must be repositioned to play a central role in building state capacity. The first step towards repositioning SOEs is to consider creation of a central administrative agency like China's SASAC, to increase the value and contribution of SOEs to provide public goods.
116. The Ministry of Public Enterprise is not an appropriate way the state manages and control SOEs primarily because of two reasons;

- (a) Firstly, it was created in the 1980s to implement and oversee commercialisation and privatisation of SOEs, and not with the intention to grow SOEs value and strategic control in the economy to benefit majority. The post-1994 government has failed to repurpose the ministry and its mandate, as a result, it is continuing with the purpose which it was created for.
 - (b) Secondly, unlike in the past when individual ministries had control over daily functions and strategic direction of SOEs, today the Minister of Public Enterprise has too much deciding powers as the only shareholder or majority shareholder without the necessary contribution by other stakeholders. The ministry decides on the appointment and removal of board members, unduly influence decisions of boards beyond the scope of legislation and at times the ministry is at the centre of chaos and crisis in these SOEs as we witnessed with the resignation of SAA and Eskom former chief executive officers in recent times.
117. The central administrative agency to be entrusted with increasing the assets value and contribution of SOEs in strategic sectors such as transports, telecommunication, mineral beneficiation and social value infrastructure i.e. water, roads, health and education facilities. The SOEs must be placed under the line function not with the intention of privatisation, but as an extension of the respective line functions, and the central agency's primary mandate is to ensure that these SOEs under line departments grown in value and assets, a process which is already underway. The EFF must guard against privatisation that is masked as strengthening SOEs by the decision to move these strategic SOEs to line function, as the EFF has always advocated.
118. Such an agency must be relatively autonomous from political micromanagement. Once it is given a broad political mandate, which should include clear infrastructure and job dividends targets, must be given enough space to implement operational and administrative policies.
119. Also, such an agency should develop infrastructure, economic and investment policy which outline clearly what each strategic SOEs must do. In addition, such policies should be approved by Parliament.
120. While the state should retain majority shareholders in strategic SOEs, the question of strategic equity partners must be looked at case by case

instead of wholesale privatisation as it is the case currently. In the current moment, the focus is on privatisation because the debt of SOEs is arguably the biggest threat to South Africa's public funds and could also be an opportunity to raise much needed cash as revenues have continued to decline as the economy fail to grow. There may be instances where it makes sense to introduce a strategic equity partner. Introduction for strategic equity partners must be considered within clearly outline policy guidelines. For example, a strategic equity partner for an SOE like SAA should bring advantage to procurement of aircrafts or access to wider routes with competitive advantage.

121. In addition to competitive advantage, a diverse ownership in SOEs while the state retains majority ownership will build much needed accountability mechanism. For example, according to South African Airways Act No. 5 of 2007 says the Minister of Public Enterprise exercise all the rights attaching to SAA shares and SAA interests on behalf of the State, including the rights of shareholder and member of SAA. This has led to unchecked powers and lack of accountability as it is the case with the current Minister of Public Enterprise. Strategic equity partners will play an important role of check and balance.

(f) Abolish use of consultants

122. Government must abolish use of consultants in all spheres of government. Government Technical Advisory Services (GTAC), an agency of the National Treasury, must be formally established through an act of Parliament as a schedule 3 national public entity and report directly to the President. GATC must build internal capacity and stop using consultants who charge exorbitant fees qualified to offer strategic advice.

(g)Infrastructure maintenance capacity

123. The state should establish state-owned housing construction company, and state-owned roads construction company, and immediately abolish tenders for construction and maintenance services in government and SOEs and must employ engineers and artisans on a full time.
124. At the centre of building state capacity through insourcing and repositioning of SOEs, is the ability to build strong and well-coordinated state capacity to deliver large infrastructure projects, particularly as it

relates to the life cycle of the infrastructure, operations and maintenance. This means that planning of infrastructure such buildings, roads, vehicles, hospital equipment, boarder scanners, water purifications and dams, electricity power plants and telecommunication towers must include as core component clear maintenance plan.

125. This should include details such as budget, number of jobs as a result of maintenance and clear timeframes of what, when and how each infrastructure is maintained. Failure to incorporate maintenance as core component of planning infrastructure leads of collapse of infrastructure before its life span and high cost of maintenance with interruption to the economy.
126. Each year, government and SOEs must submit a consolidated report on infrastructure maintenance by President to Parliament, which should include details of the number of jobs created through maintenance of infrastructure.

(h) State funded research and development

127. To drive South Africa's economic development, centred on a developmental state, spending on R&D must increase to 4% of the GDP by 2029. Spending on R&D should lead to production of knowledge, information, skills and talent needed to support, facilitate and fuel the development and growth of strategic industries and sectors.
128. Reposition Technology Innovation Agency (TIA) to play a greater strategic role in leading and stimulating technological innovation that leads to technological discoveries, innovation and improvements. This should be done by first increasing their budget, MoU with state funded research to produce research that will have job dividends with clear timeframes and achievable targets.
129. All TIA MoU signed with other state-funded research should be linked with funding by Industrial Development Corporation, Development Bank of Southern Africa and other state financial development institutions with such targets and industrial policy.
130. The state should own shares in all state funded inventions instead of receiving royalties and should prioritise inventions that will improve delivery of water, health, education and roads services and infrastructure.

131. The Ministry of Higher Education and Training, and Science and Technology, must have greater administration and coordinated approach towards funding for research and development to ensure that the future of research, innovation and development is aligned with broad political objectives. This should not result in abuse of administrative powers by bureaucrats to influence research outcome. There must be a deliberate effort to create a more relaxed environment for scientists because only when they feel free, they will be able to conduct genuine research.
132. However, this is long term approach and will not result in innovation that will lead to the industrial development that is needed to create jobs immediately. Countries that did not industrialize 200 years ago when the world experience a wave of industrialization are regarded as late industrializers. Today, countries that want to industrialize are facing different challenges, including stiff competition from countries that are industrialized and capital that is more mobile, mobile enough not to wait for investment in research and development that will results inventions that will lead to industrialization.
133. Alice Amsden, a historical economist credited with the theory of late industrialisation, a theory based on the experience of Brazil, China, India, South Korea and Taiwan was to identify how companies could move from export of natural resources to beneficiation of mineral resources to produce goods and services, based on knowledge-based assets. But to generate knowledge-based assets, one needs research, innovation, development, time and manufacturing experience. The theory went further to show that, for late industrializers, this requires countries to borrow and apply technical knowledge.
134. Unlike in the 1980s when it was difficult for countries to earn foreign currency in the absence of fast speed internet, today it is different. High speech internet and technology makes it easier to purchase or license frontier technologies. Other than the issue of foreign currency, South Africa could meet all other requirements i.e. product demand from domestic and continent market, helped by protection of infant industries.
135. In addition to product demand and protection of infant industries, companies must also keep the prices of whatever products. While the theory was developed in the 1980s, conditions have changed and require critical analysis of material conditions today.

136. Therefore, as a country, South Africa and the continent needs to explore borrowing and applying technical knowledge more aggressively to stimulate industrialisation.

(i) Amendments of Public Finance Management Act

137. To drive real economic growth will require amendment of various legislation, important amongst them is the:

(a) Amend the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) to compel national, provincial and state-owned entities to procure 80% of all goods from local producers and a minimum of 50% from producers of which 50% is owned and controlled by women and the youth.

(j) State owned retail company

138. South Africa is amongst countries with the highest level of shopping centre that serves as shops for goods and services that households consume. All the shopping centres and the shelves space they provide is owned and controlled by private companies. As a result, it is big business that decides what produces end up in the shelf.

139. Manufacturing in South Africa has declined since 1994. According to information from Statistics South Africa, in 1993 manufacturing contributed 21.3% to South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the 2nd quarter of 2024 manufacturing contributed 13% to the GDP. This means that majority of goods in South African shops are imported goods from all over the world which end up in these shelves.

140. Goods production, packaging, transportation, marketing, advertising, retail and trade should constitute one of South Africa's biggest economic sector. For this to happen, the state cannot depend on retail space shelves that is owned by big business. Government must build and support state-owned trading and retail platforms all over the country. Government must also establish a retail state-owned bank.

141. Products – such as glasses, cups, plates, spoons, tiles, energy-efficient building materials, furniture, washing products, electronics and textiles –

that people use on a daily basis must be produced locally through labour-absorptive means

142. Parliament must pass a law to introduce a legislation for a quota of 60% on all shops to sell locally produced goods and products.

(k) State-led manufacturing capacity

143. Government cannot depend on big business to revive the manufacturing sector. Government must use state procurement decisively in all spheres of government – estimated at around R1 trillion annually – to enable industrialisation. Existing or new SOEs must produce things that government buy and are used by all government departments and/or items which government spends a lot of money on.

144. All government departments at a national, provincial and local sphere, state-owned entities and the judiciary buy cars and petrol, therefore;

- (a) A SOE like Denel with sophisticated capacity must be established to manufacture cars in a labour intensive yet efficient manner.
- (b) Government spends billions every year to buy linen either for different purpose i.e. uniform, bedding, and clothing for patients in hospitals,
- (c) A SOE must manufacture linen.
- (d) Both car and linen manufacturing companies must manufacture for government departments including SOEs.

GOVERNANCE

DISCUSSION DOCUMENTS



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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is guided by a firm belief in the necessity of political power to capture the state and transform the economy for the emancipation of Black South Africans, particularly Africans.
2. The EFF understands that true liberation can only be achieved through fundamental changes in economic structures, and political power is a critical tool for achieving that transformation.
3. In the current political landscape, contesting political power naturally leads to the EFF's participation in governance. However, the nature and extent of this participation are dictated by electoral outcomes. The EFF's ability to influence governance is directly tied to the electoral mandate it receives from the people.
4. Since its formation in 2013, the EFF has participated in five elections: the 2014, 2019, and 2024 National and Provincial Elections, as well as the 2016 and 2021 Local Government Elections. These elections have provided the EFF with valuable experience and insight into South Africa's political and governance landscape.
5. The purpose of this discussion document is to reflect on the past decade, utilizing our experiences in these elections to achieve three primary objectives: (1) to contextualize the governance landscape in South Africa, (2) to critically reflect on recent shifts and changes in governance, and (3) to evaluate what these changes mean for the future of the EFF and its role in governance.

B. GOVERNANCE LANDSCAPE IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1994 – 2014

6. Governance, in the context of a political party, can be understood as taking place in two main spheres: the legislature and government. Each of these areas requires distinct and separate analysis.

a) Legislature

7. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the supreme law of the country. Parliament holds legislative authority at the national level, while the provincial and local levels are governed by provincial legislatures and municipal councils, respectively.
8. Parliament's composition and powers are set out in Chapter 4 of the Constitution. According to Section 42, Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The National Assembly is made up of 400 elected members who represent the people, ensuring that the government is accountable to the people under the Constitution.

9. In the five national and provincial elections that took place in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2024, members of the National Assembly were elected through a proportional representation system. Voters cast two ballots: one for national representation and one for regional (provincial) representation. Of the 400 National Assembly members, 200 are elected from the national list, and 200 are elected from the provincial list.
10. From 1994 to 2019, the African National Congress (ANC) dominated the National Assembly as the majority party. The ANC's election results over this period were as follows: 1994 (62.6%), 1999 (66.4%), 2004 (69.7%), 2009 (65.9%), and 2014 (62.1%). Other parties, such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), along with smaller parties, made up the remaining seats.
11. The National Party, which was the governing party during apartheid, contested its last election in 1999 under its new name, the New National Party, where it received only 6.8% of the vote. This marked the end of the former apartheid ruling party in national governance.
12. The period between 1994 and 2014 saw three major consequence, many of which stemmed from the negotiations that led to the end of apartheid. South Africa's first democratic constitution emerged from these negotiations, starting with the Interim Constitution of 1993. This document recognized the need to build a new democratic South Africa.
13. Section 88(2) of the Interim Constitution allowed for the creation of the Constitutional Assembly, established by Section 68(1) and (2). The Constitutional Assembly was tasked with drafting and adopting a new constitution, which had to comply with the constitutional principles agreed upon in Schedule 4.
14. Three key constitutional principles related to governance were crucial:
 - (a) The Constitution must be the supreme law of the land, binding all organs of state at every level of government.
 - (b) There must be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness, and transparency.
 - (c) The government must be representative, embracing a multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult suffrage, a common voters' roll, and, in general, proportional representation.
15. Once the Constitution was adopted in 1996, in line with the agreed constitutional principles, Parliament became composed of political parties that shared similar political and ideological foundations. These parties were only separated by marginal differences such as regionalism, tribalism, and racism, but all were bound by the principles of the 1993 Interim Constitution.

16. This defined much of parliamentary politics from 1994 to 2014, which can be seen as the first major consequence of the new democratic era.
17. The second consequence was that the parliamentary period between 1994 and 2014 was heavily influenced by British colonial traditions in the functioning of the legislature. This was reflected not only in the rules, established practices, and procedures but also in formal aspects like dress code and the way members addressed each other in Parliament. More importantly, these traditions were used to maintain and protect legislation that kept economic power in the hands of a small, privileged minority, turning South Africa into what can be described as a neocolonial state.
18. The third and final consequence was that Parliament largely operated in the shadows, away from public scrutiny. Political parties approached their participation in Parliament differently. The ANC often sent older, senior members of the party to serve, many of whom spent much of their time asleep during committee meetings and plenary sessions. Meanwhile, the DA's focus was on entrenching and institutionalizing a liberal constitution that protected the interests of a small white minority. Since there were no significant challenges to this setup, these dynamics went largely unchecked.
19. As a result, the general public remained largely unaware of what was happening in Parliament. No significant legislation was introduced that could have fundamentally challenged or disrupted the existing power structures. Parliamentary activities, by and large, failed to address the deep-rooted inequalities in South African society and did little to shift the balance of economic power. Instead, the status quo remained firmly in place.
20. Furthermore, despite the considerable powers vested in Parliament—such as the ability to amend the Constitution, oversee the executive, and introduce legislation aimed at addressing critical issues like the transfer of resources to the majority—the institution was effectively reduced to a junior player. Parliament's potential to fight poverty, unemployment, and inequality through meaningful interventions was undermined as it often took instructions from the government, rather than acting independently. Instead of being a proactive force for transformation, it became subservient, leaving many of the challenges facing the majority of South Africans unaddressed.
21. The weakening of Parliament, coupled with an opposition party that was largely comfortable with the status quo, led to a decline in the overall quality of governance. Over the course of 20 years, the checks and balances designed to hold the executive accountable became increasingly ineffective. Parliament's role as a watchdog of government actions diminished, allowing the executive to

operate with less scrutiny and oversight. This erosion of accountability contributed to weakened governance, as critical issues such as corruption, mismanagement of resources, and unequal distribution of wealth were not adequately addressed.

b) Government

22. The character of the first democratic government, after the ANC won the 1994 elections with an outright majority, was shaped by the 1993 Interim Constitution. Section 88(1) of this constitution states:

a) "The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Executive Deputy Presidents and (a) not more than 27 Ministers who are members of Parliament and appointed in terms of subsections (2) to (6); (b) not more than one Minister who is not a member of Parliament and appointed in terms of subsection (6)(a), provided the President, acting in consultation with the Executive Deputy Presidents and the leaders of the participating parties, deems the appointment of such a Minister expedient."

b) Furthermore, the Interim Constitution did not only focus on the size of the cabinet but also laid out the terms and conditions under which political parties would participate in the executive. Section 88(2) reads:

c) "A party holding at least 20 seats in the National Assembly and which has decided to participate in the government of national unity, shall be entitled to be allocated one or more of the Cabinet portfolios in respect of which Ministers referred to in subsection (1)(a) are to be appointed, in proportion to the number of seats held by it in the National Assembly relative to the number of seats held by the other participating parties."

23. As a result, the 1993 Interim Constitution established the first post-1994 government, known as the Government of National Unity (GNU). Contrary to popular belief, former President Nelson Mandela, as the first president of democratic South Africa, did not have complete discretion over the size of the cabinet or the appointment of ministers.

24. The first government of 1994 was actually a product of a negotiated settlement. Even though the ANC won 62.6% of the vote, securing a majority, it was not permitted to form a government on its own. Instead, it had to share power within the GNU, meaning that the policies and programs of the first government were bound by the terms of the 1993 Interim Constitution. This framework limited the ability of the ANC to fully implement its own policies, as the government had to act in accordance with the negotiated principles.

25. The GNU was meant to last until 1999, after which the government's structure, including the cabinet and party participation, would be determined by the new Constitution, adopted in 1996. The National Party (NP), however, wanted the new Constitution to maintain clauses that would prolong the GNU. When the ANC refused to include these clauses, the NP announced in May 1996 that it would withdraw from the GNU by 30 June 1996. By doing so, it forfeited the Deputy President position it had held.
26. Even at the time of the NP's withdrawal from the GNU, the contestation was not about policies or programs. The issue that led to the collapse of the GNU was the ANC's decision that, after the adoption of the new Constitution, future governments would be based on majority rule. However, the economic policies remained unchanged even after the NP's exit.
27. While municipalities were established later due to the lengthy process of demarcation and the creation of new boundaries in post-apartheid South Africa, both municipalities and provinces eventually adopted the governance structures of the national government.
28. Once majority rule was fully established after the 1999 National and Provincial Elections, governance at the national level became dominated by the ANC. However, in some provinces, the political dynamics did not allow the ANC to secure an outright majority or govern alone—especially in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape.
29. In 1994, the ANC won majorities in all provinces except KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. KwaZulu-Natal was governed by the IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party), while the National Party controlled the Western Cape. Although the ANC managed to win the Western Cape in the 1999 National and Provincial Elections, the IFP retained its majority in KwaZulu-Natal, only losing it in the 2004 elections.
30. The Democratic Alliance (DA) gained a majority of seats in the Western Cape, forming a government with the support of the Independent Democrats (ID), which later merged with the DA. By the time of the 2009 National and Provincial Elections, the Western Cape was the only province where the ANC did not hold an outright majority. However, under the leadership of former President Jacob Zuma, the ANC regained control of KwaZulu-Natal, although it did so through a coalition.
31. Besides the change of governments in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, governance in provincial governments was less contested. This was mainly due to the alignment in broader policies guiding the national government, as both the NP and IFP were part of the Government of National Unity (GNU). However, the situation in local government was completely different.
32. The governance of municipalities went through a unique structural transition from apartheid to democracy. The local government elections took place in November

1995 for most areas and in May 1996 for others, such as KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. Unlike the national and provincial elections, which were based on the 1993 Interim Constitution with clearly defined boundaries, finalizing the post-apartheid municipal demarcations and creating the necessary legislation took much longer. In this sense, these early local government elections could be seen as transitional and temporary arrangements.

33. The process of establishing the new municipal system was only completed in 1998 with the adoption of the Municipal Structures Act. This act created different categories of municipalities—metropolitan, local, and district municipalities—and set the framework for electing councillors. It was only after the December 2000 Local Government
34. Elections that South Africa fully transitioned to a democratic dispensation at the local government level. With these different categories came various forms of governance, contestation, and varied results in terms of service delivery.
35. One key feature of local government governance, absent from the national and provincial spheres, was the inclusion of independent councillors and the legislated elections of councillors who make up governance structures such as councils and mayoral committees. The Municipal Systems Act created three governance systems: the collective executive system, the mayoral executive system, and the plenary executive system.
36. In the collective executive system, as outlined in Section 43 of the Municipal Structures Act, executive authority is exercised through an executive committee, with leadership being collectively shared. The mayoral executive system, according to Section 55 of the same act, allows for the exercise of executive authority through an executive mayor. This system is particularly applicable in metropolitan municipalities, where the executive mayor is supported by a mayoral committee. In the plenary executive system, executive authority is limited to the municipal council itself, meaning that the council is the only organ with executive powers.
37. While the ideological and political system that governs local government is largely influenced by national politics, which in turn shapes governance, contestations began to emerge, particularly after the December 2000 Local Government Elections. These contestations were not primarily within governance itself but arose through community-based activists, many of whom were associated with the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO).
38. However, many of these activists eventually left SANCO when they realized that, despite their activism at the community level, SANCO was not an effective vehicle for driving change. This disillusionment led to the mushrooming of thousands of service delivery protests across the country. According to data from the Community Law Centre, surveys on the frequency of protests and the underlying

causes found that community (service delivery) protests occurred at an average rate of 17.5% every month.

39. These service delivery protests reached a peak in 2011, just before the local government elections scheduled for May of that year. The increasing number of protests also led to escalating violence from law enforcement agencies, particularly the police.
40. One tragic example was the death of Andries Tatane, who was killed by police during a service delivery protest in Ficksburg, in the eastern Free State, on 13 April 2011. He had been protesting for access to clean water.
41. Some of the activists who had left SANCO went on to run as independent candidates, while others formed new political parties, such as the Forum for Service Delivery (F4SD) in the North West. Since 2011, local government has largely been governed by coalitions, although the ANC has often led these coalitions, incorporating smaller parties into mayoral committees, council leadership positions, and budgetary decisions. Many of these smaller parties contested and won municipal wards focused on issues such as service delivery—particularly water, sanitation, electricity, and housing in informal settlements.
42. This shift reshaped municipal councils, especially leading up to the 2016 Local Municipal Elections, as governance at the local level became a more contested terrain. However, this was more pronounced in smaller local municipalities and less so in larger metropolitan municipalities or significant municipal councils such as Polokwane, Mbombela, Sol Plaatje, and Msunduzi.
43. These larger councils mirrored provincial and national governments in their approach to governance. Between 1994 and 2016, there remained a clear distinction between the national, provincial, and local spheres of government, including differences in their forms of governance.

C. RECENT SHIFTS AND CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE

a) Coalitions governments

44. While coalition governments have been part of local governance in cities like Cape Town, as well as in the provinces of Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, these coalitions were generally not highly contested. The dynamics of coalition politics became more complex and contentious when they entered metropolitan areas, particularly Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni, following the 2016 Local Government Elections. These challenges deepened after the 2021 Local Government Elections.
45. Three major shifts occurred during this period. First, the 2016 Local Government Elections marked the first time the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) contested at

the local level, introducing a new political and ideological variation to the established governance landscape.

46. The EFF's policies, which included the insourcing of municipal workers, the fight for land and housing within municipalities, and the call to strengthen state capacity in local government, brought a fresh set of ideas and goals to what had previously been dominated by the policies of the ANC, DA, and smaller parties. This introduction of ideological diversity added to the complexity of coalition-building and governance.
47. Second, the ANC lost electoral control in key metros such as Johannesburg and Tshwane, with the DA taking control as a result of the EFF's decision to support DA mayoral candidates without entering into a formal coalition agreement. In Ekurhuleni, the ANC governed through a coalition.
48. The EFF, while choosing to remain outside of formal government structures, played an influential role as an effective opposition, proposing policy shifts and making demands in council. This led to the adoption of several motions that resulted in significant policy changes, including the insourcing of security guards in the City of Johannesburg, which was one of the notable motions passed as a result of EFF pressure.
49. Third, the 2021 Local Government Elections marked a further evolution in coalition politics, demonstrating that once the ANC lost power in certain areas, it struggled to recover. The 2021 elections highlighted the declining electoral support for the ANC, a trend that began in previous elections and intensified during this period. The ANC's inability to regain control in key metros indicated a broader trend of electoral decline for the former liberation movement, as its failure to address issues like service delivery and corruption alienated large portions of the electorate.
50. Empirical data supports these trends. According to Jolobe's (2024) analysis, the 2016 local elections resulted in 27 hung municipalities across eight provinces, leading to a rise in coalition governments across the country. In key metros such as Johannesburg and Tshwane, the ANC's share of the vote dropped significantly, with the DA forming minority governments in alliance with smaller parties and receiving crucial support from the EFF.
51. This marked a major shift in the balance of power at the local government level. The data also shows that the dynamics of coalition politics are shaped more by the pragmatic need to secure governance than by ideological alignment. In many instances, as Jolobe (2024) notes, coalition governments in South Africa have been characterized by parties with divergent ideologies forming alliances to achieve electoral majorities, despite their ideological differences.
52. By 2024, this trend was confirmed in the national and provincial elections. The ANC's coalition with the DA, which was often mischaracterized as a Government

of National Unity (GNU), was a culmination of the EFF's 2013 analysis that the ANC, having failed to transform South Africa's economic and social structures post-apartheid, would gradually move towards right-wing politics.

53. This coalition, underpinned by austerity policies, reflects the ANC's drift towards alliances that prioritize political survival over ideological purity.
54. The EFF's prediction, that the ANC would eventually align itself with the DA to maintain power, came to fruition, further demonstrating the fluidity and opportunistic nature of coalition politics in South Africa.
55. While coalition governments have been a part of local governance, particularly in the City of Cape Town and across the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, these coalitions were not highly contested or complex. However, the dynamics of coalition governments shifted when they entered the metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni in 2016, deepening even further after the 2021 Local Government Elections.
56. Three significant changes emerged during this period. First, the 2016 Local Government Elections marked the first time the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) contested in local government elections, introducing a new political and ideological dynamic into the governance landscape. Until then, local governance had been primarily shaped by the policies of the ANC, DA, and other smaller parties.
57. The EFF's entry brought with it specific policies, such as the insourcing of municipal workers, the fight for land within municipalities, and the demand for building state capacity at the local government level. These new policies challenged the established norms of governance that had been in place since 1994.
58. The second major shift was the loss of electoral power by the ANC in key metros, particularly Johannesburg and Tshwane, where the DA gained control as a result of EFF support for the DA's mayoral candidates, despite the absence of a formal coalition agreement. Ekurhuleni, on the other hand, remained under an ANC-led coalition. The EFF, while choosing not to enter into a formal coalition, adopted the role of an effective opposition, using its influence to propose policy changes in council.
59. This strategy led to the adoption of various motions that resulted in policy shifts, such as the City of Johannesburg's decision to insource security guards, showcasing the EFF's impact on local governance despite not holding executive power.
60. The third and most profound shift occurred after the 2021 Local Government Elections. The coalitions that emerged during this period signalled a new reality: once the ANC lost power in a municipality, it struggled to recover. This trend

highlighted the steady decline in electoral support for the former liberation movement. The trajectory of the ANC's diminishing influence was evident, as its political dominance began to weaken across key metros

61. This trend was confirmed with the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, where the ANC's decline continued. The coalition that the ANC eventually entered into with the DA, often mischaracterized as a Government of National Unity (GNU) for political reasons, marked a significant shift.
62. This development was a culmination of the EFF's 2013 diagnosis, which foresaw the ANC's failure to transform South Africa from an apartheid state into a truly post-apartheid society.
63. As predicted, the ANC's political stance began to gravitate towards right-wing policies, as evidenced by its embrace of austerity measures over the years, and ultimately, its alignment with the DA—a party historically characterized as representing the interests of the white minority.

b) Changes in electoral amendments

64. The 2024 National and Provincial Elections were significant not only for their political outcomes but also for the changes in electoral laws that sought to reshape the landscape of governance in South Africa. The Electoral Amendment Act, passed ahead of the elections, introduced a shift towards allowing independent candidates to contest in national and provincial elections—a move seen as part of a broader attempt to transition towards constituency-based politics.
65. This shift, however, was not driven by fear of political instability or uncertainty, but rather by a deeper concern within established political forces, particularly the ANC, over the growing influence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The EFF's progressive policies, which aim to fundamentally transform the economy through the transfer of wealth from the minority white elite who continue to control economic power, present a direct challenge to the status quo.
66. The ANC and other traditional political actors fear that if the EFF gains more governance responsibilities, these policies will lead to significant shifts in economic power, redistributing wealth to the majority of Black South Africans, particularly Africans, who currently hold only symbolic political power. The introduction of the Electoral Amendment Act, in this context, can be seen as an effort to dilute party control and maintain the dominance of the current economic structures.
67. However, the results of the 2024 elections demonstrated that South Africa is not yet ready for independent candidates to play a significant role in the National Assembly or governance. Despite the introduction of the new laws and the hopes

that they would create a more open political system, not a single independent candidate was elected to the National Assembly, despite several attempts. This outcome highlights the resilience of party-based politics in South Africa and suggests that, for the time being, the electorate remains aligned with political parties over individual candidates.

68. Moreover, the failure of independent candidates to secure seats calls into question the effectiveness of the Electoral Amendment Act in achieving its intended goals.
69. The data from the 2024 elections revealed that independent candidates faced significant challenges, including a lack of resources, organizational capacity, and voter recognition—factors that ultimately hampered their ability to compete with established political parties. This underperformance also suggests that the electorate is still cautious about moving away from a party-list proportional representation system, particularly in a highly contested political environment where party loyalty remains strong.
70. In conclusion, while the introduction of independent candidates was a notable development in the 2024 elections, the experience suggests that South Africa is not yet ready for a major shift towards constituency-based politics. The fear that the ANC could lose power to growing forces like the EFF may have driven these changes, but the electoral results indicate that, at least for now, political parties remain the primary vehicle through which governance is contested and achieved in South Africa.

c) The 2024 National and Provincial Elections: The ANC's Loss of Electoral Majority

71. The 2024 National and Provincial Elections marked a pivotal moment in South Africa's political history, as it was the first time the African National Congress (ANC) failed to secure an outright majority to form a national government on its own. Having been in government for 30 years with uninterrupted control over electoral support, this election result reflected a significant shift in South Africa's political landscape. Although the ANC had been steadily losing ground in various metropolitan municipalities in the years leading up to this election, the 2024 elections definitively ended its electoral dominance at the national level.
72. While the trend of the ANC's declining support had been observable for some time, particularly in major metros like Nelson Mandela Bay, eThekweni, Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg, and Tshwane, the 2024 elections were the first national elections where this decline translated into a loss of majority.
73. This outcome did not come as a complete surprise, as projections had suggested that the ANC would lose its majority. However, what remained uncertain was the

extent of the loss. In the end, the ANC barely managed to garner 40.1% of the vote, signalling a dramatic fall from its previous dominance.

74. This election result had immediate consequences. For the first time since 1994, the ANC could not form a government alone and was forced to enter into coalition talks with other political parties. This development marked the introduction of coalition governance at the national and provincial levels—a phenomenon that had previously been confined to local government.
75. The election also revealed a growing trend of coalition governance in provinces that were once strongholds of the ANC, particularly Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape, which are the three most populous provinces in the country.
76. The ANC's declining support had been evident in its electoral performance in metropolitan municipalities, where it had been governing through coalitions for some time. For instance, in Nelson Mandela Bay, the ANC had lost its majority and had been governing through a coalition since 2016.
77. Similar patterns were seen in Johannesburg and Tshwane, where the ANC had to contend with the Democratic Alliance (DA) and other smaller parties to maintain governance. In Rustenburg, another key municipality, the ANC was also governing through a coalition, reflecting the growing complexity of South Africa's local government landscape.
78. The 2024 election results were thus seen as the culmination of a long-term trend of declining ANC dominance. Although the ANC was still able to secure the highest number of votes in the election, its failure to reach the 50% threshold to form a government on its own was a clear indication that its grip on power was slipping.
79. The ANC's loss of majority was particularly significant in provinces like Gauteng, which had long been a battleground for political control. In Gauteng, the ANC's share of the vote dropped below 50%, forcing it to seek coalition partners to maintain control of the province. Similarly, in KwaZulu-Natal, a traditional ANC stronghold in the past two elections, the party also failed to secure a majority, leading to coalition talks with smaller parties.
80. The loss of electoral support for the ANC in these critical provinces was a reflection of broader dissatisfaction with the party's governance record, particularly in areas such as service delivery, corruption, and economic management. Over the years, the ANC had faced increasing criticism for its failure to address key issues affecting the majority of South Africans, including unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The 2024 elections represented a tipping point, as voters in key provinces and metros turned away from the ANC in significant numbers.

81. One of the key factors contributing to the ANC's decline was its inability to retain control in major metropolitan areas. Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni, three of the largest metros in the country, had already been lost to coalitions following the 2016 and 2021 Local Government Elections.
82. These metros had been seen as predictor of the future for the ANC's national fortunes, and the loss of these cities was a clear sign that the party was losing its appeal in urban centres. By the time of the 2024 elections, it had become evident that the ANC's decline in these metros would translate into a broader loss of support at the national level.
83. Another important aspect of the 2024 elections was the role of coalition politics. For many years, coalition governments were largely confined to local government, particularly in municipalities where no single party could secure a majority. However, with the ANC's loss of majority at the national level, coalition politics finally reached the national and provincial stages. In Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western Cape, the ANC found itself in coalition talks with smaller parties, reflecting the new reality of South African politics.
84. The 2024 elections also demonstrated the ANC's continued inability to recover from its losses in key metropolitan areas. In Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Ekurhuleni, the ANC had been governing through coalitions for several years, but these arrangements had not been enough to restore the party's dominance. In fact, coalition governance in these metros had often been fraught with challenges, as the ANC struggled to maintain stability and cohesion in the face of opposition from smaller parties and coalitions led by the DA and other political groups.
85. As the 2024 election results were finalized, it became clear that the ANC was facing an existential crisis. Having lost its electoral majority for the first time in 30 years, the party was forced to confront the reality that its dominance in South African politics was no longer guaranteed.
86. The results also highlighted the growing influence of other political parties, particularly the EFF and DA, which had made significant gains in key provinces and metros. The EFF, in particular, had positioned itself as a key player in coalition negotiations, using its influence to shape the outcome of governance arrangements in several provinces.
87. The 2024 National and Provincial Elections marked a turning point for the ANC and South African politics as a whole. The loss of electoral majority signalled the end of the ANC's era of dominance, ushering in a new phase of coalition politics at both the national and provincial levels.
88. While the ANC remained the largest party, its inability to form a government on its own reflected a profound shift in the political landscape, with voters

increasingly looking to other parties to address the pressing issues facing the country. The introduction of coalition governance at the national level also highlighted the growing complexity of South African politics, as parties with divergent ideologies were forced to work together to form stable governments in the post-2024 era.

89. The ANC's loss of electoral dominance in 2024 also aligns with a broader trend observed among liberation movements across Africa. Historically, many liberation movements that fought for independence or freedom from colonial or oppressive regimes have struggled to maintain power beyond 20 to 30 years of governance.
90. This pattern is evident in countries like Zambia, where the United National Independence Party (UNIP) lost power after 27 years, and in Kenya, where the Kenya African National Union (KANU) lost its grip on power after nearly 40 years. As liberation movements transition from revolutionary organizations to governing bodies, they often face internal challenges, including corruption, governance fatigue, and an inability to meet the rising expectations of the electorate.
91. The ANC, as South Africa's liberation movement, is now facing a similar challenge, with its loss of majority signalling that it is no longer immune to the political dynamics that have led to the decline of other liberation movements across the continent. This historical context suggests that the ANC's decline was not unexpected but rather a part of a broader pattern experienced by liberation movements in Africa.

d) The ANC-DA Coalition Mischaracterized as a Government of National Unity

92. The outcome of the 2024 National and Provincial Elections not only led to the ANC's historic loss of its electoral majority but also triggered a coalition between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), which was mischaracterized as a "Government of National Unity" (GNU).
93. Unlike the 1994 GNU, which was a product of negotiated settlement between political forces transitioning South Africa from apartheid to democracy, the 2024 ANC-DA coalition is a calculated political partnership aimed at maintaining power and preserving the status quo, particularly the protection of white capitalist interests. This coalition was presented as a GNU to obscure its true nature and to garner broader acceptance within the ANC's ranks, but it fundamentally differs from the genuine GNU of 1994.
94. The 1994 GNU, established under the terms of the Interim Constitution, was designed to include all political parties that won more than 20 seats in the National Assembly. The idea was to ensure national unity and reconciliation during the delicate transition from apartheid. In contrast, the 2024 coalition

between the ANC and DA is not motivated by national reconciliation or unity but by the ANC's loss of political dominance and the DA's desire to keep the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) out of government.

95. The mischaracterization of this arrangement as a GNU is a deliberate political strategy, as confirmed by DA Federal Chairperson Helen Zille, who revealed that she had an agreement with President Cyril Ramaphosa to form a coalition, but for those within the ANC who might oppose such an arrangement, the "Government of National Unity" label would make it more palatable.
96. In reality, this coalition serves the interests of both the ANC and DA by ensuring the continuation of economic policies that have favoured the minority white elite at the expense of the majority Black population.
97. Over the past three decades, the ANC has increasingly aligned itself with neoliberal policies that have perpetuated inequality, poverty, and unemployment. The DA's involvement in this coalition is intended to preserve the status quo, as it represents the interests of the white capitalist establishment. As Helen Zille herself admitted, the fear driving the DA's coalition with the ANC is the potential for the EFF to come to power and implement policies such as the expropriation of land without compensation—policies that would threaten the existing economic order.
98. The EFF has long been critical of the ANC's failure to transform South Africa's economic structure, accusing the party of being content with political power while the minority white elite continues to control the country's wealth. This coalition between the ANC and DA reinforces the EFF's critique that the ANC, despite holding political power, is acting as a "neo-colonial administrator" under the supervision of white capital. The coalition, driven by mutual fears of the EFF's progressive policies, is an attempt to safeguard the existing economic power structures and prevent any meaningful shift in the distribution of wealth and resources in the country.
99. For the EFF, entering into a coalition with the ANC and DA would have been a betrayal of its ideological principles and a political compromise of unimaginable proportions. The EFF chose to remain outside of this coalition, as participating in such an arrangement would have diluted its core mission of economic emancipation for Black South Africans.
100. The decision to stay out of government at the national level, if it meant entering a coalition with the DA and the Freedom Front Plus (VF Plus), was a strategic move by the EFF to preserve its political identity and avoid becoming complicit in a government that would maintain the very systems of oppression the party seeks to dismantle.

101. The 2024 coalition is primarily concerned with staving off the political threat posed by the EFF. The DA, in particular, has made it clear that its involvement in the coalition is driven by a desire to prevent the EFF from gaining any significant influence in government. In one of her speeches, Helen Zille explicitly stated that the fear among many white South Africans is that if the EFF were to gain power, it would pursue policies such as expropriation of land without compensation—policies that would fundamentally alter the economic landscape.
102. The ANC, despite its historical position as a liberation movement, has shown through its governance over the past 30 years that it is unwilling to undertake the radical economic transformation that the EFF advocates for. Instead, the ANC has become increasingly aligned with the interests of the white capitalist class, further entrenching economic inequality.
103. The continued mischaracterization of the ANC-DA coalition as a GNU is not only misleading but also an attempt to obscure the coalition's true purpose. Unlike the 1994 GNU, which brought together a wide range of political forces to transition South Africa from apartheid to democracy, the 2024 coalition is a tactical alliance between two parties that have historically represented different segments of South African society.
104. The ANC, once the champion of the oppressed, has found itself in a coalition with the DA, a party widely perceived as representing the interests of the white minority. This partnership serves as a means for both parties to maintain power, but it offers little in terms of real solutions to the country's pressing issues of poverty, unemployment, and inequality.
105. In conclusion, the ANC-DA coalition government of 2024 is fundamentally different from the Government of National Unity formed in 1994. It is not a coalition based on national unity or reconciliation but a partnership of political convenience aimed at maintaining the status quo and preventing the rise of the EFF. The EFF's decision to remain outside of this coalition underscores its commitment to radical economic transformation and its unwillingness to compromise its ideological principles. As South Africa enters this new era of coalition politics, it is clear that the ANC and DA's coalition will be judged not by its ability to maintain power but by its willingness—or lack thereof—to address the deep-seated economic inequalities that continue to plague the nation.

D. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

106. The EFF will inevitably face difficult questions about its participation in governance, especially in light of the significant changes currently taking place in South Africa's political landscape. The challenges posed by coalition politics, the declining power of liberation movements, and the complex economic realities in the country require the EFF to carefully consider its future strategies.

There are critical questions that demand serious attention if the EFF is to maintain its ideological integrity while remaining a relevant force in governance.

107. At the core of these considerations is the question of power-sharing agreements. The EFF has positioned itself as a revolutionary party, unwilling to compromise its core principles for the sake of political convenience. However, as coalition politics become more common at both local and national levels, the EFF must grapple with the challenge of entering into governance arrangements without losing its political identity. The 2024 National and Provincial Elections brought the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA) into an unprecedented coalition, one that was mischaracterized as a Government of National Unity (GNU). The EFF chose not to participate in this arrangement, recognizing that such an alliance would undermine its revolutionary agenda and dilute its commitment to economic emancipation. The decision to abstain from participation in the GNU raises the question of whether the EFF should continue this approach or seek other forms of power-sharing agreements that do not compromise its principles, appreciating that governing with party like the DA will inherently compromise the EFF and is far greater compromise without any home of equilly greater return.
108. The EFF must also address the practical challenges of governing in a manner that distinguishes it from the ANC and other political parties. In areas where the EFF has been given the opportunity to govern, there must be a clear focus on structural reforms and effective service delivery. The failures of previous governments, particularly in areas such as corruption, mismanagement, and inefficiency, must be avoided. This requires the EFF to implement governance strategies that are not only ideologically sound but also technically efficient. The question, then, is how the EFF can balance its revolutionary objectives with the need for practical, day-to-day governance. The party must consider what structural reforms are necessary to ensure that governance under the EFF is characterized by efficiency, transparency, and a commitment to improving the lives of ordinary South Africans.
109. Another key consideration is the strategic targeting of municipalities and provinces where the EFF can have the most impact in the shortest amount of time. As the political landscape becomes increasingly fragmented, with coalition governments becoming the norm, the EFF must carefully select areas where it can assert its influence and demonstrate the effectiveness of its governance. The party must identify municipalities where it can implement its policies swiftly and effectively, thereby showcasing its ability to govern in a way that is distinct from other political parties. This strategy will be critical as the EFF prepares to take power on a larger scale.
110. The question of coalition management also requires serious consideration. As coalitions become more prevalent, particularly in hung councils and at the provincial level, the EFF must develop a strategy for managing these complex


political arrangements. The establishment of a dedicated technical unit to oversee coalition dynamics and provide strategic guidance is a proposal that merits careful consideration. Such a unit would ensure that the EFF is able to navigate coalition politics without being drawn into arrangements that compromise its ideological stance. This is particularly important as the party seeks to expand its influence and govern in areas where coalition governments are the norm.

E. CONCLUSION

111. In conclusion, the EFF must develop a decisive and balanced strategy for its future participation in governance. This strategy must be rooted in the party's revolutionary principles and commitment to economic emancipation, while also taking into account the practical realities of coalition politics and governance. The EFF cannot afford to put convenience over principles, as doing so would undermine its credibility and long-term viability as a political force. Instead, the party must strive to craft a strategy that not only stands the test of time but also ensures that the EFF remains true to its core mission of transforming South Africa's economic and political landscape. The decisions made in response to the difficult questions posed in the "What is to be done?" section will ultimately determine the future trajectory of the EFF and its role in shaping the governance of South Africa.

JUSTICE, PEACE AND SECURITY

DISCUSSION DOCUMENTS



JUSTICE, PEACE AND SECURITY

Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have acted; the indifference of those who should have known better; the silence of the voice of justice when it mattered most; that has made it possible for evil to triumph."

- Haile Selassie

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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Founding Manifesto of the Economic Freedom Fighters defines the EFF as;

"a radical, leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement with an internationalist outlook anchored by popular grassroots formations and struggles. The EFF will be the vanguard of community and workers' struggles and will always be on the side of the people. The EFF will, with determination and consistency, associate with the protest movement in South Africa and will also join in struggles that defy unjust laws."

2. Our philosophical interpretation of society is guided Marxism-Leninism and Fanonian School of thought. Our interpretation of Justice and our quest for it must be firmly understood from this background.
3. The idea of justice, peace and security, understood from this context, would inevitably lead to this question, "justice, peace and security for whom?"
4. To help us answer this question, it is important to understand the State itself, its origins and its contemporary role in the pursuit of the idea of justice, peace and security.
5. The conclusion we will inevitably reach at the end is that in its present form, the State is incapable of guaranteeing justice, peace and security for all.
6. In his seminal work on "The origin of the Family, Private Property and the State", Frederick Engels appositely noted;

"The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it 'the reality of the ethical idea', 'the image and reality of reason', as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state."³³

³³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, pp. 326-27)

7. As a socialist organisation, the EFF must examine law, justice and the legal system in the context of the role it plays as a component of the state. Law is an expression of state power.
8. Understood from the context outlined by Engels above, and from the wisdom of Vladimir Lenin so impeccably stated in "The State and the Revolution", the State in a capitalist society becomes an invaluable tool at the hands of the bourgeoisie for the oppression and suppression of the working class.
9. Lenin teaches us that the state cannot be neutral. It is an instrument of class rule and it must invariably and by definition pursue the interests of the ruling class. In a capitalist state, such as South Africa, the law serves the interests of the capitalist class.
10. The development of our legal system since 1994 enhances this view. The lack of appetite to more acutely accentuate the irreconcilability of the interests of the colonizer and the native, of the dispossessor and the dispossessed, of the bourgeoisie and the working class; which is deeply embedded in the Constitution, can only lead to permanent tensions in society.
11. The EFF cannot be a fence-sitter, and cannot afford to perpetuate the idea of equivalence of interests between classes in a capitalist, neo-colonial State such as ours. The Founding Manifesto clearly outlines who are the beneficiaries of the revolution we are waging, and our approach to the justice question must have these motive forces of our revolution at the centre of our imagination.
12. The Founding Manifesto firmly affirms that those who stand to benefit from our revolution are:

"The working class, South Africans who do not own the means of production, the dejected masses, the homeless, hopeless youth, the rural and urban poor, the informal settlement dwellers, the unemployed and underemployed population, the discriminated and undermined professionals of all races, constitute the core component of those Economic Freedom Fighters seek to emancipate from economic and social subjugation and oppression. EFF characterisation of South Africa is that it is racialised capitalism, which historically and currently placing the black majority, and Africans in particular at the lower end of society."³⁴
13. The discussion and proposals that follow are rooted in this ideological posture of the EFF.

³⁴ Founding Manifesto

B. CONSTITUTION VS THE SUPREMACY OF PARLIAMENT.

14. South Africa as a country in the western conception of a country came to being on 31 May 1910, after the adoption of the Union of South Africa Act in 1909, which unified the two former British colonies, the Cape Colony and Natal, together with the two Boer Republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.
15. The Anglo-Boer war, or more accurately, the South African war, preceded the formation of South Africa as we know it today. Its conclusion with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging, signified racial unity amongst the divergent settler colonial communities in South Africa, and the condemnation of Africans into a permanent periphery in the affairs of the territory.
16. Clause 8 of the Treaty stated that "the question of granting franchise to natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government."³⁵ So the end of the war, and discussions that ensued about the nature of the Union State that was to be formed explicitly excluded African people, who were already at the time a dispossessed and landless people. All the four colonies were now under British control, and talks ensued about unifying all of them under one government through the National Convention.
17. Central to the discussions at the National Convention, which was of course a convention of European settlers, was whether a resultant Union government would be unitary or a federation, taking into account the so called cultural and religious differences between the settler communities in the territories.
18. The exclusion of natives in the discussions leading up to, and the decision of the establishment of South Africa as a country would suggest that South Africa as a country, and her attendant institutions and laws, have no legitimacy in as far as natives are concerned. On this, Devenish notes:

"The exclusion of all persons of colour from participating in the National Convention meant that the South Africa Act was in essence a constitution devised exclusively by Whites and imposed on all the Non-whites of South Africa. In the colonial world order of 1910, the South Africa Act, carrying the imprimatur of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster, did not lack respectability or legitimacy. With the passing of the old colonial order, after the Second World War and the onset of decolonization, the South Africa Act was to be viewed in a different constitutional perspective, in that it had created a highly oligarchic and racist constitution, which is apparent from the population figures of the

³⁵ Treaty of Vereeniging (1902)

time. The total population in 1910 was approximately 6 000 000 persons of whom 4 000 000 were Africans, 500 000 were Coloured persons and 150 000 Indians. The remaining 1 250 000 were Whites, whose representatives determined the constitutional framework in which the destiny of approximately 6 000 000 inhabitants and their descendants was to be worked out.³⁶

19. The Convention went on to develop a Constitution that affirmed parliamentary sovereignty over constitutional supremacy. The courts were given limited powers to interfere with the decisions of Parliament, particularly in terms of their powers to review legislation passed by parliament. These review powers were only applicable in so far as checking compliance with the procedure for passing legislation, and not with the substance of legislation passed. All this culminated in the passing of the South Africa Act of 1909, the first constitution of a brand new republic.
20. The move away from Parliamentary Sovereignty to Constitutional Supremacy is a creation of the negotiated settlement between the former liberation movement and the settlers.
21. At its core, the replacing of the sovereignty of parliament with the supremacy of the Constitution seeks to create a constitutional hegemony in terms of which the conduct of all must be subjected to the Constitution.
22. This gives the Constitution and the Courts the ultimate power to review and set aside all legislation and conduct that is viewed to be outside of the prescripts of the Constitution.
23. This poses an immediate dilemma for the democratic project. The extent to which the State can carry out its work is already prescribed by the Constitution. This power, taken away from public representatives and given to an unelected strata called judges, is sometimes problematic for nascent democracies.
24. The strong judicial review powers granted to the Courts create the counter-majoritarian dilemma, which solidifies the Constitutional authority of the courts to have 'final and unreviewable authority' to make determinations about the constitutionality of legislations passed by parliaments, and whether these are valid and enforceable. In regimes with strong judicial reviews, Constitutional courts are given powers of invalidation, and their decisions are final.

³⁶ GE Devendish 'The South African Act Revisited: Some Constitutional and Political Reflections on Lessons Learnt from the Centenary of the Union of South Africa in 1910' (2011) *Obiter*

25. In contrast, weak forms of judicial review do not grant courts this sort of power. While courts in weak judicial review contexts are empowered to deliberate on constitutional review of legislation, their judgements do not enjoy the same authority as courts from strong judicial review environments.
26. Underlying these challenges to judicial authority is the notion that as an unelected authority, the courts are not accountable to the public as politicians are, and ought not to use their authority to invalidate legislative decisions taken by those elected.
27. The classical separation of government powers between the legislature which makes the law, the executive which implements the law, and the judiciary which interprets the law is always a tenuous one, and that to help insulate the judiciary, there must be attempts to ensure its independence. By independence of the judiciary, we mean that there must be two elements present. The first one is that judges ought to be free from government control, pressure or influence while performing their judicial functions. The second guarantor of judicial independence is that judges themselves must perform their roles impartially, without personal, political, or religious biases.
28. Both elements necessary for the independence of the judiciary are under threat if the courts are endowed with strong judicial review authority. This is because such strong judicial review mandate inevitably leads to judges having to adjudicate on politically tainted decisions, and that puts them on a collision course with elected politicians. When courts have powers to veto legislative decision, this power inadvertently gives the courts massive authority over political decisions. For new democracies, this sort of power may hinder, instead of deepening democratic practices. The courts become a contested terrain politically, and even the appointment of judges becomes tainted in politics.
29. This National People's Assembly ought to reflect seriously on the continued desirability of Constitutional supremacy in light of the growing resistance to change by those embedded in the State and resistance to transformation by the settler minority, which often uses the courts to stifle progress, or to completely stall transformative changes in society.

C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE

30. The dilemma highlighted above inevitably makes access to justice to be mediated through the prism of class and race in South Africa.
31. While there are a few cases in which the courts have ruled in favour of making socio-economic rights widely available to poor people, i.e,

Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (4 October 2000); the reality is that in the main, the majority have no access to justice in the country. Mrs Grootboom herself died without ever having access to the house that the Courts ruled she was entitled to.

32. A key impediment to access to justice is the unaffordability of legal representation to the vast majority of the population. This differential access to justice is based on race and on class. Blacks in the majority are unable to get even the minimum benefits prescribed by the current Constitution, because there is not strong culture of legally representing blacks in courts, save for a few public benefit law institutions, established and still run by whites. These institutions can never litigate for consequences that would radically alter the socio-economic landscape in the country.
33. The same applies to questions of criminal accountability. Most of the crime is perpetrated on black people, and very few of these crimes are ever prosecuted, largely because the investigative and prosecutorial capacity of the State suddenly gets weakened when it has to serve black people.
34. In this regard, it is important for the EFF to advocate for the expansion and capacitation of Legal Aid, to ensure that there is quality representation of those who do not have money to pay for litigation. The means test applied by Legal Aid to determine affordability ought to be done away with completely. The black working class, even those who earn above the limit set by Legal Aid, cannot afford to pay for private representation.
35. Similar to the work done of de-commodifying health and education, there should be a targeted attempt to de-commodify legal representation in the country.
36. The goal must be a single justice system, in which everyone has equal access. This calls on a careful reconsideration of the role of traditional courts and the regressive role they sometimes play in eroding some of the rights a progressive society aspires for.
37. A justice system rooted in a socialist conception of society is our ultimate goal.
38. This will also require the strengthening of the National Prosecuting Authority and its directorates, such as the Asset Forfeiture Unit, Specialised Commercial Crimes, Sexual Offences, and Community Affairs, as well as all other essential directorates.
39. This will also require the appointment of the Head of the NPA to be made by a democratically elected Parliament rather than the President, who the

NPA may still need to decide on whether to prosecute or not, ensuring accountability and impartiality.

40. Furthermore, it means that we must continue to advocate for the strengthening of Chapter 9 institutions, including the Public Protector, South African Human Rights Commission, and the Commission for Gender Equality, to safeguard democracy and ensure justice.
41. The other addition that should be considered is the appointment of members of the judiciary. The Judicial Services Commission's recommendations must be sent to the National Assembly for finalisation and appointment, instead of leaving these decisions in the hands of the President.

D. ON PEACE AND SECURITY

42. Similarly, the approach to dealing with crime must be rooted in this vision. One of the very first factors we must acknowledge is that the excessive levels of crime in this country are a product of offensively abnormal socio-economic inequalities.
43. The majority of those who suffer the ignominious effects of crime are also poor in their majority. There is a correlation, but that should not limit attempts to fight against the scourge of crime in the country.
44. Our criminal justice system is anything but a justice system. Access to a fair justice system executed without fear or favour is only a luxury enjoyed by the rich in this country.
45. In the 30 years of a democratic State, we have also witnessed a deliberate dumbing down of institutions of the criminal justice system. The police, who are at the coal face of fighting crime have become factionalised and despondent, they are overwhelmed by the extent of crimes in our society. More disturbing, they are used to take sides in ANC factional battles. This has largely contributed to their inability to fight the emerging scourge of extortion in the country.
46. As a consequence, apart from the judiciary, every other arm of the criminal justice system have been captured by the corrosive influence of politicians and are used to fight factional battles, leaving millions of South Africans vulnerable to pervasive criminality.
47. There is therefore an urgent need to reform policing in the country, to capacitate the police, root out corrupt elements within the police, and to completely delink policing from day to day politicking.

48. The National Prosecuting Authority also needs deep vacuum cleaning to exorcise the spirit of factional prosecutions and sheer incompetence at the highest levels.
49. The primary outlook of the EFF is to ensure that the system is corrective and rehabilitative rather than punitive. Further, the correctional services system must be transformed to include compulsory education and skilling for all inmates. This must be followed by the time expiry of criminal records, depending on the nature of the crime and work done after imprisonment. This will ensure the proper reintegration of ex-offenders as productive and law-abiding citizens.
50. An important component of not condemning inmates to a life of stigmatisation and crime must include a specific focus on programmes aimed at juvenile offenders with the aim of ensuring their non-return to correctional facilities.
51. The bail system must be abolished for minor crimes and strengthened for serious crimes with a specific emphasis on sexual offences and violent crimes.

E. IMMIGRATION

52. The issue of immigration has often been deliberately distorted by those who seek to paint the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) as proponents of lawlessness. Critics frequently invoke the term "open borders" in an attempt to discredit the EFF's stance, implying that the party advocates for unregulated migration and chaos at South Africa's borders. However, this misrepresentation does not align with the EFF's actual position on immigration, which is clearly outlined in the party's Founding Manifesto.
53. The EFF's perspective on immigration is rooted in solidarity with the oppressed across the African continent. The Founding Manifesto explicitly states that the EFF will champion the cause of all immigrants, particularly economic migrants and asylum seekers, whether they are in the country legally or not. This is not a call for lawlessness, but a recognition of the harsh realities faced by many Africans who are forced to flee their home countries due to economic deprivation, conflict, or persecution. Most of these immigrants come to South Africa in search of better opportunities and safety, but their treatment by the police, government institutions, and society at large is deeply troubling.
54. African immigrants in South Africa are often denied access to basic services such as healthcare, face discrimination from both government officials and ordinary citizens, and in some instances, are even refused the dignity of a proper burial. This treatment is particularly ironic, given the fact that many

African countries provided refuge and support to South African liberation fighters during the apartheid era, and numerous South Africans are buried across the continent. The EFF's stance is firm: the rights and dignity of immigrants must be protected, and this commitment is non-negotiable.

55. The EFF's position on immigration must be understood within the broader context of African unity and integration. The party is committed to the idea of a borderless African continent, where free trade, movement of people, and the ultimate elimination of unnecessary borders are achieved through consensus and mutual agreement among African states. This does not imply an unregulated, chaotic system, but rather a structured and progressive move towards continental integration, driven by economic cooperation and shared development goals.

56. It is critical that EFF activists, as well as the broader public, understand this nuanced perspective. The portrayal of the EFF as advocating for "open borders" is a deliberate misrepresentation aimed at undermining the party's commitment to Pan-Africanism and solidarity with the oppressed. The challenge for the EFF is to ensure that its position on immigration is communicated clearly, so that those who seek to distort the party's message for their own benefit can be effectively countered. Immigration policy, in this context, becomes a vital part of the EFF's broader vision for African liberation and unity.

F. ON CRIME AND POLICING

57. Crime in South Africa has become an endemic issue, with the police force seemingly incapable of addressing the crisis. Despite government interventions and various policing strategies over the years, certain police stations consistently rank among the highest for violent crimes, including murder, rape, and gender-based violence. This systemic failure is most evident in areas such as Inanda Police Station in eThekweni, which regularly features in the top 10 for murder, and Lusikisiki in the Eastern Cape, which is notorious for rape. Thohoyandou in Limpopo is another area where gender-based violence, particularly rape, has reached alarming levels. The continued presence of these police stations in crime statistics over many years indicates that the problem is not simply a matter of inadequate resources or poor leadership, but a deeper structural issue within the South African Police Services (SAPS).

58. The EFF's assessment of the SAPS is that it is failing to serve the interests of the poor and marginalized, who are disproportionately affected by violent crime. Women and children, particularly in rural and township areas, are at the highest risk of gender-based violence, yet the police often fail to respond adequately. This failure is compounded by corruption within the police force, political interference, and factionalism that distracts from the

core mandate of the police—protecting citizens and maintaining law and order.

59. Proposals for discussion include the need for a comprehensive reform of the SAPS. The police force must be professionalized, with clear standards of accountability and competence that are enforced without political interference. This would involve a rigorous process of vetting and training, ensuring that officers are equipped to handle the complex social and economic issues that contribute to crime. Corruption, which is rampant within the SAPS, must be rooted out through the establishment of an independent oversight body that is free from political manipulation. This body would have the authority to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption within the police force, ensuring that officers who are implicated in criminal activities are held accountable.
60. Furthermore, the relationship between the police and the communities they serve must be transformed. Community policing, where local residents work alongside the police to identify and address the root causes of crime, should be a central pillar of the new policing strategy. This approach would not only rebuild trust between the police and communities but also provide valuable insights into the specific challenges that different areas face. The involvement of communities in crime prevention efforts would create a more responsive and effective police force that is better equipped to tackle the unique crime dynamics in different regions.
61. Another critical area for reform is the investigative and prosecutorial capacity of the police, particularly in cases of gender-based violence. Too often, cases of rape and domestic violence are mishandled or neglected, resulting in victims being denied justice. The EFF advocates for specialized units within the SAPS that focus exclusively on gender-based violence, with officers who are trained to handle such cases with sensitivity and professionalism. These units must be adequately resourced and supported by a justice system that prioritizes the prosecution of offenders.

G. DEFENCE

62. The collapse of South Africa's defence capabilities over the past 30 years is another symptom of the broader decline in state capacity under successive post-apartheid governments. Despite multiple defence reviews and strategic plans, South Africa's military infrastructure and human resources have been allowed to deteriorate to the point where the country is no longer capable of defending its sovereignty or playing a meaningful role in regional security. This is a deliberate outcome of systemic neglect, driven by a lack of political will and an unwillingness to invest in the necessary resources to maintain a capable defence force.

63. South Africa's defence infrastructure, which once stood as a symbol of regional military power, has been reduced to a shadow of its former self. The morale of the men and women who serve in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been eroded by poor living conditions, inadequate training, and a lack of modern equipment. The country's defence budget has been slashed repeatedly, leading to a situation where critical equipment is outdated or in disrepair, and essential training exercises are no longer conducted. This has left South Africa vulnerable to both external threats and internal instability, as the SANDF is unable to effectively respond to crises or fulfill its peacekeeping obligations within the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
64. Proposals for discussion must center around the revitalization of the SANDF. A comprehensive review of the defence budget is needed to ensure that the SANDF is adequately funded to carry out its mandate. This includes not only investing in modern equipment but also addressing the welfare of SANDF members. Soldiers should be provided with fair remuneration, proper housing, and access to healthcare and other essential services. The neglect of the human element within the SANDF has contributed to low morale and inefficiency, and this must be addressed as a priority.
65. Furthermore, there is a need to invest in local industries to support the development and maintenance of military equipment. South Africa has the potential to develop its own defence industry, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers and creating jobs in the process. This would require a coordinated effort between the government, private sector, and educational institutions to develop the necessary skills and technologies to build and maintain defence equipment locally.
66. The SANDF's role in regional security must also be reassessed. South Africa's position within the SADC requires a capable and well-resourced defence force that can participate in peacekeeping missions and respond to regional security threats. The current state of the SANDF, however, makes this difficult, and South Africa's influence in regional security affairs has diminished as a result. Strengthening the SANDF's capabilities would not only enhance national security but also re-establish South Africa as a leader in promoting peace and stability within the region.
67. These proposals aim to encourage a serious and informed debate on the future of South Africa's defence capabilities. The collapse of the SANDF is a national security risk that must be addressed through a combination of investment in human resources, infrastructure, and local defence industries.

H. ON GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

68. Chapter 9 Institutions provide an inexpensive outlet for the poor to access justice and to counteract state abuse and arrogance.

69. Accordingly, the EFF must ensure that the capacity of Chapter 9 Institutions is massively expanded, particularly the offices of the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission and the Gender Commission.
70. In addition to the judiciary, the legal profession and institutions of legal training must be transformed to reflect the demographics and social norms and values of the majority.
71. There is a dire need for transformation of the law profession. While ultimately we want this service to be de-commodified, at present, there is a need to drive deeper level transformation of the practice of the law. The State has not done much to change the briefing patterns for lawyers. Black lawyers are still excluded from many consequential cases in the country, even those cases litigated by the State itself.

I. CONCLUDING REMARKS

72. While we are fully alive to the inherent shortcomings of a legal system which is designed to perpetuate the oppression of black people, the working class and women, it is our revolutionary duty to exploit the gaps and opportunities which are available within that system in order to fundamentally change it.
73. The EFF must expand the political education of the masses to understand that the system needs a complete overhaul in the long-term but that it can be simultaneously used to achieve short-term gains for the oppressed.
74. It is in the management of these contradictions that the EFF policy on justice and participation in the structures of legislation-making and judicial adjudication must navigate.
75. The ultimate goal must remain the replacement of the current liberal constitution with a programme based on equality, justice and lasting peace. These ideals can only be achieved by the introduction of a socialist state and legal system.

SPORTS, ARTS AND CULTURE

DISCUSSION DOCUMENTS



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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The nature of the politics in South Africa in the Sports, Arts and Culture sectors is such that they remain characterized by the legacy of the Apartheid system. And while some of the sectors have shown signs of political change, this has not translated into economic benefit for the people who are in majority black, and African in particular. While rhetoric from the incumbent dominant class, white monopoly capital and their security guards, claims that these sectors have brought about "social cohesion", the reality on the ground could not be further from the rhetoric.
 - (a) Blatant racism has come back full swing, and social ills such as Gender-Based Violence have taken center stage.
 - (b) While improving Year-on-Year matric results has been focal in the past decade or so, the culture of Learning is not on the agenda
 - (c) More South Africans, especially black South Africans are falling ill from diseases previously not prevalent amongst them.
 - (d) More and more cities and towns are collapsing through decay and the culture of filth
2. These are ills of a system that placed no value a certain section of society. The Apartheid legacy which still influences society even in this 30yr old post-Apartheid democracy has left a distasteful footprint of a divided society.
3. In the Sport sector;
 - (a) Sport remains segregationist as it has remained exclusively white referenced
 - (b) Women Sports remains at the periphery as sports continues to be male dominated
 - (c) Sports facilities remain, especially in schools, an exclusively white privilege and
 - (d) Transformation is slow because much of it is reliant on white monopoly capital
4. In the Arts sector;
 - (a) there are still disparities between the old Apartheid dominant class and the marginalized who are black, and new phenomena are emerging as a direct result of the Apartheid segregatory regime
 - (b) Facilities such as Theatres, Movie Houses, Studios are still not accessible to the black Majority

- (c) Artists are still exploited by Production Houses, Collecting Agencies, Broadcasters etc.
- (d) Producers in the Music, Theatre, Television and Film disciplines are still struggling with resource to do their work. This included both funding and facilities
- (e) South Africa is struggling with a market that cannot support growing industries in Music, Visual and Audio-Visual Arts.

5. In the Heritage sector;

- (a) Apartheid Symbols remain in the mainstream of our Heritage. This includes Die Stem, Old Apartheid Statues, Old Apartheid streets, town and City Names, Names of rivers and other natural attractions.
- (b) Old Apartheid History is still being taught in schools, not the history that is biased and portrays cultures other than white as the drivers of our history.
- (c) The History of the San and the Khoe is still not taught in schools
- (d) Language and Technical Language have not been equalized to reflect the composition of our population. English and Afrikaans remain the media of instruction
- (e) Libraries are not equitably spread out throughout the country to include previously marginalized areas, and they must be filled with relevant content
- (f) There are not enough Art Galleries for artists to exhibit their works and for art to thrive.

6. And while South Africa is faced with an epic scourge of unemployment, the custodian of these sectors, the Department of Sports Arts and Culture has not centralized the responsibility of creating jobs for practitioners. We should be creating jobs in the following;

- (a) Fashion and textiles industry
- (b) Graphics Industry
- (c) Literature and Publishing
- (d) Visual arts
- (e) Audio and Audio-Visual industries
- (f) Music
- (g) Dance and Performance
- (h) Online Creators (Website and Online presence)

7. Moreover, the Department of Sports Arts and Culture has neglected the most crucial demand from the sectors it presides over, REGULATION. The EFF has put together the most comprehensive regulation plan and is in the process of processing it through the parliament procedures as a Member's Bill.
8. Overall, the Sports Arts and Culture sectors remain untransformed, and they are not geared towards the economic emancipation of a new democratic society. This document seeks to find ways to organize these sectors towards the transformations of these sectors into the new socialist agenda of equality and equitability.

B. ON THE ARTS

9. Marxist cultural activist and playwright, Bertolt Brecht on the verge of completing his lifetime theoretical work, the 'dialectical theatre', popularly known as 'epic theatre' argues that art at its highest form must inspire self-reflection in society. It must allow society to critique the world it lives in, and at all material times, inspire change towards an egalitarian community as opposed to an egotistical individual.
10. The EFF believes that the Arts in South Africa must reflect an equal society in which the artist can fully express themselves without the capture of capital. This can only happen when the artist is empowered with the tools of his/her trade and the means of production. To this end, the EFF proposes the following measures which satisfy both the aspirations of the current artist and producer but are also in line with the reality of a 'Government in waiting' posture. We propose the EFF establish the following bodies to manage the transformation of the Arts

C. NATIONAL ARTS AND CULTURE REGULATORY AGENCY (NACRA)

11. The industries in the Arts sector have been calling for a regulatory body to manage, regulate and professionalize them. The EFF is in the process of submitting a Members Bill in Parliament to this effect. We propose that this be a body enacted through an act of parliament and be accountable to the department. This body will;
 - i. Keep a register of all practitioners in the Arts

- ii. Keep a regularly updated register of all projects in the Arts and all details pertaining to them (e.g. BEE status, employees and remunerations, permits etc.)
- iii. Keep a register of all companies registered to do work in SA
- iv. Collect royalties for Artists and disburse them
- v. Facilitate financial services to artists and practitioners in the Arts sectors
- vi. Be the ombudsman for misconduct and abuse of all practitioners and where necessary act as mediator
- vii. Collect all necessary statistics of the sector and its activities and be the think tank of growth, development and job creation
- viii. Promote South African works, locally, in the continent and elsewhere.
- ix. Constantly and continuously seek partners both in Africa and elsewhere to develop the market for SA products.
- x. Establish state owned Music and Film Production Companies to produce works of national interest (e.g. Historical Films, Documentaries on National Heritage, digitizing historical music and other works)
- xi. Provide bursaries and education opportunists for aspirant practitioners
- xii. This Bill would naturally replace the National Arts Council Act

D. SUB-REGIONAL ARTS MANAGEMENT CENTRES

12. Sub-regional Arts Management Centers must be established to manage and facilitate Arts activities, facilities and personnel of the sub-region. The functions and responsibilities of the center must be;

- i. To manage statistics of all Arts activities in the sub-region on behalf of the NACRA and report directly to the National body.
- ii. To oversee the equitable establishment of music, film and television studios in the subregion, arts centers, community radio and television stations, etc. on the bases of ward distribution and be responsible for the management of those facilities.
- iii. To keep a register of all artists in its jurisdiction and manage arts activities in the area.
- iv. In essence, these two bodies would give into effect the EFF's 11yr old aspirations of Making sure the arts industry is well regulated
- v. Artists, especially women and children are treated fairly and within the constitution
- vi. Galleries, studios, arts centers and theatres are built equitably at grassroots level
- vii. A State-owned entity collects royalties on behalf of artists
- viii. State-Owned Music and Film production companies are established
- ix. Quotas for broadcasters to air Local Content are set at 75%

- x. Artists are assisted with contracts and strategic plans
- xi. Preference to local artists and companies to be adhered to.

E. FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE ARTS

13. The EFF must establish a State Owned or State Supported Financial Services tailored for the Arts Sectors. Because the Arts have a unique employment culture of mostly ad-hoc work, mainstream banking institutions find it difficult to offer financial services to artists and practitioners in those sectors. Because NACRA can provide a database, stats and trends in the Arts sectors, tailor-making services will now be made easier. The services will include

- i. Funeral Covers
- ii. Insurances including Life Covers
- iii. Medical Aids
- iv. Savings Plans etc.

14. These services are essential for the stability of artists in both the Music and Audiovisual arts.

F. ON SPORTS AND RECREATION

15. Sports and Recreation are another sector largely characterized by the legacy of inequality stemming from the Apartheid era. Segregation in these sectors has filtered into the democratic dispensation and is stubbornly continuing to define.

16. Most schools that are largely black in South Africa do not have sporting facilities. Those are reserved exclusively for previously white schools.

17. Indigenous sporting codes like stick fighting have not found their way into the mainstream sporting arena where they can be regulated and elevated.

18. Elitist sporting codes such as Rugby, Cricket and Hockey are flatly refusing to transform.

19. In all sporting codes, women are still not equal to their men counterparts. They do not receive the same support and remuneration for the same work they do.

20. The townships in general do not have sporting facilities.

21. This chapter seeks to find practical ways to transform these codes and equalize the disparities found in the sector. Like in the Arts and Culture sector, the challenges we encounter in Sports and Recreation are persistent since the inception of the EFF.

G. FACILITIES IN TOWNSHIPS AND RURAL AREAS

22. The EFF still commits to;

- i. Establish multipurpose centers and gym facilities equitably in townships and rural areas. These shall be ward based
- ii. Establish at least one multipurpose stadium in each region to accommodate local sporting codes specific to the area.
- iii. Establish a database of ward-based coaches and instructors to manage these facilities and run programs

H. EQUALISATION OF WOMEN'S SPORTS

23. The EFF will;

- i. Ensure an increase of women participation in sports and in different sporting codes.
- ii. Partner with a myriad of sponsors and businesses to ensure an equal if not more remuneration of women in professional sports.
- iii. Ensure equal broadcast of women sports as that of men's sports.

24. But while the EFF is not yet in Government, the EFF should find creative ways to pressurize clubs to pay women equally through the courts. The EFF should investigate possible ways to achieve this.

I. TRANSFORMATION OF ELITE SPORTING CODES.

25. The EFF government should establish a Sports Transformation Agency empowered to establish transformation quotas with different sporting codes and establish timelines.

26. This should be done in consultation with the sporting codes but not in their own terms. Failure to comply must result in certain penalties within the legal jurisdictions of government.

27. Alternatively, government should, in conjunction with its own agencies, establish alternative teams which will be later adopted as National Teams. These teams must be equipped with all the expertise and the independence to do their work while government finds ways to convert them into national outfits.

28. This strategy will require a long-term view and government agency will time and resource to build formidable national teams from the ground up. Incubation will be highly necessary and a thorough process of talent searching will require a very skilled team to be resourced

J. ON HERITAGE

29. It is a fact that there are more Apartheid statues and historic ornaments still displayed around South Africa than progressive post-1994 objects. \

30. The EFF government must do the following:

K. REMOVAL OF APARTHEID SYMBOLS

31. Remove Die Stem from the National Anthem and replace it with another Afrikaans song that is in line with the principles of a new democratic society.

32. Remove Apartheid statues and other historical ornaments and instead place them in the "Never Again Museum" which will be established by the EFF

33. Rename all street names that still bear the characters and concepts of Apartheid

34. Rename all the town City names that still bear the characters and concepts of Apartheid

35. Rename all the rivers, mountains and other natural objects of interest that still bear the characters and concepts of Apartheid.

L. HISTORY

36. The EFF must rewrite history from the Apartheid-biased account to a more balanced and honest history with no agenda

37. This history must be infused into the classrooms and be taught to the learners of this new society

38. The EFF must unearth and archive the History of the San and the Khoi people, archive it and provide it to learners for purposes of official education.

- 39. The EFF must memorialize all legitimate history of South Africa into modern platforms through audiovisual productions using authentic South African
- 40. All historical music and audiovisual projects must be digitized and banked in a platform that is accessible to society through modern means
- 41. The EFF government must memorialize all icons of our history through audiovisual productions, including musicians and performers, to allow generations to come to experience the history

M. LANGUAGE

- 42. The EFF must ensure that indigenous languages are elevated in institutions of learning to be the preferred mediums of instruction
- 43. The EFF government must include Sign Language and the languages of the San and the Khoi as official languages
- 44. The EFF must fast track and settle the process of translating indigenous languages into technical subjects such as Science and Mathematics

N. OTHER INDUSTRIES

- 45. The EFF must support the local textiles industry which has the potential of creating thousands of jobs around the country. The EFF must:
- 46. Revive the textiles industries that were decimated post-1994, Industries that existed in the Free State, in North West and in KZN
- 47. Support local fashion designers with Fashion shows that can be managed through the Sub-regional Arts Management Agencies.
- 48. Support the introduction of Fashion Studies throughout all Universities and institutions of higher learning.
- 49. At least 80% of textiles products in the retail space must be produced locally and by at least 75% black companies with an emphasis on Women and Youth

O. ADVERTISING AND ONLINE CREATIVES

50. Advertising keeps growing as new platforms emerge on the online community is growing and new platforms are emerging, online creatives increasingly need to be monitored. The ownership patterns in above-the-line advertising are not changing. White people still control the lion's share of the advertising space. This has meant That advertising is sometimes skewed in it view against black people, or its irrelevant to much of the market.

51. In an EFF government;

- i. In addition to monitoring content, ICASA must be empowered to monitor the ownership patterns in the advertising arena
- ii. At least 75% of Outdoor Advertising facilities must be owned by Black people, with an emphasis on youth and women
- iii. At least 75% of advertising projects above-the-line must be produced by Black companies, with an emphasis on youth and women
- iv. Advertising and Online Creatives must find expression in the NACRA platform
- v. Advertising and online creatives practitioners have a right to complain to NACRA about Racist or favoritist behavior towards them or their colleagues.

P. ON CULTURE

52. In the current government controlled by white monopoly capital and their security guards, there is no concerted agenda to preserve and protect the fundamental cultures that exist in South Africa, and to encourage new cultures that are in line with the new societal contract of a democratic dispensation. Social Cohesion is not an event, it is a culture built deliberately and over time by a patient government presiding over a conscious society

53. The EFF government must concertedly encourage political and economic consciousness in society. This must be done through long-term and patient campaigns in societal, educational, religious and business spaces. A conscious nation helps government to achieve goals and it the Department of Arts and "Culture", the custodians of 'Culture' who must drive this cause. In Cuba, it is a conscious society that has helped its government to stand against imperialism. In Rwanda, it is a conscious society that has helped the government to keep Kigali clean when it was on the verge of total collapse.

54. Culture is often neglected as a political deliverable, but it is the cornerstone of what here in South Africa we call nation building. It is at the core of building the fourth arm of the state, the people. A responsible state takes responsibility of that space and consciously builds a society that is ready for the new agenda, in our case, the agenda of the National Democratic Revolution.

55. In an EFF Government;

- i. All the cultures in South Africa must be preserved for future reference as culture evolves through the years. This must never be done with the intention of stagnating culture.
- ii. New cultures that are relevant to a developmental state must be cultivated are The Culture of Learning and self-development, the Culture of Healthy Living, Political Consciousness including Voter Education, and Responsible manhood rid of Gender-Based Violence

56. As society progresses, many new problems will require new innovative solutions from a combat-ready society. The EFF must prepare the South African society for such a time.

Q. ON JOB CREATION

57. Sports, Arts and Culture sectors have always been seen as potential job creators, yet no concerted efforts have been made to elevate that potential into a reality. The EFF understands that job creation is not an event, it is the culmination of long-term strategies, deliberate opportunities created and political will to execute. In the Sports, Arts and Culture, the EFF is emphatic on building facilities at grassroots level, where training and nurturing must begin. Our complimentary pillar No1 speaks of decentralization, the ability to create opportunities in new places. Massive industrialization is also a major pillar of our job creation strategy. This is how these concepts find expression in the Sports Arts and Culture arena

58. In Sports, the EFF must build new multi-purpose Sports centers for competitive sports. Each provincial demarcation must have one major such a facility. Biannual events must be organized every year in all the provincial demarcations where sub regional teams must compete in a myriad of sporting codes. These events must be well-resourced, well-marketed and must work towards self-sustainability

59. SA must encourage Regional events for the SADC region the Southern Countries compete in all the sporting codes. Currently, Africa competes very minimally as a continent, and this is in very few sporting codes such as in football. Other sporting codes such as Rugby, Cricket, other Olympic Sporting codes and original Indigenous games receive no attention at all. Much more resource needs to go into the All-Africa-Games events and the preparations thereto.
60. The development of new sporting codes such as Stick Fighting is essential both for job creation and cultural preservation. The EFF government must make an effort in harvesting these indigenous codes and mainstreaming them.
61. In the Arts, the EFF government must move quickly to remove the red tape in the creation of community TV and Radio Stations. Currently the process of applying for a license in these two disciplines is too cumbersome and too expensive for communities. It must be mandatory for every subregion to have a radio-station, and for every-region to have a TV station, well-resourced and well-marketed. Not only will these facilities become a platform for artists in Music, Film and Television to showcase their work, but they will also be perfect platforms for crucial information dissemination. This will also help to decentralize the concentration of these platforms from the three hubs, JHB, CPT and DBN. People will be able to practice their craft closer to their area of residence.
62. Building well-equipped sound studios in every sub-region will allow musicians and other sound producers to create new work in their areas of residence. Equally, creating Television and Film Studios in every region will allow Film and Television practitioners to produce new work that is relevant to their area. In the sub-regional, regional and national ecosystem, new work is created which creates new jobs.
63. In the context of dwindling markets for the entertainment industries, it is crucial for South Africa to find new markets in the continent of Africa. The bigger markets in Nigeria, DRC, Ghana and Kenya are waiting to be harvested. Political will is needed to forge relations to facilitate access to these markets. Agreements between South Africa and these countries could lead to creation of viable platforms in the markets, a launchpad for a huge export market for the country and the creation of thousands of jobs

64. The EFF Government must take it upon itself to tell the history of South Africa through audiovisual platforms. This is a massive project as it involves the re-research of the history as it was never told correctly by Apartheid whose agenda was to portray Africans as barbaric. This history will go into the archives and contribute to education. Then thousands of people will be employed to convert this work into audiovisual formats for commercial reasons, or for archival and educational purposes
65. Arts in Tourism is another area in which job creation has potential in South Africa. There are many places of tourism that are failing to attract tourists because they have failed to create attraction to their destination. The Arts have in the past assisted greatly in turning around these places. South Africa must develop a strategy to attach the arts to all the tourists destinations and find sustainable ways to maintain those marriages
66. In Fashion and Textiles, the EFF Government must support the revival of the textiles market by finding new markets in Africa, raising tariffs on imports, industrializing, creating new jobs and protecting them.
67. The retail markets in South Africa is ordering products from China and Europe, and with good reason, those countries have made a good offer to retailers here. South Africa must not complain and compete robustly for these markets, failing which, the government must assist in creating competing retailers. The point is that the retail market must assist in job creation by procuring to local textiles companies. Without that intervention, it is impossible to create jobs in the fashion and textiles industries.

R. IN CONCLUSION

68. Sports Arts and Culture is an area that has been neglected for far too long in this post-Apartheid era. The ANC has treated the sector as an unwanted child over the 30yrs of its government. Problems have accumulated over this time and now things have come to a head.
69. The sectors must now be fixed. Problems of transformation and regulation have plagued Sports Arts and Culture, and government has just not heeded.
70. The EFF has the responsibility of fixing the sectors and revert them to the agents of change that they've come to be known as in the run-up to 1994. It is also a known fact that the Arts have a potential of job creation, but they

cannot realize that goal until political will fixes the sector. This document sought to achieve this from a Marxist-Leninist-Fanonist and Pan-Africanist perspective of the EFF. Our policies as the organization are well-suited to address all the problems faced by practitioners in Sports Arts and Culture.



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